Ryan Christopher Goff v. Kini L.E. Knudson et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ryan Christopher Goff, No. CV-25-04537-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Kini L.E. Knudson et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Kini L.E. Knudson1 and the City of 16 Phoenix’s (collectively, Defendants)2 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Ryan Christopher Goff’s 17 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 18 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20). The Motion is fully briefed, (Docs. 22, 23), and the 19 Court now rules. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 The following summary of facts is taken from the SAC (Doc. 11)3 and the Court 22 construes the facts alleged therein in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accepting all 23 well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 24 (9th Cir. 2000).

25 1 Plaintiff sues Kini L.E. Knudson in his official capacity as Director of the Street Transportation Department of the City of Phoenix. 26 2 All other defendants have been terminated from this action. 27 3 “An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.” CDK Glob. LLC v. 28 Brnovich, 16 F.4th 1266, 1274 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010). 1 Plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability” that impairs his mobility and he 2 ambulates with a cane. (Doc. 11 at 2, ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges that the public street, curb ramp, 3 and pedestrian right-of-way adjacent to his home experience “recurring flooding” when it 4 rains. (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶ 10). When the flooding occurs, the standing water obstructs “safe 5 cane-assisted passage,” and Plaintiff cannot safely access the sidewalk or his vehicles. 6 (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶¶ 12–13). The flooding has occurred since at least 2021 and caused damage 7 to Plaintiff’s vehicles. (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶¶ 14–15). In response to the flooding damage, 8 Plaintiff submitted a claim to the City of Phoenix’s Risk Management Office. (Doc. 11 at 9 3, ¶ 16). The City denied Plaintiff’s claim on September 30, 2021. (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶ 17). 10 Plaintiff alleges that the denial constitutes “actual notice” of the flooding impacting 11 Plaintiff’s property and that “no grading correction or drainage modification was 12 implemented” despite the notice. (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶¶ 18, 20). 13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, by failing to take corrective action, violated Title 14 II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) (Count 1). (Doc. 11 at 4). Plaintiff 15 also alleges a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2). (Doc. 11 at 4). Defendants 16 move to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20). 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 19 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand 20 detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 21 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 22 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 23 statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 24 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell 25 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 26 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 27 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts 1 must “construe pro se filings liberally” and give such plaintiffs the “benefit of any doubt.” 2 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation 3 omitted). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant “must be held to less stringent standards 4 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 5 94 (2007) (per curiam)). “A liberal construction of a pro se complaint, however, does not 6 mean that the court will supply essential elements of a claim that are absent from the 7 complaint.” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2022). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. ADA Violation 10 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Phoenix “provides public sidewalk and 11 pedestrian right-of-way services” and that the recurring flooding near his home “obstructs 12 the pedestrian path of travel.” (Doc. 11 at 4, ¶¶ 25–26). Plaintiff claims that the City had 13 notice of the flooding and that the City’s failure to take reasonable corrective measures 14 constituted “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA. (Doc. 11 at 4, ¶¶ 15 27–28). 16 Defendants primarily argue that the City of Phoenix was not required to make the 17 sidewalk outside Plaintiff’s home “accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” 18 because the sidewalk is an “existing facility” and subject to the ADA’s implementing 19 regulations’ safe harbor provision. (Doc. 20 at 5); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(2)(i). The 20 safe harbor provision provides:

