NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0298n.06
Case No. 25-1332
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED Jul 10, 2026 ) RYAN BAUGH, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellee. ) ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. The Central Intelligence Agency denied Ryan Baugh’s application
for a security clearance. The Agency provided Baugh with a redacted copy of its investigation
record, gave a page-length explanation for its decision, and notified him about the opportunity to
seek administrative review. Baugh declined to seek administrative review. He instead sought an
injunction and writ of mandamus in federal court to compel the Agency to release its unredacted
investigation file. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
I.
In January 2019, Ryan Baugh applied to the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain
clearance to handle Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information on behalf of his
employer, a government contractor. Six months later, the Agency informed Baugh by letter that
the government denied his application. It concluded that Baugh’s past use of controlled substances No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
disqualified him from accessing classified materials. The letter told Baugh that he could request
review of the decision and could obtain non-classified information contained in the government’s
investigation file about him.
Baugh declined to seek review of the denial, but he did request the investigation file. When
Baugh received the file in October 2022, he learned that the Agency had heavily redacted it.
Although the Agency detailed its final decision and reasons for denying his application, it blacked
out Baugh’s identifying information and several pages of notes by the officers who reviewed the
application. Citing Executive Order 12,968 and agency policy, it explained that agencies must
provide documents that justify the denial of a security clearance application but only “to the extent
the documents would be provided if requested under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 552) or the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a).” R.10-2 at 3; Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 5.2(a)(2)–
(3), 60 Fed. Reg. 40245, 40252 (Aug. 2, 1995); see ICPG 704.3(D)(1)(c) (Intelligence Community
guidance implementing EO); AR 7-7(II)(16)(e)(2)(b) (Central Intelligence Agency guidance
implementing EO).
Over the next year, Baugh repeatedly asked the Agency to release his full investigation
file. The Agency sent several additional documents but continued to censor the reviewing officers’
notes. The Agency also continued to ask Baugh if he wanted to seek review of its security
clearance decision. Baugh, for his part, remained focused on the redacted investigation file and
stopped responding to the Agency’s invitations to begin the review process. R.1 at 9. On
December 20, 2023, after the Agency’s fifth inquiry about whether Baugh wanted to seek review
of its no-clearance decision, the Agency informed Baugh’s attorney that, “[i]f we do not receive a
response within 10 business days, your client’s request for a review will be cancelled, due to our
inability to contact you.” R.1 at 9.
2 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
At this point, Baugh abandoned the administrative process. He instead filed this lawsuit in
federal court. He claimed that the Agency’s redactions violated Executive Order 12,968 and
agency policy, which prevented him from “continu[ing] with the ongoing administrative
proceeding” to gain a security clearance. R.1 at 11. He requested declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, plus a writ of mandamus under the
Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C § 1361.
The Agency moved to dismiss Baugh’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim under the APA
or the Mandamus Act. In its motion, the Agency disclaimed any “acknowledgment” of “the factual
veracity of any of the allegations,” including whether Baugh “named the proper Defendant.” R.10
at 10 n.1. Based on this disclaimer, Baugh moved for jurisdictional discovery. The district court
granted the Agency’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit and denied Baugh’s motion for jurisdictional
discovery.
II.
The APA provides a cause of action if “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”
5 U.S.C. § 704. The Mandamus Act likewise requires Baugh to show that “he has no
other adequate remedy.” Baaghil v. Miller, 1 F.4th 427, 435 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
“[R]elief will be deemed adequate where a statute affords an opportunity for de novo district-court
review of the agency action” and “relief of the same genre to the party seeking redress,” even if
that relief is not “identical.” Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246, 262 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
Baugh’s complaint fails to state a claim under either statute. It alleges that the Agency
failed to comply with Executive Order 12,968 and the implementing guidance, which restate the
Agency’s obligation to provide documents to the extent required by applicable law, namely FOIA
3 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
and the Privacy Act. Baugh asks for an injunction and writ of mandamus ordering the Agency to
“immediately provide him with all information in his investigative file to the extent that the
information would not be exempt under FOIA” and the Privacy Act. R.1 at 11.
