1 2 3 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 RYAN P, Case No. 3:25-cv-05407-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER REVERSING AND 8 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS 10 Defendant. 11 12 Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the 13 Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying plaintiff’s application for 14 supplemental security income (“SSI”). See Dkts. 6, 11. 15 Plaintiff asserts four issues. First, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment at 16 ‘Step Two’ of the required five-step analysis, arguing the ALJ failed to properly consider 17 the severity of his impairments. Dkt. 11 at 3. Second, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s 18 Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) determination, arguing the ALJ improperly 19 discounted Dr. Alyssa Ruddell’s opinion. Dkt. 11 at 6. Third, plaintiff argues the ALJ’s 20 res judicata findings failed to comply with Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 21 1988) and Acquiescence Ruling (“AR”) 97-4(9). Dkt. 11 at 11. Finally, plaintiff argues 22 the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s statements regarding symptoms and limitations 23 associated with pain. Dkt. 11 at 15. 24 1 The parties unanimously consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 4. 2 For the reasons below, the Court reverses and remands this matter for further 3 administrative proceedings.
5 Plaintiff previously applied for supplemental security income (“SSI”), which was 6 denied by ALJ M. J. Adams on May 22, 2020. Administrative Record (“AR”) 95. ALJ 7 Adams found, among other matters, that plaintiff’s RFC limited him to “light work as 8 defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)” among other limitations. AR 102. 9 Plaintiff again applied for SSI on April 5, 2021, alleging a disability beginning May 10 20, 2020. AR 45. Defendant denied plaintiff’s application initially and on reconsideration. 11 AR 180, 186. ALJ Cecilia LaCara held a hearing on February 5, 2024, before denying 12 plaintiffs’ claim on April 18, 2024. AR 42 (denial), 67 (hearing). 13 In sum, ALJ LaCara’s decision denying benefits resolved the required five-step 14 process as follows. First, plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
15 April 5, 2021, the application date. AR 48. Second, plaintiff has numerous severe 16 impairments -- lumbar spine disorder, obesity, depression, and anxiety order. AR 48. 17 The ALJ found other impairments were not sufficiently severe (including hiatal hernia 18 and GERD symptoms), but noted she “considered all of the complaint’s medically 19 determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the 20 claimant’s residual functional capacity.” AR 48-49. Third, plaintiff did not have an 21 impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of 22 listed impairments. AR 49. Fourth, plaintiff’s RFC limited him to “medium work as 23 defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c)” among other limitations. AR 51. Fifth, plaintiff was unable
24 1 to perform past relevant work, but could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in 2 the national economy (industrial cleaner, hospital cleaner, and laundry worker). AR 59- 3 60. The ALJ listed all three jobs as requiring a “medium” work level. AR 60. 4 The Appeals Council denied review. AR 1. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.
6 A. Step Two (Severity of Impairments) 7 Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s assessment of symptoms at Step Two, arguing 8 that “the record documents repeated and persistent treatment for bothersome gastric 9 and digestive symptoms . . .” Dkt. 11 at 4. “These records show persistent, ongoing 10 pain, discomfort, and vomiting due to a combination of digestive impairments, and the 11 ALJ failed to support the assertion that they no more than minimally affected his 12 functioning.” Dkt. 11 at 6. 13 For Step Two of the analysis required under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), the 14 ALJ “consider[s] the medical severity of [plaintiff’s] impairments.” If plaintiff “do[es] not
15 have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the 16 duration requirement in § 416.909, or a combination of impairments that is severe and 17 meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.” Id. “An 18 impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit 19 your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 20 “Step two is merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims” 21 and “is not meant to identify the impairments that should be taken into account when 22 determining the RFC.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting 23
24 1 the “RFC therefore should be exactly the same regardless of whether certain 2 impairments are considered ‘severe’ or not.”). 3 “When an ALJ fails to identify a severe impairment at step two, but nonetheless 4 considers at subsequent steps all of the claimant's impairments, including the
