FILED Jul 19 2019, 9:19 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Evan M. Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ryan Baxter, July 19, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2050 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D03-1612-F1-11
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 1 of 8 [1] Ryan Baxter appeals his conviction of Level 1 felony child molesting. 1 Baxter
asserts:
1. The trial court erred by admitting a medical report; and
2. His victim’s testimony was incredibly dubious, rendering his conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Jonathan Woods (“Father”) divorced Courtney Baxter (“Mother”) when their
daughter A.W. was two years old. Father received primary custody over A.W.
Every other weekend, A.W. would stay with Mother and her husband, Baxter.
When A.W. would return from visits with Mother and Baxter, A.W.’s behavior
would be noticeably changed. A.W. would be moody, avoid other people, and
have night terrors.
[3] Near the end of January 2016, A.W., then four, was staying with Mother and
Baxter for the weekend. One night, after Mother had gone to work, A.W. was
in Baxter’s bedroom. Baxter made A.W. lie down on the bed and threatened to
spank her if she did not remove her clothes. Baxter then took off his pants and
put his penis in A.W.’s butt and vagina. A.W. told Baxter to stop, but he
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 2 of 8 ignored her. When Baxter was finished, he told A.W. to go back to her room.
A.W. experienced anal and vaginal pain for several days after the incident.
[4] One night after A.W. had returned to Father’s home, A.W. was getting ready
for bed with her grandmother, Rose. A.W. told Rose what happened with
Baxter. The next day, Rose told Father what happened. Father and Rose then
took A.W. to report the incident to the police. On February 8, 2016, A.W.
underwent a sexual assault examination. The nurse, Nancy Grant, determined
A.W. had an injury consistent with prior penile penetration that was healing.
[5] The State charged Baxter with three counts of Level 1 felony child molesting.
A jury found Baxter guilty of one count of Level 1 felony child molesting. The
trial court imposed a forty-eight-year sentence with eight years suspended.
Discussion and Decision Admission of Evidence [6] Baxter argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing A.W.’s medical
report into evidence because it contained inadmissible hearsay. “A trial court
has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will
disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.”
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 3 of 8 actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,
490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
[7] Baxter argues the medial report prepared by Grant contains hearsay because it
contains A.W.’s report identifying Baxter as the perpetrator of the sexual
assault that caused her injury. Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c).
Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by law or other court rules. Evid.
R. 802.
[8] While the statement identifying Baxter as the perpetrator typically would be
inadmissible, Isee Muncy v. State, 716 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(testimony regarding out-of-court identification of defendant was
inadmissible), trans. denied, the State asserts a hearsay exception provided in
Evidence Rule 803 renders admissible Grant’s report of A.W.’s identification
of Baxter as the person who sexually assaulted her. Indiana Evidence Rule
803(4) provides “[a] statement that: (A) is made by a person seeking medical
diagnosis or treatment; (B) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—
medical diagnosis or treatment; and (C) describes medical history; past or
present symptoms, pain or sensations; their inception; or their general cause” is
not excluded by the hearsay rule.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 4 of 8 [9] For a report to be admissible under that exception, the declarant’s self-interest
in obtaining effective medical treatment must be considered. The court must
determine: “1) is the declarant motivated to provide truthful information in
order to promote diagnosis and treatment; and 2) is the content of the
statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely on it in
rendering diagnosis or treatment.” McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.
1996). “[C]ourts may exercise their discretion in admitting medical diagnosis
statements which relay the identity of the perpetrator.” Perry v. State, 956
N.E.2d 41, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[10] Statements made by victims of sexual assault “satisfy the second prong of the
analysis because they assist medical providers in recommending potential
treatment for sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy testing, psychological
counseling, and discharge instructions.” 2 VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255,
260 (Ind. 2013). As we have explained:
All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of the abuser. The physician generally must know who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim’s family or household. In the domestic sexual abuse case, for example, the treating
2 Baxter does not argue the first prong of the analysis, so we need not address it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 5 of 8 physician may recommend special therapy or counseling and instruct the victim to remove herself from the dangerous environment by leaving the home and seeking shelter elsewhere.
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FILED Jul 19 2019, 9:19 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Evan M. Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ryan Baxter, July 19, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2050 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D03-1612-F1-11
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 1 of 8 [1] Ryan Baxter appeals his conviction of Level 1 felony child molesting. 1 Baxter
asserts:
1. The trial court erred by admitting a medical report; and
2. His victim’s testimony was incredibly dubious, rendering his conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Jonathan Woods (“Father”) divorced Courtney Baxter (“Mother”) when their
daughter A.W. was two years old. Father received primary custody over A.W.
Every other weekend, A.W. would stay with Mother and her husband, Baxter.
When A.W. would return from visits with Mother and Baxter, A.W.’s behavior
would be noticeably changed. A.W. would be moody, avoid other people, and
have night terrors.
[3] Near the end of January 2016, A.W., then four, was staying with Mother and
Baxter for the weekend. One night, after Mother had gone to work, A.W. was
in Baxter’s bedroom. Baxter made A.W. lie down on the bed and threatened to
spank her if she did not remove her clothes. Baxter then took off his pants and
put his penis in A.W.’s butt and vagina. A.W. told Baxter to stop, but he
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 2 of 8 ignored her. When Baxter was finished, he told A.W. to go back to her room.