21 Elements that have not been altered in existing facilities on or after March 15, 2012 and that comply with the corresponding technical and scoping 22 specifications for those elements in either the 1991 Standards or in the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), Appendix A to 41 CFR 23 part 101–19.6 (July 1, 2002 ed.), 49 FR 31528, app. A (Aug. 7, 1984) are not required to be modified in order to comply with the requirements set forth in 24 the 2010 Standards. 25 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(2)(i). 26 The ADA thus distinguishes between existing facilities that were not altered on or 27 after March 15, 2012 and newly constructed facilities. (Doc. 20 at 4). Compare 28 C.F.R. 28 § 35.150 (existing facilities) with 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (new construction and alterations). 1 Defendants direct the Court to the Maricopa County Assessor’s website—which states 2 Plaintiff’s home was constructed in 1958—and state that “the Court may take judicial 3 notice that the subdivision dates back to the late 1950s and early 1960s.” (Doc. 20 at 4). 4 Defendants note that the SAC “does not allege that the subject sidewalk or drainage 5 facilities were installed or modified on or after March 15, 2012,” and contend those 6 facilities are “existing facilities” that need not be modified to comply with the ADA. (Doc. 7 20 at 4–5). Because Plaintiff’s flooding complaints do not “fall within the purview of the 8 ADA for existing facilities,” Defendants argue that he fails to state an ADA claim. (Doc. 9 20 at 5–6). 10 Plaintiff’s Response fails to address or refute Defendants’ existing-facilities 11 argument. (See generally Doc. 22). Defendants seemingly ask this Court to accept that 12 Plaintiff’s home was built in 1958, and from that fact alone, further conclude that (1) the 13 subdivision, its drainage systems, and the public sidewalks therein were likewise 14 constructed in the late 1950s or early 1960s, and (2) neither the drainage system nor the 15 sidewalks have been altered on or after March 15, 2012. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(2)(i) 16 (limiting safe harbor provision to “[e]lements that have not been altered in existing 17 facilities on or after March 15, 2012”). Defendants have not submitted evidence 18 establishing either proposition.4 On the present record, the Court will not make such 19 sweeping factual conclusions regarding the applicability of the ADA’s safe harbor 20 provision. 21 For purposes of resolving the pending Motion, the Court assumes without deciding 22 that the safe harbor provision does not apply and separately analyzes whether Plaintiff has 23 plausibly stated an ADA claim. 24 i. Legal Standard 25 Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a disabled 26 4 Even if Defendants had submitted such evidence, courts are generally barred from 27 considering evidence outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003); Laborers Dist. Council 28 Constr. Indus. Pension Fund v. Sea Ltd., 743 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1095 (D. Ariz. 2024). 1 individual based on their disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a Title II ADA claim, a 2 plaintiff must plead facts plausibly showing that: “(1) he is a qualified individual with a 3 disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public 4 entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the 5 public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason 6 of his disability.” Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal 7 quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added). “As to the third requirement, [p]laintiffs 8 must show that the exclusion, denial, or discrimination was ‘solely by reason of 9 disability.’” Golden Gate Transactional Indep. Serv., Inc. v. California, CV 18-08093 SJO 10 (AGRx), 2019 WL 4222452, at *18 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2019). 11 A plaintiff seeking monetary damages under the ADA “must prove intentional 12 discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 13 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). Proving intentional 14 discrimination requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with “deliberate 15 indifference,” which requires “both [(1)] knowledge that a harm to a federally protected 16 right is substantially likely, and [(2)] a failure to act upon that [] likelihood.” Id. at 1139; 17 see also Updike, 870 F.3d at 950–51. A plaintiff satisfies the first element of the deliberate- 18 indifference test by notifying the public entity of his need for accommodation. Updike, 870 19 F.3d at 951. “To meet the second [element], the entity’s failure to act must be a result of 20 conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. 21 (internal quotations omitted). 22 ii. Analysis 23 Plaintiff fails to state a Title II ADA claim because Plaintiff has not alleged he was 24 “denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 25 discriminated against by the public entity” by reason of his “disability.”5 Moreover, even

26 5 And while Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff if a “qualified individual with a disability,” the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he has a disability 27 as defined by the ADA. A “qualified individual with a disability” refers to an individual with a disability who “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services 28 or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131. The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 1 assuming Plaintiff had otherwise stated an ADA violation, Plaintiff has not plausibly 2 alleged the deliberate indifference necessary to recover monetary damages. Specifically, 3 Plaintiff has not alleged that he ever sought an accommodation from Defendants or 4 otherwise notified Defendants of his alleged disability to plausibly plead the notice element 5 of the deliberate-indifference test. Indeed, the SAC does not allege that Defendants knew 6 Plaintiff was disabled. Instead, the evidence attached to the SAC and Defendants’ Motion 7 to Dismiss suggests that Plaintiff only notified Defendants of damage to his vehicles and 8 sought compensation for those damages. 9 1. 2025 Notice of Claim 10 Plaintiff attached to the SAC a Notice of Claim—dated March 19, 2025—that he 11 submitted against the City of Phoenix (the “2025 Notice”).6 (Doc. 11 at 27). Plaintiff 12 submitted the 2025 Notice “for damages sustained due to repeated flooding caused by the 13 City’s negligence in maintaining its drainage infrastructure.” (Doc. 11 at 27). The 2025 14 Notice alleged that in August 2021 and December 2023, “severe flooding” occurred at 15 Plaintiff’s home which “result[ed] in the total loss of three vehicles.” (Doc. 11 at 27). The 16 limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Major life activities 17 include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 18 thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. 12102(2)(A). The ADA does not define the phrase “substantially limits,” but it is understood to mean that an individual’s ability to 19 perform a particular major life activity is significantly restricted when compared to most people in the general population. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). 20 Plaintiff merely alleges that he “is a qualified individual with a disability and 21 ambulates with a cane due to mobility impairment.” (Doc. 11 at 2, ¶ 5). This barebones allegation, without more, is merely a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, 22 which the Court need not accept as true on a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead that he has a qualifying disability under the ADA, 23 he fails to state a claim for relief. See Goekjian v. City of Portland, 3:25-CV-00727-AR, 2025 WL 4670414, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 24 3:25-CV-00727-AR, 2026 WL 892959 (D. Or. Mar. 31, 2026) (finding plaintiff failed to state a claim under the ADA because plaintiff did not explain how his physical 25 impairments—“a fractured L5 vertebra, shattered bones in the left ear, and resulting seizure disorder and mobility impairments”—substantially limited one or more major life 26 activities).

