RYAN DIXON V. ELIZABETH BERNS

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 21, 2022
• Docket: 21-35902
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYAN ADAM DIXON, No. 21-35902

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00070-RSM

v. MEMORANDUM* ELIZABETH BERNS; MATTHEW SCOTT GOGUEN; JIE LIANG GOGUEN,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

YVONNE CURTIS; JENNI R.W. HALLACK; CYNTHIA BUHR; STATE OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 8, 2022**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: WALLACE, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Ryan Adam Dixon appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action related to state court proceedings that

terminated his parental rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri

v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Dixon’s action because Dixon failed to

allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (judges are absolutely immune from damage liability for

judicial acts).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Dixon’s action

without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to

amend is proper where amendment would be futile).

We reject as unsupported by the record Dixon’s contention that the district

court erred by failing to address various motions.

2 21-35902 Dixon’s motion for voluntary dismissal as to appellees Mathew Scott

Gogeun and Jie Liang Goguen (Docket Entry No. 17) is granted. This appeal is

dismissed as to appellees Mathew Scott Gogeun and Jie Liang Goguen only. See

Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). Dixon’s motion for proof of admission to practice (Docket

Entry No. 8) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 21-35902