RENDERED: JUNE 26, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0978-ME
RYAN MITCHELL YODER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION v. HONORABLE THOMAS A. RAUF, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-D-00156-001
E.Y., A MINOR CHILD; J.Y., A MINOR CHILD; R.Y., A MINOR CHILD; AND WHITNEY MEREDITH YODER APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a domestic violence case. Appellant is Ryan Mitchell
Yoder (Father). Appellee is Whitney Meredith Yoder (Mother). Mother filed a
domestic violence petition on April 23, 2025, on behalf of herself and the parties’
three minor children against Father in Kenton Circuit Court, Family Division.1
1 The children are also captioned as Appellees. The family court initially continued the case to allow the guardian ad
litem (GAL) to interview the children. After an evidentiary hearing, the court
issued a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) on May 28, 2025. Father filed motions
pursuant to CR2 59.05, CR 52.02, and CR 60.02. The basis for the latter was
Mother’s testimony wherein she stated that one of father’s mental health
counselors, Dr. Paul Schmidt, warned her that she was unsafe around Father.
Father subsequently filed a letter from Dr. Schmidt in support of his CR 60.02
motion wherein Dr. Schmidt denied telling Mother that she was unsafe around
Father.
On July 11, 2025, the family court granted the CR 52.02 in part and
amended its findings. The court denied the CR 59.05 and CR 60.02 motions. The
court clarified that temporal proximity between incidents and the petition was not
dispositive considering the evidence of a “common domestic violence cycle” with
intermittent reconciliation. The court reaffirmed its previous order wherein it
determined that the statutory requirements were satisfied. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the family court’s factual determinations for clear error.
CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are not
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2- clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente,
110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). However, “with regard to the trial court’s
application of law to those facts, this Court will engage in a de novo review.”
Buddenberg v. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Ky. App. 2010) (citation
omitted). Ultimately, “in reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is not
whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of the trial
judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v. Cherry,
634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted).
CR 60.02 provides in relevant part: “On motion a court may, upon
such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . (c) perjury or
falsified evidence . . . .” “We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an
abuse of discretion standard.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky.
2014) (citation omitted). With these standards in mind, we return to the record and
law at issue in the present case.
ANALYSIS
Father raises three arguments: 1) grabbing his daughter’s arm does not
qualify as domestic violence; 2) verbal arguments between the parties do not
qualify as domestic violence; and 3) the court erred in denying his CR 60.02
motion. Each will be addressed in turn. We begin with the latter.
-3- The family court did not rely on Mother’s brief testimony wherein she
stated that Dr. Schmidt warned she was unsafe with Father. Moreover, there is no
indication that the result would have been different here if Dr. Schmidt’s post-
judgment letter was considered by the court in its ruling. Meece v.
Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 289-90 (Ky. 2017). Therefore, the family court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s CR 60.02 motion.
KRS3 403.740(1) provides that a court may issue a DVO after
conducting a hearing in accordance with KRS 403.730 and the court “finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and
may again occur . . . .” “Domestic violence and abuse” means:
physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members ....
KRS 403.720(2). See also Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920, 924-25 (Ky.
2015). “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient
evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a
victim of domestic violence.” Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky.
App. 2021) (quoting Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010)).
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4- However, a DVO “cannot be granted solely on the basis of the contents of the
petition.” Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).
The family court’s findings relied primarily on Mother’s testimony.
However, it is undisputed that the couple had separated numerous times and that
Father has significant mental health issues for which he has not always taken his
prescribed medications. The evidence presented may be summarized as follows:
1) Father grabbed his five-year-old daughter’s arm so tightly that skin was
squeezing out; she said “ouch,” appeared in pain, and her arm was very red. He
then forced her into a seated position; 2) Father threatened Mother, locked her out
of the house, threatened to take the children, and controlled access to money and
food; and 3) mental health findings included that Father reported hearing voices—
at least one time instructing him to harm Mother—was diagnosed with psychosis,
and was prescribed medications reflected in the trial exhibits. The court included
in its findings that Father disputes the psychosis diagnosis but acknowledges
cognitive confusion. The court noted that although some hearsay testimony was
presented without objection, that it did not rely on hearsay in reaching its decision,
and referenced its duty to assess credibility under CR 52.01.
Pursuant to Father’s CR 59.05 motion, the family court amended its
order to include, inter alia, findings of physical aggression by Father toward
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RENDERED: JUNE 26, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0978-ME
RYAN MITCHELL YODER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION v. HONORABLE THOMAS A. RAUF, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-D-00156-001
E.Y., A MINOR CHILD; J.Y., A MINOR CHILD; R.Y., A MINOR CHILD; AND WHITNEY MEREDITH YODER APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a domestic violence case. Appellant is Ryan Mitchell
Yoder (Father). Appellee is Whitney Meredith Yoder (Mother). Mother filed a
domestic violence petition on April 23, 2025, on behalf of herself and the parties’
three minor children against Father in Kenton Circuit Court, Family Division.1
1 The children are also captioned as Appellees. The family court initially continued the case to allow the guardian ad
litem (GAL) to interview the children. After an evidentiary hearing, the court
issued a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) on May 28, 2025. Father filed motions
pursuant to CR2 59.05, CR 52.02, and CR 60.02. The basis for the latter was
Mother’s testimony wherein she stated that one of father’s mental health
counselors, Dr. Paul Schmidt, warned her that she was unsafe around Father.
Father subsequently filed a letter from Dr. Schmidt in support of his CR 60.02
motion wherein Dr. Schmidt denied telling Mother that she was unsafe around
Father.
