1 2 3 6 7 RYAN DUARTE, Case No. 25-cv-04124-NW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 T-MOBILE US, INC., Re: ECF No. 28 Defendant. 11
12 13 On March 31, 2025, Plaintiff Ryan Duarte sued Defendant T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T- 14 Mobile”) in Santa Clara Superior Court. ECF No. 1. Defendants subsequently removed 15 Plaintiff’s action to this District. Id. 16 On October 15, 2025, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 17 complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 24. The Court found that one issue raised in 18 Defendant’s motion was dispositive: Plaintiff had alleged in the complaint that he “was terminated 19 from his job with Health Net,” not T-Mobile. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend. 20 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on November 26, 2025. ECF No. 27. In 21 the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights by wrongfully terminating his 22 employment based on his religious beliefs, specifically, the belief that he cannot take a vaccine for 23 COVID-19. Plaintiff brings two claims: (1) violation of California’s Fair Employment & Housing 24 Act (“FEHA”) for employment discrimination; and (2) violation of California’s Unfair 25 Competition Law (“UCL”). 26 Having considered the parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concluded 27 oral argument was not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and vacated the hearing. The 1 I. BACKGROUND1 2 Plaintiff is a former T-Mobile employee, and resident of California. In September 2021, 3 after T-Mobile began requiring COVID-19 vaccinations, Plaintiff submitted a request for a 4 religious exemption to T-Mobile’s accommodations department. In his accommodation request, 5 Plaintiff stated that his Christian beliefs prevented him from taking the COVID-19 vaccine, 6 quoting the biblical instruction in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20, “that his body is a temple.” FAC ¶ 9. 7 Plaintiff asked T-Mobile to accommodate him by allowing him to work from home. Soon after, 8 T-Mobile put employees who requested an exemption on paid leave of absence. “Defendant then 9 revoked Plaintiff’s exemption request and Plaintiff was terminated from his job with T-Mobile on 10 April 4, 2022.” Id. ¶ 13. 12 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 14 The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 15 in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 16 2005). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 19 Defendant moves to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 28. The 20 motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 29, 32. 21 A. FEHA Claim 22 To state a claim for religious discrimination under FEHA, “a plaintiff must allege, among 23 other things, that she holds ‘a bona fide religious belief’ that conflicts with an employment 24 requirement.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 25 2023) (quoting Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39, 45 26 (2002) (discussing FEHA claims)). “[C]ourts [are not required to] take plaintiffs’ conclusory 27 1 assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Id. at 1223 (stating the plaintiff 2 bears the burden to allege a conflict with religious beliefs). 3 Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to plausibly support an inference that his 4 belief conflicts with T-Mobile’s vaccine policy. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that: 6 [H]is Christian religious beliefs prevented them from taking the COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiff quoted the biblical instruction in 1 7 Corinthians 6:19-20 that his body is a temple. He also told T-Mobile that his religious beliefs prevented him from putting foreign 8 substances in his body. Moreover, Plaintiff sent T-Mobile a letter from the Board President of Warriors of the Ruwach, a Christian 9 organization, which stated that Plaintiff should not take vaccinations because doing so goes against biblical scripture. 10 11 FAC ¶¶ 9-10. 12 While Plaintiff’s FAC references a letter from the “Board President of Warriors of the 13 Ruwach,” he does not identify why vaccines go against “biblical scripture” in his beliefs, nor does 14 Plaintiff attach the letter. Further, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged he was terminated because of 15 his religious beliefs. Rather, he alleges that he submitted an exemption request, and then 16 “Defendant put all employees seeking an exemption request on a paid leave of absence” and 17 “revoked Plaintiff’s exemption request and Plaintiff was terminated from his job.” FAC ¶ 13. 18 These facts do not plausibly allege that Defendant’s decision to put employees seeking exemptions 19 on leave of absence was tied to the employees’ religious beliefs, or that Plaintiff was later 20 terminated because of his beliefs. These conclusory allegations are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 21 678; Zajonc v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-02860-JSC, 2025 WL 2419267, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 22 Aug. 21, 2025) (holding that former T-Mobile employee had not adequately alleged that T-Mobile 23 terminated her because of her religious beliefs). 24 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is granted.2 25