5 erroneously omitted severe impairment, the error at step two is harmless.” Cindy F. v. 6 Berryhill, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1207 (D. Or. 2019) (citing Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 7 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007)). To illustrate, the Court in Cindy F. rejected an argument 8 “simply pointing to a host of diagnoses scattered throughout the medical record” as the 9 “ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments at the subsequent steps of the sequential 10 analysis and in his summary of the medical evidence.” Id. 11 Here, the ALJ at Step Two found plaintiff had “the following severe impairments: 12 lumbar spine disorder, obesity, depression, and anxiety disorder.” AR 48. The ALJ 13 further found these “medically determinable impairments significantly limit the ability to 14 perform basic work activities . . .” AR 48. The ALJ also found the record contains
15 evidence that other, non-severe conditions such as “hernia and GERD” which “caused 16 symptoms,” but “none that would result in significant work-related limitations or that 17 persisted for the required duration, as they were generally controlled with medication 18 and eventually surgery.” AR 48. 19 The ALJ expressly noted the remainder of the decision “considered all of the 20 claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, 21 when assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” AR 49. 22 Thus, the ALJ decided in plaintiff’s favor at step two and stated even non-severe 23 limitations were considered for the plaintiffs’ RFC. Thus, plaintiff “could not possibly
24 1 have been prejudiced” and “[a]ny alleged error is therefore harmless and cannot be the 2 basis for a remand.” Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049. As such, the Court finds any alleged error 3 here was harmless. 4 B. Step Four (RFC)
5 ALJ LaCara made the following RFC finding: 6 claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except work is limited to simple routine tasks 7 with no contact with the public (incidental contact with the public can be allowed but cannot be part of the main duties of the position), occasional 8 superficial interaction with coworkers that do not involve any tandem tasks, and occasional interaction with supervisors. 9 AR 51 (emphasis added). Plaintiff first challenges ALJ LaCara’s incorporation of Dr. 10 Ruddell’s opinion into the RFC. Dkt. 11 at 6. Plaintiff then argues ALJ LaCara failed to 11 give sufficient res judicata consideration to ALJ Adams’ prior finding plaintiff could only 12 “perform light work” (AR 102), as ALJ LaCara’s subsequent decision found plaintiff 13 could “perform medium work.” (AR 51). Dkt. 11 at 11. 14 i. Dr. Ruddell’s Opinion 15 Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s RFC by arguing the ALJ erroneously 16 discounted Dr. Ruddell’s medical opinion. Dkt. 11 at 6. This includes the ALJ’s 17 evaluation of the opined moderate limitations, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 7-8, and marked 18 limitations. E.g. Dkt. 11 at 8-11. 19 Dr. Ruddell provided evaluations in 2021 and 2023 on behalf of Washington’s 20 Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”). AR 504, 937. 21 Both evaluations contain disclaimers that the evaluation was ‘telephonic’ and 22 ‘represents client report.’ AR 504, 937. Both evaluations document the plaintiffs’ 23 reported history (psychosocial, medical, educational, daily living, etc.). AR 504-05, 937- 24 1 38. Both forms document Dr. Ruddell’s “clinical findings” and “assessment/diagnosis.” 2 AR 505, 938. And both forms document plaintiff’s limitations using a check-box format. 3 AR 506, 939. Neither form indicated severe limitations, but there were some “marked” 4 limitations. AR 506, 939. Each form noted an overall severity rating of “marked” and
5 “moderate” in 2021 and 2023 respectively. AR 506, 939. 6 a. Dr. Ruddell’s Marked Limitations 7 Here, the ALJ rejected the “marked” limitations as Dr. Ruddell “did not provide 8 any narrative explanation or cite specific support for allegedly marked limitations.” AR 9 58 (stating also that “because Dr. Ruddell did not provide sufficient explanation or 10 support for the limitations she assessed, it appears that her opinion was based in part 11 on the claimant’s subjective reports, which are not entirely consistent with the record”). 12 The Ninth Circuit has cautioned, “[p]sychiatric evaluations may 13 appear subjective, especially compared to evaluation in other medical fields” as 14 “[d]iagnoses will always depend in part on the patient's self-report, as well as on the
15 clinician's observations of the patient.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 16 2017). 17 The Ninth Circuit has also “accepted the discounting of a medical opinion set 18 forth in a checkbox form with little to no explanation.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 19 740-41 (9th Cir. 2023); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 20 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“While an opinion cannot be 21 rejected merely for being expressed as answers to a check-the-box questionnaire . . . 22 ‘the ALJ may permissibly reject check-off reports that do not contain any explanation of 23 the bases of their conclusions’ . . .”).