27 6 A court may consider evidence that has been “incorporated, either literally or by reference, into the plaintiff’s complaint” without converting a motion to dismiss into a 28 summary judgment motion. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 746 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (D. Ariz. 2024). 1 2025 Notice alleged that the City failed to take remedial action which exacerbated the 2 damage to Plaintiff’s vehicles. (Doc. 11 at 27). The 2025 Notice demanded “compensation 3 for property damage,” “reimbursement for additional economic losses,” and “non- 4 economic damages for inconvenience and distress.” (Doc. 11 at 27). 5 The 2025 Notice contains no reference to Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Any alleged 6 exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination against Plaintiff cannot be by reason of 7 Plaintiff’s disability if Defendants were unaware of its existence. And the 2025 Notice does 8 not seek an accommodation for Plaintiff’s alleged disability—it seeks money damages 9 only.7 10 2. Claim to the City of Phoenix Risk Management Office 11 in 2021 12 Before the 2025 Notice of Claim, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff “submitted a claim 13 to the City of Phoenix Risk Management Office regarding flooding damage” and that that 14 claim was denied on September 30, 2021. (Doc. 11 at 3, ¶¶ 16–17). Plaintiff does not 15 specify when he filed the initial claim resulting in the September 30, 2021 denial, nor does 16 he attach that claim to the SAC. Plaintiff does, however, attach the City’s denial letter.8 17 (See Doc. 11 at 18). The denial letter states that the City of Phoenix was “sorry to hear 18 about the damage to [Plaintiff’s] vehicles” and assured Plaintiff that the City had carefully 19 considered his claim. (Doc. 11 at 18). The letter explains that “torrential rains” on July 25, 20 2021 “generated an excessive amount storm run-off that exceeded the capacity of the storm 21 drains” but that the City had received confirmation from the Street Department that “there 22 is no malfunction with the operation of the storm system and [that] the storm drains are 23 regularly maintained and cleaned.” (Doc. 11 at 18). Because there was no defect with the 24 storm drainage system, the letter concluded that the City was not legally responsible for 25 7 Plaintiff does not indicate whether the City of Phoenix responded to the 2025 26 Notice.

27 8 A court may consider evidence that has been “incorporated, either literally or by reference, into the plaintiff’s complaint” without converting a motion to dismiss into a 28 summary judgment motion. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 746 F. Supp. 3d at 755. 1 the damage caused to Plaintiff’s vehicles and advised that his claim was ineligible for 2 payment. 3 As stated, Plaintiff did not attach the underlying claim that resulted in the September 4 30, 2021 denial. Accordingly, this Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff informed the 5 City of his alleged disability or requested an accommodation for that disability. However, 6 the Court notes that the denial letter—which exclusively discusses damage to Plaintiff’s 7 vehicles and Plaintiff’s request for payment—indicates that the City understood Plaintiff’s 8 claim as seeking compensation for property damage resulting from flooding, not relief 9 related to his alleged disability. 10 3. Complaint Filed in Maricopa County Superior Court 11 Attached to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is a Complaint that Plaintiff filed in 12 Maricopa County Superior Court on April 11, 2025.9 (Doc. 20-1). Therein, Plaintiff alleged 13 the following facts only:

14 On or about August 9, 2021, and again on December 28, 2023, Plaintiff’s vehicles and property were severely damaged due to repeated street flooding 15 caused by Defendant’s failure to inspect, repair, or maintain drainage infrastructure. Despite prior notice, emails, and neighborhood complaints, 16 the City took no action. 17 (Doc. 20-1 at 4). Plaintiff requested $112,583 in compensatory damages and injunctive 18 relief “requiring repairs and prevention measures.” (Doc. 20-1 at 8). Defendants argue that 19 “Plaintiff’s initial lawsuit focused on property damage—not accessibility.” (Doc. 20 at 8). 20 The Court agrees. Like the 2025 Notice of Claim and the City’s September 30, 2021 denial 21 letter, the state-court Complaint does not assert Plaintiff’s disabled status or otherwise 22 allege that he notified Defendants of his disability. Instead, the Complaint seeks 23 compensation and injunctive relief based on alleged flooding and resulting property 24 damage.