26 2 In the alternative, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FEHA claim on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies. 27 “[A]n employee bringing a FEHA claim must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an 1 B. UCL Claim 2 The UCL provides only for equitable remedies. Therefore, when a plaintiff brings a UCL 3 claim in a federal court, they must establish that they “lack[] an adequate remedy at law” before 4 the Court can award them the UCL’s equitable relief. Sonner v. Premium Nutrition Corp., 971 5 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. (prohibiting 6 unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices). A plaintiff “must, at a minimum, plead 7 that” they lack “adequate remedies at law” if they seek equitable relief. Johnson v. Trumpet 8 Behav. Health, LLC, No. 3:21-CV-03221-WHO, 2022 WL 74163, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2022) 9 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To meet this burden, Plaintiff 10 must plead “specific facts showing that damages are ‘inadequate or incomplete.’” Norman v. 11 Gerber Prods. Co., No. 21-CV-09940-JSW, 2023 WL 122910, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2023) 12 (internal citation omitted). 13 Plaintiff fails to allege that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. Nor has Plaintiff alleged 14 his claims in the alternative. Plaintiff does not assert that the damages available from his FEHA 15 claim will be “inadequate or incomplete.” Norman, 2023 WL 122910 at *3; Zajonc, 2025 WL 16 2419267 at *3 (“Plaintiff’s FEHA claim seeks damages, and thus, provides an adequate remedy at 17 law.”). At this pleading stage, while Plaintiff “need not explain in great detail why [his] legal 18 remedies are insufficient[,]” he must at least provide “an allegation to that effect.” Rabin v. 19 Google LLC, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2024). 20
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1 2 3 6 7 RYAN DUARTE, Case No. 25-cv-04124-NW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 T-MOBILE US, INC., Re: ECF No. 28 Defendant. 11
12 13 On March 31, 2025, Plaintiff Ryan Duarte sued Defendant T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T- 14 Mobile”) in Santa Clara Superior Court. ECF No. 1. Defendants subsequently removed 15 Plaintiff’s action to this District. Id. 16 On October 15, 2025, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 17 complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 24. The Court found that one issue raised in 18 Defendant’s motion was dispositive: Plaintiff had alleged in the complaint that he “was terminated 19 from his job with Health Net,” not T-Mobile. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend. 20 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on November 26, 2025. ECF No. 27. In 21 the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights by wrongfully terminating his 22 employment based on his religious beliefs, specifically, the belief that he cannot take a vaccine for 23 COVID-19. Plaintiff brings two claims: (1) violation of California’s Fair Employment & Housing 24 Act (“FEHA”) for employment discrimination; and (2) violation of California’s Unfair 25 Competition Law (“UCL”). 26 Having considered the parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concluded 27 oral argument was not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and vacated the hearing. The 1 I. BACKGROUND1 2 Plaintiff is a former T-Mobile employee, and resident of California. In September 2021, 3 after T-Mobile began requiring COVID-19 vaccinations, Plaintiff submitted a request for a 4 religious exemption to T-Mobile’s accommodations department. In his accommodation request, 5 Plaintiff stated that his Christian beliefs prevented him from taking the COVID-19 vaccine, 6 quoting the biblical instruction in 1 Corinthians 6:19-20, “that his body is a temple.” FAC ¶ 9. 7 Plaintiff asked T-Mobile to accommodate him by allowing him to work from home. Soon after, 8 T-Mobile put employees who requested an exemption on paid leave of absence. “Defendant then 9 revoked Plaintiff’s exemption request and Plaintiff was terminated from his job with T-Mobile on 10 April 4, 2022.” Id. ¶ 13. 12 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 14 The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 15 in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 16 2005). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 19 Defendant moves to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 28. The 20 motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 29, 32. 21 A. FEHA Claim 22 To state a claim for religious discrimination under FEHA, “a plaintiff must allege, among 23 other things, that she holds ‘a bona fide religious belief’ that conflicts with an employment 24 requirement.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 25 2023) (quoting Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39, 45 26 (2002) (discussing FEHA claims)). “[C]ourts [are not required to] take plaintiffs’ conclusory 27 1 assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Id. at 1223 (stating the plaintiff 2 bears the burden to allege a conflict with religious beliefs). 3 Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to plausibly support an inference that his 4 belief conflicts with T-Mobile’s vaccine policy. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 5 Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that: 6 [H]is Christian religious beliefs prevented them from taking the COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiff quoted the biblical instruction in 1 7 Corinthians 6:19-20 that his body is a temple. He also told T-Mobile that his religious beliefs prevented him from putting foreign 8 substances in his body. Moreover, Plaintiff sent T-Mobile a letter from the Board President of Warriors of the Ruwach, a Christian 9 organization, which stated that Plaintiff should not take vaccinations because doing so goes against biblical scripture. 10 11 FAC ¶¶ 9-10. 