24 1 Because the ALJ’s decision on this point is supported by the law and by 2 substantial evidence, the ALJ properly rejected reliance on Dr. Ruddell’s “marked” 3 limitations. 4 b. Dr. Ruddell’s Moderate Limitations
5 The ALJ also found an RFC “for simple, routine tasks with limited interpersonal 6 interaction generally accounts for moderate functional limitations.” AR 58. 7 Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile the RFC includes limitations to simple, routine tasks 8 with limited social contact, Dr. Ruddell opined that plaintiff would have moderate 9 difficulty performing even routine tasks without special supervision.” Dkt. 11 at 7 10 (emphasis in original) (citing AR 939). Plaintiff further argues the “ALJ did not explain 11 how a limitation to ‘simple, routine tasks’ would accommodate a limited ability to 12 maintain a schedule, appropriate behavior, or accommodate interruptions from 13 behavioral symptoms.” Dkt. 11 at 8. 14 An ALJ’s RFC need not incorporate limitations verbatim, so long as the RFC
15 adequately translates and captures said limitations. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 16 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Merrill-Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 411 F. 17 Supp. 3d 503, 509 (D. Ariz. 2019). 18 Courts have found a limitation to “simple, routine tasks” adequately translates a 19 moderate limitation for performing work activities without special or additional 20 supervision. See, e.g., Amloian v. Colvin, No. SA CV 15-02081-DFM, 2016 WL 21 7223260, at *5-*6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016). Courts have held the same for 22 interruptions from “psychologically based symptoms.” Cobb v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV- 23 05112-DWC, 2016 WL 3856144, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 15, 2016).
24 1 The same cannot be said for “work schedule limitations,” which are “not 2 addressed by a restriction to simple, routine tasks.” Darrell F. v. Bisignano, No. 24-cv- 3 08590-SK, 2025 WL 3500538, at *10-*11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025) (addressing an ALJ 4 decision which “credited” a medical opinion that plaintiff “had a moderate limitation in his
5 ability to complete a normal workweek.”). In Darrell F., the Court upheld the RFC as the 6 medical opinion gave sufficient explanation because it: “specifically stated that Plaintiff 7 would not have a work schedule limitation if he was restricted to simple, routine tasks.” 8 Id. at *11. Here, unlike the medical opinion in Darrell F., Dr. Ruddell did not offer that 9 detail linking the simple, routine tasks with the work schedule limitation. 10 Thus, the Court holds the ALJ erred by omitting specific scheduling limitations 11 from the RFC and stating only that plaintiff was limited to “simple, routine tasks.” 12 ii. Res Judicata 13 Plaintiff next argues ALJ LaCara “erred by increasing Plaintiff’s physical RFC 14 since the prior ALJ decision, without meeting the Agency’s burden of showing medical
15 improvement to support the less-restrictive finding.” Dkt. 11 at 11. “The ALJ’s failure to 16 give ‘some res judicata consideration’ to the prior RFC assessment, or to explain the 17 basis for finding improvement since the prior findings, is legal error and requires 18 remand.” Dkt. 11 at 11 (quoting Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693-94). 19 ALJ LaCara’s decision explained the “prior ALJ decision” (by ALJ Adams in May 20 2020) found that plaintiff “could perform light work” as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) 21 and 416.967(b), “without any postural or environmental restrictions and was limited to 22 simple tasks and occasional interaction with coworkers but no tandem tasks, occasional 23
24 1 interaction with the public, and occasional changes in the work setting.” AR 56 2 (emphasis added) (citing AR 102, 105-06). 3 ALJ LaCara found ALJ Adams’ prior May 2020 decision “moderately persuasive.” 4 AR 56. ALJ LaCara explained the prior decision “accounts for limitations resulting from
5 the claimant’s impairments, but the current record contains recent imaging that has 6 been described as ‘essentially normal’ . . . which, when considered in connection with 7 the modest examination findings of record, suggest the claimant is capable of more than 8 light exertion.” AR 56 (quoting AR 1231). 9 Ultimately, ALJ LaCara formulated an RFC which limited plaintiff to “perfom[ing] 10 medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c),” in addition to various other non- 11 physical limitations. AR 51 (emphasis added). 12 “The principles of res judicata apply to administrative decisions, although the 13 doctrine is applied less rigidly to administrative proceedings than to judicial 14 proceedings.” Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693.
