1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RYAN DEAN, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-1054-JAM-JDP 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs Ryan Dean, Dana Moorer, and Lief Dean bring this motion for default judgment 18 against defendants Trezell and Jacqueline West (the “Wests”).1 The Wests have not answered the 19 complaint or otherwise appeared. I recommend, however, that plaintiffs’ motion be denied. 20 Procedural History 21 Ryan Dean and Dana Moorer, the biological mother and grandmother of Cinsere and 22 Classic Pettus, filed a complaint against the State of California Department of Social Services 23 (“CDSS”), Kern County Department of Human Services (“KCDHS”), Kim Johnson, Dena 24 Murphy, Trezell West, Jacqueline West, and Anna Zavala-Garza. ECF No. 1. Therein, plaintiffs 25 allege that defendants removed Cinesere and Classic from Ryan’s care and placed them in unsafe 26 foster homes, which eventually led to the death of both children. Id. Plaintiffs brought claims for 27
28 1 The Wests are the only remaining defendants. See ECF No. 77. 1 violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and 2 California’s wrongful death statute. 3 Defendants Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza moved to dismiss.2 4 ECF Nos. 18, 20, & 21. The district judge dismissed the claims against Johnson in her official 5 capacity without leave to amend and dismissed the remaining claims with leave to amend. ECF 6 No. 37. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on February 16, 2023. ECF No. 28. On 7 March 13, 2023, the district judge related Ryan and Moorer’s case with a case brought by Lief 8 Dean, Ryan’s father and the children’s grandfather (No. 2:22-cv-2162-JAM-AC). ECF No. 47. 9 Thereafter, defendants Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza filed 10 renewed motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 49 & 50. The district judge granted the motions and 11 dismissed all claims against Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza with prejudice 12 because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and the state claim was barred by 13 California law. ECF No. 77. The district judge also granted plaintiffs’ request for a 120-day stay 14 to resolve the pending claims against the Wests. Id. at 13. The purpose of the stay was to allow 15 plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint with Ryan, Moorer, and Lief’s claims and to allow for 16 sentencing of the Wests in state court. Id. 17 The court imposed the 120-day stay on August 25, 2023, which expired on December 25, 18 2023. On August 11, 2025, after not receiving any filing from plaintiffs after November 15, 19 2023, the district court issued an order to show cause for plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute. ECF No. 20 77. Plaintiffs sought the Wests’ default, which the Clerk of Court entered on September 4, 2025, 21 ECF No. 93. Pending now is plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. ECF No. 97. 22 Background 23 Ryan’s children, Cinsere and Classic Pettus, were removed from her care and placed in 24 the foster care system. ECF No. 38 at ¶¶ 29, 37-42. Cinsere was first placed in the foster home 25 of Latoya Spry in 2016. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 31. Ryan had Classic in June 2017. KCDHS removed 26 Classic from Ryan’s care a few days after his birth and placed him in the care of Spry. Id. at ¶¶ 27 2 The Wests were served on September 15, 2022. ECF Nos. 9 & 10. However, neither 28 have appeared. 1 37, 39-40. Classic and Cinsere were moved from Spry’s care to the Wests’ care in late 2018. Id. 2 at ¶ 44. While with the Wests, plaintiffs allege that the children seemed scared, lost weight, and 3 Classic had scratches on his face. Id. at ¶ 47. Ryan and Moorer made several efforts between 4 2016 and 2019 to return her children to their care, including a request by Moorer in March 2019 5 to have her grandchildren placed back in her care. Id. at ¶¶ 48-57. Less than one year after 6 Cinsere and Classic were placed with the Wests, the children were reported missing. Id. at ¶ 58. 7 As of March 2022, the Wests were charged with murder, willful cruelty to a child, and false 8 reporting of an emergency. Id. at ¶ 59.3 9 Legal Standard 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party who 11 fails to plead or otherwise defend against an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] 12 defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” 13 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. 14 Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a motion 15 for default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 16 exercising that discretion, the court considers the following factors: 17 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 18 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was 19 due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 20 21 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 22 standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 23 Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Triunfo- 24 Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 25 Generally, once default is entered “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those 26
