RYAN P. WALTERS, an Individual v. State of California, by and through the California Highway Patrol, Beau Biter, Enrique Ayala, John Betz, and Brandon Urrutia

District Court, C.D. California·Decided January 14, 2026·No. 8:24-cv-00196·Unknown

Opinion

Attorney General of California ELIZABETH S. ANGRES Supervising Deputy Attorney General HAIYANG A. LI Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 288063 300 So. Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Telephone: (213) 269-6404 Facsimile: (916) 731-2120 E-mail: Haiyang.Li@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendants State of California, by and through the California Highway Patrol, Beau Biter, Enrique Ayala, John Betz, and Brandon Urrutia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN P. WALTERS, an Individual, Case No. 8:24-cv-00196 MWF-DFM Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER v. DISCOVERY MATTER STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

TO THE HONORABLE COURT: 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action involves production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets for the procedures that must be following and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. This action involves confidential, proprietary or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential, proprietary and private materials and information consist of, among other things confidential and private information related to peace officers and department policies including information otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under state or federal statutes, court rules, case decisions, or common law. Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the following reasons. First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code, §§ 1040- 1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release will result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Fourth, Defendants contend that documents requested in discovery will contain personal information of unrelated third parties. Public disclosure of such information will implicate the privacy rights of third parties unrelated to this action. Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does result in litigation. In addition, many policies and procedures documents that are requested in discovery contain highly sensitive and confidential materials that deal with CHP officers’ tactics and practices, the public disclosure of which will put such officers’ lives at risk. Public disclosure of these materials will also hamper and impair law enforcement activities, including detection of criminal activity and apprehension of criminal offenders. Plaintiff does not concede to any of the contentions put forth above by Defendants; however, Plaintiff agrees that a protective order is appropriate in this matter in order to better facilitate the exchange of discoverable information in the possession of Defendants. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled

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RYAN P. WALTERS, an Individual v. State of California, by and through the California Highway Patrol, Beau Biter, Enrique Ayala, John Betz, and Brandon Urrutia, (C.D. Cal. 2026).

RYAN P. WALTERS, an Individual v. State of California, by and through the California Highway Patrol, Beau Biter, Enrique Ayala, John Betz, and Brandon Urrutia (RYAN P. WALTERS, an Individual v. State of California, by and through the California Highway Patrol, Beau Biter, Enrique Ayala, John Betz, and Brandon Urrutia) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)