On July 11, 2025, the family court granted the CR 52.02 in part and
amended its findings. The court denied the CR 59.05 and CR 60.02 motions. The
court clarified that temporal proximity between incidents and the petition was not
dispositive considering the evidence of a “common domestic violence cycle” with
intermittent reconciliation. The court reaffirmed its previous order wherein it
determined that the statutory requirements were satisfied. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the family court’s factual determinations for clear error.
CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are not
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2- clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente,
110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). However, “with regard to the trial court’s
application of law to those facts, this Court will engage in a de novo review.”
Buddenberg v. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Ky. App. 2010) (citation
omitted). Ultimately, “in reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is not
whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of the trial
judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v. Cherry,
634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted).
CR 60.02 provides in relevant part: “On motion a court may, upon
such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . (c) perjury or
falsified evidence . . . .” “We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an
abuse of discretion standard.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky.
2014) (citation omitted). With these standards in mind, we return to the record and
law at issue in the present case.
ANALYSIS
Father raises three arguments: 1) grabbing his daughter’s arm does not
qualify as domestic violence; 2) verbal arguments between the parties do not
qualify as domestic violence; and 3) the court erred in denying his CR 60.02
motion. Each will be addressed in turn. We begin with the latter.
-3- The family court did not rely on Mother’s brief testimony wherein she
stated that Dr. Schmidt warned she was unsafe with Father. Moreover, there is no
indication that the result would have been different here if Dr. Schmidt’s post-
judgment letter was considered by the court in its ruling. Meece v.
Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 289-90 (Ky. 2017). Therefore, the family court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s CR 60.02 motion.
KRS3 403.740(1) provides that a court may issue a DVO after
conducting a hearing in accordance with KRS 403.730 and the court “finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and
may again occur . . . .” “Domestic violence and abuse” means:
physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members ....
KRS 403.720(2). See also Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920, 924-25 (Ky.
2015). “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient
evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a
victim of domestic violence.” Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky.
App. 2021) (quoting Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010)).
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4- However, a DVO “cannot be granted solely on the basis of the contents of the
petition.” Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2008).
The family court’s findings relied primarily on Mother’s testimony.
However, it is undisputed that the couple had separated numerous times and that
Father has significant mental health issues for which he has not always taken his
prescribed medications. The evidence presented may be summarized as follows:
1) Father grabbed his five-year-old daughter’s arm so tightly that skin was
squeezing out; she said “ouch,” appeared in pain, and her arm was very red. He
then forced her into a seated position; 2) Father threatened Mother, locked her out
of the house, threatened to take the children, and controlled access to money and
food; and 3) mental health findings included that Father reported hearing voices—
at least one time instructing him to harm Mother—was diagnosed with psychosis,
and was prescribed medications reflected in the trial exhibits. The court included
in its findings that Father disputes the psychosis diagnosis but acknowledges
cognitive confusion. The court noted that although some hearsay testimony was
presented without objection, that it did not rely on hearsay in reaching its decision,
and referenced its duty to assess credibility under CR 52.01.
Pursuant to Father’s CR 59.05 motion, the family court amended its
order to include, inter alia, findings of physical aggression by Father toward
Mother including yelling, threats, and angry outbursts; testimony of pet abuse;
-5- threats of self‑harm in the presence of a firearm; and that Father had an addictive
personality, including alcohol use which had been limited within the past year and
not consumed in front of the children. The court concluded that all prior findings
remained in effect except as modified.
Father specifically contends that the family court improperly relied on
one disciplinary incident where he grabbed his daughter’s arm, left no bruise or
need for medical care, and thus did not constitute “physical injury” under KRS
403.720(2)(a). In support, Father cites to the penal code’s definition of physical
pain as requiring “substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical
condition[.]” KRS 500.080(17). It can also mean “[p]hysical damage to a
person’s body.” Physical Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Father further cites to Petrie v. Brackett, 590 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Ky.
App. 2019) (vacating DVO where “the family court’s failure to make a finding of a
physical injury, past or present physical threats of abuse, or fear of imminent harm,
wholly undermined its decision to grant the DVO.”). Unlike Petrie, the family
court in the present case made detailed findings concerning Father grabbing his
daughter’s arm, the resulting injury, and her reaction to the pain. Thus, having
reviewed the trial testimony, we believe this specific incident constituted “physical
injury” under the statute.
-6- Similarly, the record reflects Mother’s fear of imminent physical
injury was reasonable. She testified in detail concerning multiple instances during
which she was very fearful for her physical safety, including at least one instance
where Father clenched his fists near her face during a verbal argument. Although
that specific event was not memorialized in the family court’s orders, it is well-
settled that an appellate court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by
the record. See, e.g., Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gray, 814
S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991).
We arrive at this result somewhat cautiously. Indeed, this is not a
“run of the mill DVO case.” Caudill, 318 S.W.3d at 115 (reversing DVO where
there was “[a]t most, there was an unwanted touching . . . .”). See also Hall v.
Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App. 2020) (concluding that “there was no
testimony elicited which would provide a proper basis for entry of a domestic
violence order as there was no testimony about an imminent danger of domestic
violence.”). Unlike Caudill and Hall, however, we believe that the evidence here,
“more likely than not,” constitutes domestic violence. The totality of the evidence
memorialized in the court’s finding also indicates, “more likely than not,” that such
abuse may again occur. In sum, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly
erred or otherwise abused its discretion.
-7- CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Kenton Family Court’s Domestic
Violence Order entered May 28, 2025, as amended by Order entered July 11, 2025,
is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WHITNEY MEREDITH YODER: Hillary A. Hunt Ft. Wright, Kentucky Robert Gary Defusco Covington, Kentucky
-8-