27 3 According to plaintiffs, the Wests were convicted of second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, willful cruelty to a child, and false reporting of an emergency in 2023. ECF No. 97 28 at 3. 1 relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 2 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th 3 Cir. 1977)). However, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are 4 legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 5 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 Discussion 7 Plaintiffs argue that the court should grant the motion because the Eitel factors favor 8 default judgment. ECF No. 97 at 3-4. However, plaintiffs’ motion fails at the second Eitel factor. 9 The district court found that plaintiffs’ federal claims were barred by the statute of limitations and 10 that the state claim was barred by California law. Plaintiffs have offered no argument 11 undermining the district court’s conclusions, and this court agrees with the district court’s 12 reasoning. 13 The statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ federal claims ran before they filed the initial 14 complaint.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RYAN DEAN, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-1054-JAM-JDP 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs Ryan Dean, Dana Moorer, and Lief Dean bring this motion for default judgment 18 against defendants Trezell and Jacqueline West (the “Wests”).1 The Wests have not answered the 19 complaint or otherwise appeared. I recommend, however, that plaintiffs’ motion be denied. 20 Procedural History 21 Ryan Dean and Dana Moorer, the biological mother and grandmother of Cinsere and 22 Classic Pettus, filed a complaint against the State of California Department of Social Services 23 (“CDSS”), Kern County Department of Human Services (“KCDHS”), Kim Johnson, Dena 24 Murphy, Trezell West, Jacqueline West, and Anna Zavala-Garza. ECF No. 1. Therein, plaintiffs 25 allege that defendants removed Cinesere and Classic from Ryan’s care and placed them in unsafe 26 foster homes, which eventually led to the death of both children. Id. Plaintiffs brought claims for 27
28 1 The Wests are the only remaining defendants. See ECF No. 77. 1 violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and 2 California’s wrongful death statute. 3 Defendants Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza moved to dismiss.2 4 ECF Nos. 18, 20, & 21. The district judge dismissed the claims against Johnson in her official 5 capacity without leave to amend and dismissed the remaining claims with leave to amend. ECF 6 No. 37. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on February 16, 2023. ECF No. 28. On 7 March 13, 2023, the district judge related Ryan and Moorer’s case with a case brought by Lief 8 Dean, Ryan’s father and the children’s grandfather (No. 2:22-cv-2162-JAM-AC). ECF No. 47. 9 Thereafter, defendants Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza filed 10 renewed motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 49 & 50. The district judge granted the motions and 11 dismissed all claims against Johnson, CDSS, KCDHS, Murphy, and Zavala-Garza with prejudice 12 because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and the state claim was barred by 13 California law. ECF No. 77. The district judge also granted plaintiffs’ request for a 120-day stay 14 to resolve the pending claims against the Wests. Id. at 13. The purpose of the stay was to allow 15 plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint with Ryan, Moorer, and Lief’s claims and to allow for 16 sentencing of the Wests in state court. Id. 17 The court imposed the 120-day stay on August 25, 2023, which expired on December 25, 18 2023. On August 11, 2025, after not receiving any filing from plaintiffs after November 15, 19 2023, the district court issued an order to show cause for plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute. ECF No. 20 77. Plaintiffs sought the Wests’ default, which the Clerk of Court entered on September 4, 2025, 21 ECF No. 93. Pending now is plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. ECF No. 97. 22 Background 23 Ryan’s children, Cinsere and Classic Pettus, were removed from her care and placed in 24 the foster care system. ECF No. 38 at ¶¶ 29, 37-42. Cinsere was first placed in the foster home 25 of Latoya Spry in 2016. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 31. Ryan had Classic in June 2017. KCDHS removed 26 Classic from Ryan’s care a few days after his birth and placed him in the care of Spry. Id. at ¶¶ 27 2 The Wests were served on September 15, 2022. ECF Nos. 9 & 10. However, neither 28 have appeared. 1 37, 39-40. Classic and Cinsere were moved from Spry’s care to the Wests’ care in late 2018. Id. 2 at ¶ 44. While with the Wests, plaintiffs allege that the children seemed scared, lost weight, and 3 Classic had scratches on his face. Id. at ¶ 47. Ryan and Moorer made several efforts between 4 2016 and 2019 to return her children to their care, including a request by Moorer in March 2019 5 to have her grandchildren placed back in her care. Id. at ¶¶ 48-57. Less than one year after 6 Cinsere and Classic were placed with the Wests, the children were reported missing. Id. at ¶ 58. 