15 “Normally, an ALJ's findings that a claimant is not disabled ‘creates a 16 presumption that the claimant continued to be able to work after that date.’” Vasquez v. 17 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827 18 (1995)). 19 “The claimant, in order to overcome the presumption of continuing nondisability 20 arising from the first administrative law judge's findings of nondisability, must prove 21 ‘changed circumstances’ indicating a greater disability.” Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693 22 (citation omitted). This includes when “‘the claimant raises a new issue, such as the 23
24 1 existence of an impairment not considered in the previous application.’” Vasquez, 572 2 F.3d at 597 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 827). 3 “If the claimant rebuts the presumption, adjudicators then must give effect to 4 certain findings, as explained below, contained in the final decision by an ALJ or the
5 Appeals Council on the prior claim, when adjudicating the subsequent claim.” AR 97- 6 4(9), 1997 WL 742758, at *3 (noting also “this Ruling applies only to a finding of a 7 claimant's residual functional capacity” among other subjects). “Adjudicators must adopt 8 such a finding from the final decision on the prior claim . . . unless” (1) “there is new and 9 material evidence relating to such a finding or” (2) “there has been a change in the law, 10 regulations or rulings affecting the finding or the method for arriving at the finding.” Id. 11 To illustrate the above principles, a Court may ultimately find an ALJ correctly 12 found a “decision by another ALJ that [plaintiff] was not disabled [was] not entitled to res 13 judicata” due to “‘changed circumstances.’” Drake v. Saul, 805 Fed. App’x. 467, 468 14 (9th Cir. 2020). Even so, the ALJ may still “commit[] reversible error in failing to give res
15 judicata effect to the residual functional capacity” when “there is no evidence that the 16 limitations reflected in the [prior] RFC findings improved.” Id. 17 Here, defendant does not dispute plaintiff met the ‘changed circumstances’ 18 requirement to rebut a presumption of non-disability by alleging “impairments not 19 previously considered” in the previous ALJ decision. See Dkt. 13 at 10-12. 20 As to whether “there has been a change in the law,” AR 97-4(9), 1997 WL 21 742758, at *3, defendant argues the 2017 regulatory changes to the evaluation of 22 medical evidence satisfies this requirement. Dkt. 13 at 11. However, it is undisputed 23 ALJ LaCara did not cite these regulatory changes when making her re judicata finding.
24 1 AR 56. Thus, defendants may not now assert these changes as “‘long-standing 2 principles of administrative law require [a court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on 3 the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that 4 attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.’” Balcazar v. Comm’r of
5 Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-cv-00305-EPG, 2024 WL 3637967, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2024) 6 (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009)). 7 Next is whether there “is new and material evidence relating to such a finding.” 8 AR 97-4(9), 1997 WL 742758, at *3. In the present case, the ALJ increased the 9 plaintiff’s capacity for work from “light” to “medium” in line with the regulatory definitions 10 of those terms. This finding thus necessarily included these regulatory definitions, 11 meaning the ALJ found plaintiff’s lifting capacity increased from “no more than 20 12 pounds” to “no more than 50 pounds,” and the plaintiff’s ability for “frequent lifting or 13 carrying” increased from “up to 10 pounds” to “up to 25 pounds.” 20 CFR 416.967(b)- 14 (c); see also 20 CFR 404.1567(b)-(c). In other words, medium work requires more than
15 double the lifting capacity of light work. 16 ALJ LaCara justified the increase from light to moderate work by noting “the 17 current record contains recent imaging that has been described as ‘essentially normal’ . 18 . . which, when considered in connection with the modest examination findings of 19 record, suggest that the claimant is capable of more than light exertion.” AR 56 (quoting 20 AR 1231). This refers to clinical notes regarding “lumbar, thoracic and cervical MRIs” 21 and “a brain MRI,” both of which were noted as “essentially normal.” AR 1231. The note 22 further opines that “[b]ased on his imaging findings and exam findings I do not see how” 23 “obtaining disability for his current pain symptoms” “would be warranted.” AR 1232.