A.W. experienced anal and vaginal pain for several days after the incident.
[4] One night after A.W. had returned to Father’s home, A.W. was getting ready
for bed with her grandmother, Rose. A.W. told Rose what happened with
Baxter. The next day, Rose told Father what happened. Father and Rose then
took A.W. to report the incident to the police. On February 8, 2016, A.W.
underwent a sexual assault examination. The nurse, Nancy Grant, determined
A.W. had an injury consistent with prior penile penetration that was healing.
[5] The State charged Baxter with three counts of Level 1 felony child molesting.
A jury found Baxter guilty of one count of Level 1 felony child molesting. The
trial court imposed a forty-eight-year sentence with eight years suspended.
Discussion and Decision Admission of Evidence [6] Baxter argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing A.W.’s medical
report into evidence because it contained inadmissible hearsay. “A trial court
has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will
disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.”
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 3 of 8 actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,
490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
[7] Baxter argues the medial report prepared by Grant contains hearsay because it
contains A.W.’s report identifying Baxter as the perpetrator of the sexual
assault that caused her injury. Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c).
Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by law or other court rules. Evid.
R. 802.
[8] While the statement identifying Baxter as the perpetrator typically would be
inadmissible, Isee Muncy v. State, 716 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(testimony regarding out-of-court identification of defendant was
inadmissible), trans. denied, the State asserts a hearsay exception provided in
Evidence Rule 803 renders admissible Grant’s report of A.W.’s identification
of Baxter as the person who sexually assaulted her. Indiana Evidence Rule
803(4) provides “[a] statement that: (A) is made by a person seeking medical
diagnosis or treatment; (B) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—
medical diagnosis or treatment; and (C) describes medical history; past or
present symptoms, pain or sensations; their inception; or their general cause” is
not excluded by the hearsay rule.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 4 of 8 [9] For a report to be admissible under that exception, the declarant’s self-interest
in obtaining effective medical treatment must be considered. The court must
determine: “1) is the declarant motivated to provide truthful information in
order to promote diagnosis and treatment; and 2) is the content of the
statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely on it in
rendering diagnosis or treatment.” McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.
1996). “[C]ourts may exercise their discretion in admitting medical diagnosis
statements which relay the identity of the perpetrator.” Perry v. State, 956
N.E.2d 41, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[10] Statements made by victims of sexual assault “satisfy the second prong of the
analysis because they assist medical providers in recommending potential
treatment for sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy testing, psychological
counseling, and discharge instructions.” 2 VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255,
260 (Ind. 2013). As we have explained:
All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of the abuser. The physician generally must know who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim’s family or household. In the domestic sexual abuse case, for example, the treating
2 Baxter does not argue the first prong of the analysis, so we need not address it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 5 of 8 physician may recommend special therapy or counseling and instruct the victim to remove herself from the dangerous environment by leaving the home and seeking shelter elsewhere. In short, the domestic sexual abuser’s identity is admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser has such an intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser’s identity becomes “reasonably pertinent” to the victim’s proper treatment.
Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
[11] Father and Rose took A.W. to the hospital. The identification of Baxter as the
perpetrator was relevant and necessary in order for Grant to know if she could
discharge A.W. into Father’s custody without A.W. being subjected to more
abuse after she was released. Because the identification of Baxter as the
perpetrator was necessary to ensure A.W.’s safety, the court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the medical report. See Perry, 956 N.E.2d at 49
(identification of assailant “relevant to any psychological counseling for
domestic abuse, and significant to medical personnel in deciding how to
discharge their patient”).
Sufficiency of Evidence [12] Baxter argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. When
considering the sufficiency of evidence, “a reviewing court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d
124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must affirm “if the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 6 of 8 fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 126
(internal citation omitted).
[13] Baxter specifically claims the evidence was insufficient because A.W.’s
testimony was incredibly dubious. “Under the incredible dubiosity rule, a court
will impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses
only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced,
equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Tillman v.
State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994). “Application of this rule is limited to
cases . . . where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony [that]
is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of
circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Id.
[14] Incredible dubiosity is not available to invalidate A.W.’s testimony because her
testimony is not inherently contradictory and it is corroborated by other witness
testimony. At trial, Grant, a sexual assault nurse examiner, testified A.W.
sustained injury to her hymen that was consistent with penile penetration.
Grant’s testimony provides circumstantial evidence in support of A.W.’s
testimony and invalidates Baxter’s incredible dubiosity argument. See Moore v.
State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 760 (Ind. 2015) (rejecting incredible dubiosity when
testimony supported by circumstantial evidence). A.W.’s testimony was
sufficient to support Baxter’s conviction. See Bennet v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1189,
1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (testimony of victim of child molest was sufficient to
sustain a conviction).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 7 of 8 Conclusion [15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Grant’s medical report.
Because A.W.’s testimony was supported by evidence of sexual assault
observed during an examination, A.W.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious.
The evidence was sufficient to convict Baxter. Accordingly, we affirm.
[16] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2050 | July 19, 2019 Page 8 of 8