Baugh’s complaint thus attempts to “duplicate existing procedures for review of agency
action.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). Both FOIA and the Privacy Act
provide for injunctive relief if an agency wrongfully withholds records. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B),
552a(g)(3)(A); see Cincinnati Enquirer v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 45 F.4th 929, 932 (6th Cir. 2022);
see also Hanley v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 623 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). And
if Baugh brought a claim under those laws, a favorable ruling would “order relief identical to that”
now claimed under the APA and Mandamus Act, “i.e., production of the unredacted documents
[Baugh] seeks.” Rimmer, 700 F.3d at 262. That possibility “clearly provides an alternat[ive]
adequate remedy” and deprives Baugh of a cause of action under the APA or the Mandamus Act.
Id. at 262, 264.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0298n.06
Case No. 25-1332
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED Jul 10, 2026 ) RYAN BAUGH, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellee. ) ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. The Central Intelligence Agency denied Ryan Baugh’s application
for a security clearance. The Agency provided Baugh with a redacted copy of its investigation
record, gave a page-length explanation for its decision, and notified him about the opportunity to
seek administrative review. Baugh declined to seek administrative review. He instead sought an
injunction and writ of mandamus in federal court to compel the Agency to release its unredacted
investigation file. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
I.
In January 2019, Ryan Baugh applied to the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain
clearance to handle Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information on behalf of his
employer, a government contractor. Six months later, the Agency informed Baugh by letter that
the government denied his application. It concluded that Baugh’s past use of controlled substances No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
disqualified him from accessing classified materials. The letter told Baugh that he could request
review of the decision and could obtain non-classified information contained in the government’s
investigation file about him.
Baugh declined to seek review of the denial, but he did request the investigation file. When
Baugh received the file in October 2022, he learned that the Agency had heavily redacted it.
Although the Agency detailed its final decision and reasons for denying his application, it blacked
out Baugh’s identifying information and several pages of notes by the officers who reviewed the
application. Citing Executive Order 12,968 and agency policy, it explained that agencies must
provide documents that justify the denial of a security clearance application but only “to the extent
the documents would be provided if requested under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
§ 552) or the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a).” R.10-2 at 3; Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 5.2(a)(2)–
(3), 60 Fed. Reg. 40245, 40252 (Aug. 2, 1995); see ICPG 704.3(D)(1)(c) (Intelligence Community
guidance implementing EO); AR 7-7(II)(16)(e)(2)(b) (Central Intelligence Agency guidance
implementing EO).
Over the next year, Baugh repeatedly asked the Agency to release his full investigation
file. The Agency sent several additional documents but continued to censor the reviewing officers’
notes. The Agency also continued to ask Baugh if he wanted to seek review of its security
clearance decision. Baugh, for his part, remained focused on the redacted investigation file and
stopped responding to the Agency’s invitations to begin the review process. R.1 at 9. On
December 20, 2023, after the Agency’s fifth inquiry about whether Baugh wanted to seek review
of its no-clearance decision, the Agency informed Baugh’s attorney that, “[i]f we do not receive a
response within 10 business days, your client’s request for a review will be cancelled, due to our
inability to contact you.” R.1 at 9.
2 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
At this point, Baugh abandoned the administrative process. He instead filed this lawsuit in
federal court. He claimed that the Agency’s redactions violated Executive Order 12,968 and
agency policy, which prevented him from “continu[ing] with the ongoing administrative
proceeding” to gain a security clearance. R.1 at 11. He requested declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, plus a writ of mandamus under the
Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C § 1361.
The Agency moved to dismiss Baugh’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim under the APA
or the Mandamus Act. In its motion, the Agency disclaimed any “acknowledgment” of “the factual
veracity of any of the allegations,” including whether Baugh “named the proper Defendant.” R.10
at 10 n.1. Based on this disclaimer, Baugh moved for jurisdictional discovery. The district court
granted the Agency’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit and denied Baugh’s motion for jurisdictional
discovery.
II.
The APA provides a cause of action if “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”
5 U.S.C. § 704. The Mandamus Act likewise requires Baugh to show that “he has no
other adequate remedy.” Baaghil v. Miller, 1 F.4th 427, 435 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
“[R]elief will be deemed adequate where a statute affords an opportunity for de novo district-court
review of the agency action” and “relief of the same genre to the party seeking redress,” even if
that relief is not “identical.” Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246, 262 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
Baugh’s complaint fails to state a claim under either statute. It alleges that the Agency
failed to comply with Executive Order 12,968 and the implementing guidance, which restate the
Agency’s obligation to provide documents to the extent required by applicable law, namely FOIA
3 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
and the Privacy Act. Baugh asks for an injunction and writ of mandamus ordering the Agency to
“immediately provide him with all information in his investigative file to the extent that the
information would not be exempt under FOIA” and the Privacy Act. R.1 at 11.