7 As of March 2022, the Wests were charged with murder, willful cruelty to a child, and false 8 reporting of an emergency. Id. at ¶ 59.3 9 Legal Standard 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party who 11 fails to plead or otherwise defend against an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] 12 defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” 13 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. 14 Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a motion 15 for default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 16 exercising that discretion, the court considers the following factors: 17 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 18 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was 19 due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 20 21 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 22 standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 23 Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Triunfo- 24 Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 25 Generally, once default is entered “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those 26
27 3 According to plaintiffs, the Wests were convicted of second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, willful cruelty to a child, and false reporting of an emergency in 2023. ECF No. 97 28 at 3. 1 relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 2 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th 3 Cir. 1977)). However, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are 4 legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 5 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 Discussion 7 Plaintiffs argue that the court should grant the motion because the Eitel factors favor 8 default judgment. ECF No. 97 at 3-4. However, plaintiffs’ motion fails at the second Eitel factor. 9 The district court found that plaintiffs’ federal claims were barred by the statute of limitations and 10 that the state claim was barred by California law. Plaintiffs have offered no argument 11 undermining the district court’s conclusions, and this court agrees with the district court’s 12 reasoning. 13 The statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ federal claims ran before they filed the initial 14 complaint. Without a federal limitations period, the federal courts borrow from the forum state 15 the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims applicable to personal injury claims. TwoRivers v. 16 Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). Consistent with this principle, federal, not state, law 17 determines when a civil rights claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801- 18 02 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to 19 know of the injury that is the basis of the action. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. Hence, the statute 20 of limitations for a section 1983 or section 1985 claim brought in California is two years. See 21 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (establishing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury 22 actions). And claims under section 1986 have a one-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 23 (“[N]o action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced 24 within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”). 25 As the district judge acknowledged, the absolute latest plaintiffs’ claims could have 26 accrued was in March 2019 when Ryan and Moorer asked to have the children returned to their 27 custody. Yet plaintiffs did not file the complaint until June 2022, well after the two-year statute 28 of limitations ran. Accordingly, for the same reasons stated in the district court’s order, plaintiffs’ 1 | federal claims are time-barred. 2 Plaintiffs’ state claim for wrongful death fails for the same reasons articulated in the 3 | district court’s order. California’s “binding one action rule” bars plaintiffs from bringing a 4 | successive wrongful death action on behalf of a decedent. Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, 79 F. Supp. 3d 5 | 1148, 1181 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The pendency of another action growing out of the same 6 | transaction is grounds for abatement of the second action. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Superior 7 | Crt., 151 Cal. App. 3d 455, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see also Munro v. Pac. Coast Dredging & 8 | Reclamation Co., 84 Cal. 515, 522, 24 P. 303, 305 (1890 ) (holding that if a wrongful death action 9 | is brought after another is filed “the pendency of the prior action may be well pleaded in 10 || abatement of it; or, if a judgment has been rendered in the first, such judgment may be well 11 | pleaded in bar of the second action”). Classic’s and Cinsere’s biological fathers brought a 12 | wrongful death action in Kern County Superior Court on behalf of the children on September 29, 13 | 2021. See ECF No. 51-1, 51-5. Because another wrongful death claim was filed on behalf of the 14 | same decedents prior to the filing of this action, California law requires the abatement of this 15 | claim. 16 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, 17 | ECF No. 97, be DENIED. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ January 15, 2026 q——— 21 JEREMY D. PETERSON 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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