24 1 However, the ALJ’s decision, beyond this specific citation and a generalized 2 gesture towards ‘modest’ exam findings, fails to explain or offer specific support as to 3 how the record specifically demonstrate plaintiffs’ lifting and exertional capacity 4 improved to the degree required for medium work under the applicable regulations. See,
5 e.g., Elizabeth C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C20-5025-BAT, 2021 WL 62438, at *4 6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 2021) (“None of those examination notes address functional 7 capacity, lifting ability, or restrictions on standing, walking, or sitting.”). 8 Thus, the Court holds ALJ LaCara’s decision regarding ALJ Adams’ past 9 decision was not supported by new and material evidence relating to plaintiffs’ specific 10 capacity for light versus medium work. 11 C. Subjective Complaints 12 Plaintiff next argues the ALJ failed to offer clear and convincing reasons for 13 rejecting his subjective complaints regarding pain. Dkt. 11 at 15. 14 The ALJ’s determinations regarding a claimant’s statements about limitations
15 “must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 16 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990)). When 17 assessing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ must determine whether plaintiff has presented 18 objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 19 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). If such evidence is present and there is no evidence of 20 malingering, the ALJ can only reject plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of his 21 symptoms for specific, clear and convincing reasons. Id. (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 22 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). An ALJ “may not ‘take a general finding—an 23 unspecified conflict between [c]laimant's testimony . . . and her reports to doctors—and
24 1 comb the administrative record to find specific conflicts.’” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 2 1266, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 3 2014)). This Court is not permitted to “fill in the ALJ’s reasoning” to remedy the ALJ’s 4 analysis on this issue. Id. at 1278.
5 Here, the ALJ found, and defendant does not substantively dispute, that plaintiff’s 6 “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of 7 the alleged symptoms . . .,” thus satisfying the first part of the above analysis. AR 52; 8 Dkt. 13 at 12-15. 9 The ALJ additionally found that “the claimant’s statements concerning the 10 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 11 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in 12 this decision.” AR 52. 13 In so finding, the ALJ provided a summary of plaintiffs’ testimony and then 14 separately summarized plaintiffs’ treatment history, which the decision characterized as
15 containing “modest examination findings” or “normal” imaging. AR 51-52 (testimony), 16 52-54 (treatment). The Ninth Circuit has disapproved of a ALJs relying on “high-level 17 reasons” supported by a “summary of medical evidence,” even when the summary is 18 “relatively detailed.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277-78 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and 19 quotation marks omitted). On a similar note, providing a separate and generalized 20 summary of plaintiff’s testimony is problematic as an “ALJ must specifically identify the 21 testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence 22 undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). 23
24 1 The Court declines to hold such error was harmless. “An error is harmless only if 2 it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 3 1278 (quoting Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015)). As in 4 Lambert, because “the ALJ did not provide enough ‘reasoning in order for us to
5 meaningfully determine whether the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial 6 evidence,’ we cannot treat the error as harmless.” Id. (quoting Treichler v. Comm’r of 7 Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (2014)). 9 Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes the ALJ improperly 10 determined plaintiff to be not disabled. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is reversed and 11 remanded for further administrative proceedings, on an open record. On remand, the 12 issues the ALJ must address include re-evaluating Dr. Ruddell’s opinion, re-evaluating 13 the degree of deference owed to ALJ Adams’ prior decision, and re-evaluating plaintiffs’ 14 subjective testimony.
15 16 Dated this 18th day of June, 2026. 17 18 A 19 Theresa L. Fricke 20 United States Magistrate Judge
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