Ryan Edward Rude v. Hunter Anglea

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: April 2, 2024
• Docket: 5:19-cv-00403
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 RYAN EDWARD RUDE, Case No. 5:19-cv-00403-JWH (AGR) 11 Petitioner, 12 v. ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 13 HUNTER ANGLEA, Warden, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 Respondent. 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the First Amended 2 Petition, the records on file, and the Amended Report and Recommendation of the 3 United States Magistrate Judge. Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review 4 of those portions of the Report to which objections have been made. 5 The Amended Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommends denial 6 of the First Amended Petition and dismissal of this action with prejudice. (ECF 7 No. 59.) As explained below, Petitioner’s objections to the Report (ECF No. 61) do 8 not warrant a change to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendation. 9 Petitioner requests the appointment of counsel and an investigator. (ECF 10 No. 61 at 1.) The appointment of counsel is not warranted because Petitioner has 11 not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. See Richards v. Harper, 12 864 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1988) (failure to demonstrate likelihood of success on the 13 merits suffices to deny appointment of counsel). The appointment of an 14 investigator is not warranted because any evidence obtained during an investigation 15 would be irrelevant to the Court’s review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Bemore 16 v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1176 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e may not consider new 17 evidence unless the state court’s legal conclusions were contrary to, or an 18 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the 19 Supreme Court, or its determination of facts was unreasonable in light of the 20 evidence presented to the state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”). 21 Petitioner objects that the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence 22 from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), in violation of Brady v. 23 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (ECF No. 61 at 1-2.) As the Report found, 24 however, Petitioner has not shown that such evidence was suppressed because there 25 was no evidence that the prosecutor knew of or had access to such evidence. (ECF 26 No. 59 at 8-9.) Petitioner’s objection does not challenge this finding. 27 Petitioner objects that the FBI reports, which allegedly found no unlawful 28 activity, support his claim of actual innocence. (ECF No. 61 at 2.) As the Report 1 found, however, the FBI analysts expressly focused on federal crimes, not the state 2 crimes that are the subject of this action. (ECF No. 59 at 15.) Although Petitioner 3 seeks further evidentiary development of this issue (ECF No. 61 at 2), it is 4 unwarranted. Petitioner does not explain, nor is it apparent, how additional legal 5 opinions from FBI analysts, who would not be offering any new facts, would 6 demonstrate his actual innocence. 7 Petitioner objects that the purchasers of securities were “way more involved 8 than the vague stories provided.” (ECF No. 61 at 3.) To the extent that Petitioner 9 is arguing he is actually innocent of the crime of offering or selling unqualified 10 securities, on the basis of an exemption for a prior personal or business relationship, 11 he has fallen short of the extraordinarily high showing required for such a claim. 12 Unproven assertions about the purchasers’ level of involvement does not establish 13 actual innocence. See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 14 banc) (“Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a 15 petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that he is entitled 16 to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.”). 17 Petitioner objects that his convictions for burglary were barred by the statute 18 of limitations. (ECF No. 61 at 4.) As the Report found, however, a statute of 19 limitations bar is not the equivalent of actual innocence. (ECF No. 59 at 14.) 20 Moreover, the jury found that Petitioner was prosecuted within the statute of 21 limitations (id.), which Petitioner does not dispute. 22 Petitioner objects that there is evidence he made contributions and suffered 23 losses the same as every other purchaser. (ECF No. 61 at 4.) To the extent that 24 Petitioner again is arguing that he is actually innocent, such evidence might, at best, 25 only undercut the evidence of guilt, without affirmatively demonstrating actual 26 innocence. See Hooper v. Shinn, 56 F.4th 627, 634 (9th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) 27 (“But ‘[e]vidence that merely undercuts trial testimony or casts doubt on the 28 petitioner’s guilt, but does not affirmatively prove innocence, is insufficient to merit 1 || relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”) (quoting Jones v. Taylor, 763 2 || F.3d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 2014)). 3 Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 4 1. The Amended Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is 5 | ACCEPTED and ADOPTED. 6 2. Judgment shall be entered DENYING the First Amended Petition and 7 || DISMISSING this action with prejudice. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 | DATED: _ April 2, 2024 11 ee VY 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28