12 While Plaintiff’s FAC references a letter from the “Board President of Warriors of the 13 Ruwach,” he does not identify why vaccines go against “biblical scripture” in his beliefs, nor does 14 Plaintiff attach the letter. Further, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged he was terminated because of 15 his religious beliefs. Rather, he alleges that he submitted an exemption request, and then 16 “Defendant put all employees seeking an exemption request on a paid leave of absence” and 17 “revoked Plaintiff’s exemption request and Plaintiff was terminated from his job.” FAC ¶ 13. 18 These facts do not plausibly allege that Defendant’s decision to put employees seeking exemptions 19 on leave of absence was tied to the employees’ religious beliefs, or that Plaintiff was later 20 terminated because of his beliefs. These conclusory allegations are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 21 678; Zajonc v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-02860-JSC, 2025 WL 2419267, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 22 Aug. 21, 2025) (holding that former T-Mobile employee had not adequately alleged that T-Mobile 23 terminated her because of her religious beliefs). 24 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is granted.2 25
26 2 In the alternative, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FEHA claim on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies. 27 “[A]n employee bringing a FEHA claim must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an 1 B. UCL Claim 2 The UCL provides only for equitable remedies. Therefore, when a plaintiff brings a UCL 3 claim in a federal court, they must establish that they “lack[] an adequate remedy at law” before 4 the Court can award them the UCL’s equitable relief. Sonner v. Premium Nutrition Corp., 971 5 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. (prohibiting 6 unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices). A plaintiff “must, at a minimum, plead 7 that” they lack “adequate remedies at law” if they seek equitable relief. Johnson v. Trumpet 8 Behav. Health, LLC, No. 3:21-CV-03221-WHO, 2022 WL 74163, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2022) 9 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To meet this burden, Plaintiff 10 must plead “specific facts showing that damages are ‘inadequate or incomplete.’” Norman v. 11 Gerber Prods. Co., No. 21-CV-09940-JSW, 2023 WL 122910, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2023) 12 (internal citation omitted). 13 Plaintiff fails to allege that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. Nor has Plaintiff alleged 14 his claims in the alternative. Plaintiff does not assert that the damages available from his FEHA 15 claim will be “inadequate or incomplete.” Norman, 2023 WL 122910 at *3; Zajonc, 2025 WL 16 2419267 at *3 (“Plaintiff’s FEHA claim seeks damages, and thus, provides an adequate remedy at 17 law.”). At this pleading stage, while Plaintiff “need not explain in great detail why [his] legal 18 remedies are insufficient[,]” he must at least provide “an allegation to that effect.” Rabin v. 19 Google LLC, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2024). 20
21 employee, it must issue a right-to-sue letter notifying the employee that she may bring a civil legal 22 action against her employer within one year of the date of the notice.” McCullough v. Xerox Corp., No. 13-cv-04596-HSG, 2015 WL 5769620, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2015) (internal 23 citations omitted). A plaintiff who fails to sufficiently allege exhaustion of administrative remedies fails to state a FEHA claim. See Minor v. Fedex Off. & Print Servs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 24 3d 966, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Here, Plaintiff did not allege in his FAC that he received a right-to- 25 sue letter from CRD. Plaintiff alleges only that he “met all jurisdictional requirements” and “submitted a claim with the EEOC and is currently waiting for EEOC to finish its investigation . . . 26 issue a right to sue letter.” FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff indicates in his Opposition that he received a right-to-sue notice from CRD on March 25, 2025, a few days before he initiated this action. Decl. 27 of Trevor Weinberg, ¶ 2, ECF No. 29, Ex. 1. However, the FAC itself does not contain these ] Plaintiff argues that he can recover prospective injunctive relief only under the UCL, and 2 || has therefore alleged that he lacks an adequate remedy at law for that specific form of relief. ECF 3 || No. 29 at 16. To establish Article III standing to bring a claim for forward-looking relief, Plaintiff 4 || must demonstrate that he faces “a substantial risk of future injury.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 5 || 43, 69 (2024). Plaintiff has not alleged that T-Mobile in fact has a policy of terminating 6 || employees for failing to take the COVID-19 vaccine or that he, a former employee, faces a 7 || substantial risk of future injury. Accordingly, Plaintiff's UCL claim for prospective injunctive 8 || relief fails for lack of Article III standing. 9 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's UCL claim is granted. 10 |} IV. CONCLUSION 11 Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 12 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (pursuant to Rule 15(a), leave to amend “should be freely granted when 13 || justice so requires,” keeping in mind the underlying purpose of Rule 15 is “to facilitate decision on 14 || the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”) (en banc) (internal quotes and ellipses 15 || omitted). a 16 Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 21 days of this Order. Plaintiff may not 2 17 || add claims or parties without further leave of Court. If Plaintiff's amended complaint does not Z 18 sufficiently address the issues raised in this Order, Plaintiffs claims will be dismissed with 19 || prejudice. 21 Dated: May 6, 2026 as . Noél Wise 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28