Rutman v. Giedel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rutman v. Giedel

67 A.D.2d 662, 411 N.Y.S.2d 960, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10238

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 8, 1979

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 67 A.D.2d 662 (Rutman v. Giedel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rutman v. Giedel, 67 A.D.2d 662, 411 N.Y.S.2d 960, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10238 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

— In a defamation action, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, entered March 21, 1977, which, inter alia, is in favor of the defendant, upon the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint at the end of the entire case, at a jury trial. Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. The false accusation that a police officer was drunk or intoxicated while on duty is slanderous per se and requires no allegation or proof of special damages (see Ann. 53 ALR2d 8, 121; 34 NY Jur, Libel and Slander, §§39, 45). The single-instance rule is inapplicable. That a police officer would permit himself to be drunk while on duty shows such a lack of character as would render him unfit for his position (see Mason v Sullivan, 26 AD2d 115). The jury could have found that the defendant’s complaint at the station house was motivated by malice. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the complaint. Hopkins, J. P., Titone, O’Connor and Cohalan, JJ., concur.

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— In a defamation action, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, entered March 21, 1977, which, inter alia, is in favor of the defendant, upon the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint at the end of the entire case, at a jury trial. Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. The false accusation that a police officer was drunk or intoxicated while on duty is slanderous per se and requires no allegation or proof of special damages (see Ann. 53 ALR2d 8, 121; 34 NY Jur, Libel and Slander, §§39, 45). The single-instance rule is inapplicable. That a police officer would permit himself to be drunk while on duty shows such a lack of character as would render him unfit for his position (see Mason v Sullivan, 26 AD2d 115). The jury could have found that the defendant’s complaint at the station house was motivated by malice. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the complaint. Hopkins, J. P., Titone, O’Connor and Cohalan, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

67 A.D.2d 662, 411 N.Y.S.2d 960, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rutman-v-giedel-nyappdiv-1979.

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