25 9 A court may consider evidence that the court has judicially noticed without converting a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Ctr. for Biological 26 Diversity, 746 F. Supp. 3d at 755. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permits courts to “take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.” Reyn’s Pasta 27 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint filed in Maricopa County Superior Court. (See 28 generally Doc. 20-1). 1 Accordingly, the Court finds that the SAC does not plausibly support an inference 2 that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or any need for accommodation 3 before Plaintiff filed suit in this Court. 4 iii. Conclusion re: ADA Claim 5 Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege (1) that he has a qualifying disability under 6 the ADA, or (2) that Defendants denied Plaintiff the benefits of its “services, programs, or 7 activities” or otherwise discriminated against Plaintiff by reason of his disability, Plaintiff 8 fails to state a claim under Title II of the ADA. The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion 9 to Dismiss as to this claim. 10 B. Monell Claim 11 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to “authorize corrective remediation” after 12 receiving notice of Plaintiff’s flooding issues was “deliberate inaction constitut[ing] 13 official municipal policy” under Monell. (Doc. 11 at 4, ¶¶ 31–32). Plaintiff claims the 14 municipal policy deprived him of his “federally protected rights.” (Doc. 11 at 5, ¶ 33). 15 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim is fatally flawed because Monell claims are 16 contingent upon an underlying constitutional violation and the SAC fails to allege such a 17 violation. (Doc. 20 at 3). The Court agrees. 18 To bring a § 1983 claim against the City of Phoenix under Monell, Plaintiff must 19 establish: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that 20 the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 21 plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the 22 constitutional violation.” Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 23 Cir. 1992). 24 Plaintiff does not identify “a constitutional right of which he was deprived” through 25 Defendants’ conduct or inaction. Rather, Plaintiff asserts in conclusory fashion that he was 26 deprived of his “federally protected rights,” which is wholly insufficient to survive a 27 motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. And while a “policy of inaction” can 28 serve as a basis for § 1983 liability, Garcia v. Yuba Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 559 F. Supp. 3d 1 1122, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2021), it appears that Defendants took at least some action in 2 response to Plaintiff’s complaints. Indeed, attached to the SAC is an email from Defendant 3 Kini L.E. Knudson outlining various “commitments” he made in response to Plaintiff’s 4 flooding concerns. (Doc. 11 at 11 (noting the need to organize a drainage study and 5 “evaluate repair and cost options” upon receipt of the study results)). And Plaintiff’s 6 Response to Defendants’ Motion identifies “ongoing municipal involvement” related to his 7 complaints. (Doc. 22 at 2). Plaintiff specifically notes that “[t]he Office of Councilwoman 8 Laura Pastor coordinated meetings with the Streets Department and the City officials 9 regarding Plaintiff-related concerns.” (Doc. 22 at 2). The Court finds it difficult to square 10 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged “deliberate inaction” with Plaintiff’s 11 own admissions regarding the City’s involvement regarding his claims. 12 In the Court’s view, mere dissatisfaction with the manner in which a municipality 13 resolves a constituent’s grievance does not constitute a policy of inaction for purposes of 14 pleading a § 1983 Monell claim. Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim and the Court will 15 grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 16 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 17 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 18 granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 19 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv- 20 Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 21 However, “[l]eave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to 22 dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 23 The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has 24 previously been permitted to amend his complaint. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. 25 United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is 26 one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires granting leave to 27 amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 28 This Court, in previously granting Plaintiff leave to amend, advised Plaintiff that his 1 || case would be dismissed if he failed to timely file an amended complaint curing the 2|| deficiencies identified in the Court’s order.!° (Doc. 10 at 5). Defendants argue that || amendment would be futile because Plaintiff has had three opportunities!’ to state a 4|| plausible claim and has failed to do so. The Court agrees and will deny leave to amend the 5 || Complaint for a third time. 6 Vv. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is granted and 9|| this case is dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 10]| granted, as specified above. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's remaining pending motions (Docs. 13,25, and 26), and Defendants’ pending motion (Doc. 28) are denied as moot. 13 Dated this 30th day of June, 2026. 14

16 James A. Teilborg 17 Senior United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 The Court specifically noted that Plaintiff's first amended complaint “fail[ed] to how it was presented to each Defendant)" (Doe. 10 at), Plamtiti's SAC failed to address 26 || these issues despite the Court’s explicit identification oe these deficiencies. 11 Plaintiff amended his Complaint once as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(A), (Doc. 6), and again upon leave of the Court, (Doc. 10 (granting leave to file a second amended complaint)).

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