Baugh’s complaint thus attempts to “duplicate existing procedures for review of agency
action.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). Both FOIA and the Privacy Act
provide for injunctive relief if an agency wrongfully withholds records. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B),
552a(g)(3)(A); see Cincinnati Enquirer v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 45 F.4th 929, 932 (6th Cir. 2022);
see also Hanley v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 623 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). And
if Baugh brought a claim under those laws, a favorable ruling would “order relief identical to that”
now claimed under the APA and Mandamus Act, “i.e., production of the unredacted documents
[Baugh] seeks.” Rimmer, 700 F.3d at 262. That possibility “clearly provides an alternat[ive]
adequate remedy” and deprives Baugh of a cause of action under the APA or the Mandamus Act.
Id. at 262, 264.
The disclaimers in the Executive Order and implementing guidance cement this
conclusion. They say that they “create[] no procedural or substantive rights” “enforceable by a
party against the United States.” Exec. Order No. 12,968 §§ 5.2(c), 7.2(e); accord
ICPG 704.3(D)(5); AR 7-7(II)(16)(i)(5). It is true that an agency, on occasion, might find itself
bound by an order or policy promising “greater procedural protections” than those laid out by
Congress. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1959). But the Executive Order and guidance
took care to avoid this situation. They “remind[] affected parties of existing duties” established
by FOIA and the Privacy Act. Tenn. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 908 F.3d 1029, 1042 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quotation omitted). The sole “requirement in Executive Order 12,968 and the implementing
4 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
regulations,” as Baugh himself acknowledges, “is that [the] CIA apply FOIA and the Privacy Act.”
Reply Br. 5 (emphasis in original).
Baugh resists this conclusion on the ground that he cannot sue under FOIA and the Privacy
Act until the Agency completes its review of his security clearance application. But he never
explains why the Agency’s review of his security clearance application bars his FOIA and Privacy
Act claims. Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Issues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, without some effort to develop an argument, are deemed forfeited.”)
(quotation omitted). Nor does our own review of the statutes reveal any such exhaustion
requirement. See Haase v. Sessions, 893 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Dettmann v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 802 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Baugh separately claims that litigation under FOIA and the Privacy Act takes too long to
qualify as an adequate remedy. But any delay in Baugh’s vindication of his FOIA and Privacy
Act rights is of his own making. He offers no explanation why he did not bring claims for this
information under FOIA and the Privacy Act several years ago. Any procedural hurdles under
these statutes, moreover, do not aid his cause. As our “sister circuits” have “uniform[ly]
conclu[ded],” a legal remedy does not become inadequate merely “because it is procedurally
inconvenient for a given plaintiff.” Martinez v. Pompeo, 977 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (quotation omitted) (collecting cases from six circuits).
III.
Baugh separately insists that he has a right to jurisdictional discovery. The premise of his
request is a footnote in the Agency’s motion to dismiss saying that “the United States does not . . .
confirm or deny that Plaintiff has named the proper Defendant in this lawsuit.” R.10 at 10 n.1. As
5 No. 25-1332, Baugh v. Central Intelligence Agency
Baugh sees it, this disclaimer calls into question whether a different agency holds his investigation
files and thus whether this court even has jurisdiction over his lawsuit.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baugh’s request. See Hohman v.
Eadie, 894 F.3d 776, 781 (6th Cir. 2018). Baugh offers no authority for the novel idea that a court
must permit jurisdictional discovery to soothe a party’s own doubts about jurisdiction in his own
case. Such requests risk serious abuse, particularly when, as here, discovery offers nothing more
than “a fishing expedition for an otherwise claimless plaintiff.” Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust
Co., 848 F.2d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). Even if we overlook that point,
Baugh’s own complaint fully supported the district court’s jurisdiction. It showed injury (“adverse
and harmful professional and financial effects”), causation (“as a result of” the Agency’s
“impermissibly with[o]ld[ing] information”), and redressability (“an injunction compelling” the
Agency to “immediately provide him with all information” required by FOIA and the Privacy Act).
R.1 at 11; see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). At this stage of litigation,
“jurisdiction follows from (and only from) the operative pleading.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025). The district court thus had jurisdiction over Baugh’s
complaint.
We affirm.