Ryan Borchik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJanuary 23, 2026
Docket2:21-cv-00567
StatusUnknown

This text of Ryan Borchik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Ryan Borchik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryan Borchik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, (D. Nev. 2026).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 Ryan Borchik, Case No. 2:21-cv-00567-BNW

5 Plaintiff, ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION 6 v. IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM COMMENTING 7 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance ON REDACTIONS [ECF 84] Company, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion in Limine No. 3: Precluding Comment on 11 Redactions or Documents Withheld on the Basis of Privilege.” ECF No. 84. As explained below, 12 the Court grants Defendant’s motion. 13 I. BACKGROUND 14 A. Facts and Procedural History 15 This is an insurance dispute in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, an insurance company, 16 breached the parties’ insurance contract, breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 17 inherent in that contract (also known as a bad-faith claim), and violated Nevada’s unfair claims 18 practices act (Nevada Revised Statute § 686A.310) by mishandling his insurance claim. ECF No. 19 1-1. In discovery, Defendant produced its claim file for Plaintiff. See ECF No. 84 at 6. Some 20 information in the claim file was redacted to preserve attorney-client privilege. Id. 21 B. Parties’ Arguments 22 Defendant requests that the Court preclude Plaintiff from commenting on redactions in its 23 claim file as small portions have been redacted as protected by attorney-client privilege. ECF No. 24 84 at 6. Defendants argue that excluding such comments is appropriate under Federal Rule of 25 Evidence 403 as any probative value is outweighed by the risks that the jury will conclude 26 Defendant is hiding something nefarious. Id. 27 1 Plaintiff agrees to refraining from commenting on the attorney-client privilege redactions 2 provided Defendant and its witnesses are also precluded from commenting on the redactions 3 within the exhibits. ECF No. 95 at 4. Plaintiff points out that there are some unredacted references 4 to attorney-client communications in Defendant’s exhibits, specifically unredacted 5 communications with Defendant’s counsel about scheduling an independent medical 6 examination. Id. at 3. Plaintiff requests that Defendant and its witnesses do not refer to any of the 7 unredacted communications or unredacted references to communications between it and its 8 counsel. Id. at 5. In support of his argument, Plaintiff states that Defendant cannot “have its cake 9 and eat it too” by redacting certain communications and keeping some communications 10 unredacted and attempt to use them at trial. Id. at 5. Plaintiff does not cite any authority in support 11 of his contention. 12 In its reply, Defendant agrees that the order preventing Plaintiff from commenting on the 13 redactions should be reciprocal and Defendant will not comment on the redacted information 14 either. ECF No. 102 at 2. However, Defendant argues that issues regarding unredacted 15 information were not discussed during the parties’ meet and confer and that Plaintiff’s response 16 is, in part, a separate motion in limine. Id. As Plaintiff’s response acts as a motion in limine, such 17 motion it is untimely. Id. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial efficiency, the argument will be 18 addressed. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 A motion in limine is a procedural device that permits courts to rule on the admissibility 22 of evidence or testimony before trial. United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 23 2009). Though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize ruling on motions in 24 limine, the practice is based on the “district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 25 trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). However, in limine rulings are 26 provisional. Such “rulings are not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his mind 27 during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000). Relatedly, 1 admissible at trial. Humes v. Acuity, No. 2:17-CV-01778-JAD-DJA, 2021 WL 1971491, at *2 (D. 2 Nev. May 14, 2021). Rather, it means that the court cannot determine whether the evidence 3 should be excluded without the context of trial. Id. 4 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to 5 make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 6 consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. If evidence is not relevant, it is not 7 admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. If evidence is relevant, the court may still exclude it “if its 8 probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 9 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 10 presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “[P]rejudice outweighs probative value . . . if 11 the jury is basing its decision on something other than the established facts and legal propositions 12 in the case.” United States v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) provides that when a motion must 14 be filed a specified time, the court my extend the time for good cause. Such extension can be 15 granted with or without motion if the court acts, or a request is made, before the original time 16 expires or “on motion made after the time expired if the party failed to act because of excusable 17 neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). 18 B. The Court grants Defendant’s motion in limine and denies Plaintiff’s countermotion. 19 The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s opposition acts as its own motion in 20 limine to preclude Defendant from referring to any communications between Defendant and its 21 counsel. Plaintiff should have filed its request as a motion in limine by the January 6, 2026, 22 deadline rather than as a response by the January 9 deadline. Thus, Plaintiff’s request is untimely. 23 But, in the interest of judicial efficiency and the orderly presentation of evidence at trial, the 24 Court will address the argument. 25 Plaintiff does not explain why Defendant should be precluded from referring to any 26 communications between Defendant and its counsel under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 or 403. 27 1 || “What is good for the goose is good for the gander” is not an adequate legal standard. See Local 2 || Rule 7-2 (requiring motions to be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities). 3 Since the parties agree, however, that both counsel for Plaintiff and for Defendant should 4 || be precluded from commenting on redacted information in the case files as protected by the 5 || attorney-client privilege, and because allowing such commentary would be unfairly prejudicial 6 || under Federal Rule of Evidence

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Related

Luce v. United States
469 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Ohler v. United States
529 U.S. 753 (Supreme Court, 2000)
United States v. Heller
551 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Ryan Borchik v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryan-borchik-v-state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-company-nvd-2026.