Ryan Patrick Rucker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 20, 2017
• Docket: 35A02-1705-CR-956
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 20 2017, 10:27 am

regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Ryan Patrick Rucker Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana Carlisle, Indiana George P. Sherman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ryan Patrick Rucker, November 20, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 35A02-1705-CR-956 v. Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 35C01-1110-FA-217

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 1 of 4 Case Summary [1] Ryan Patrick Rucker appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous

sentence. Because there is no error on the face of the sentencing judgment, we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In August 2011, Rucker and his wife were visiting friends in Huntington

County. Rucker entered the bedroom of his friends’ sleeping eight-year-old

daughter, pulled down her underwear, and licked her vagina. The child awoke

and told him to stop.

[3] The State charged Rucker with class A felony child molesting. The parties

entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Rucker pled guilty, with his

sentence set at twenty-five years executed and no probation. During the March

2012 guilty plea hearing, the State established a factual basis, and the trial court

accepted Rucker’s guilty plea. In May 2012, the court issued a judgment

sentencing Rucker according to the terms of the plea agreement.

[4] In March 2017, Rucker filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, asserting

that his sentence was illegal and “the result of an illusory plea that propagated

an invalid plea of guilty made under a false pretense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2

at 57. The trial court denied Rucker’s motion, as well as his subsequent motion

to correct error. Rucker now appeals.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 2 of 4 Discussion and Decision [5] We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence using

an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2012). A motion to correct erroneous sentence is a statutory matter,

derived from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, which states,

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

The statute provides “prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process

for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State,

805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537

(Ind. 1991)). A motion to correct sentence is appropriate only when the

sentence is “erroneous on its face.” Id. at 786. This means that “a motion to

correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear

from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory

authority.” Id. at 787. “As to sentencing claims not facially apparent, the

motion to correct sentence is an improper remedy. Such claims may be raised

only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by postconviction proceedings.”

Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 3 of 4 [6] Here, the judgment shows that Rucker was convicted of class A felony child

molesting and sentenced to twenty-five years executed, with zero years

suspended. The sentencing range for a class A felony is twenty to fifty years,

with an advisory term of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). Thus, Rucker’s

sentence is within the term allowed by statute for his offense. In other words,

there simply is no error on the face of the judgment. Rucker’s arguments are

framed in terms of the face of the record or the face of the waiver or plea agreement

and seem to implicate the voluntariness of his plea. These arguments are not

properly presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As such,

the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his motion. Accordingly,

we affirm.

[7] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 4 of 4