315 Ga. 521 FINAL COPY
S22A0916. RUTLAND v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Israel Rutland was convicted of felony murder in
connection with the deaths of Kelly Marie Prescott and Matthew
Dean Horton resulting from a vehicular collision following a high-
speed police chase.1 On appeal, Appellant contends in two related
1 Prescott and Horton died on November 12, 2013. On February 2, 2015,
a Berrien County grand jury indicted Appellant for the following counts: felony murder of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 1); felony murder of Horton, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 2); homicide by vehicle in the first degree of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 3); homicide by vehicle in the first degree of Horton, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 4); serious injury by vehicle of Heidi Mancil (Count 5); fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Counts 6-11); aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12 and 13); reckless conduct (Count 14); reckless driving (Count 15); driving under the influence (Count 16); driving while license suspended (Count 17); and failure to stop at a stop sign (Count 18). Prior to trial, the driving under the influence count (Count 16) was dismissed. Jury selection occurred from September 20 to 21, 2016, and Appellant was represented by counsel during jury selection. At a trial from December 6 to December 15, 2016, Appellant represented himself, and his stand-by counsel presented closing argument. The jury found Appellant not guilty of two counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12 and 13) claims that his convictions for felony murder and homicide by
vehicle in the first degree constitute “inconsistent verdicts”
requiring reversal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that on November 12,
2013, Appellant was driving through Tift County when a law
enforcement officer attempted to pull him over to execute a pending
arrest warrant. Appellant refused to pull over and led officers on a
high-speed chase spanning multiple counties. Once in Berrien
County, the Nashville Police Department deployed “stop sticks.”
Though Appellant ran over the “stop sticks,” he never reduced his
speed, lost control of his vehicle, or left his lane of travel. Shortly
thereafter, he drove through an intersection with a stop sign and
collided with a Trailblazer driven by Heidi Mancil. Mancil’s siblings,
and reckless conduct (Count 14), but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court merged the two counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Counts 3 and 4) into the two felony murder counts (Counts 1 and 2), and Appellant was sentenced to serve life in prison plus six years. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial. After the motion-for-new-trial hearing, the trial court vacated one of Appellant’s convictions for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Count 6), re-sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison plus five years, and otherwise denied the motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Prescott and Horton, were also occupants of the vehicle. Prescott and
Horton were declared dead at the scene, and their cause of death
was determined to be severe trauma as a result of the collision.
Although Mancil survived, she suffered serious injuries and had to
be life-flighted to the nearest hospital to treat her injuries.
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it
accepted the jury’s guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by
vehicle in the first degree because they were “inconsistent verdicts.”
He argues that these verdicts were “inconsistent” because the felony
murder convictions required a finding that Appellant “acted with
criminal intent” and the homicide by vehicle convictions required a
finding that Appellant “acted . . . [with] criminal negligence.” For
the reasons explained below, this claim has no merit.
“As a general rule, inconsistent verdicts occur when a jury in a
criminal case renders seemingly incompatible verdicts of guilty on
one charge and not guilty on another.” McElrath v. State, 308 Ga.
104, 108 (2) (a) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (emphasis in original). See
also State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 216 (1) (a) (862 SE2d 125) (2021).
3 An example of “inconsistent verdicts” is when a defendant is
convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of the
crime of aggravated assault, but found not guilty of aggravated
assault. See Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295-296 (4) (687 SE2d
427) (2009). Although this Court once viewed inconsistent verdicts
as impermissible, we now allow inconsistent verdicts to stand,
reasoning that “it is not generally within the court’s power to make
inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the
reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty
verdicts.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 109 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation
omitted). But, we have acknowledged that “repugnant verdicts”
require reversal. See id. at 111 (2) (c). “Repugnant verdicts” “occur
when, in order to find the defendant not guilty on one count and
guilty on another, the jury must make affirmative findings shown
on the record that cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.”
Id. at 111 (2) (c) (emphasis omitted). An example of “repugnant
verdicts” is when a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill of
felony murder and aggravated assault and not guilty of malice
4 murder by reason of insanity. See id. at 112 (2) (c) (“Put simply, it is
not legally possible for an individual to simultaneously be insane
and not insane during a single criminal episode against a single
victim, even if the episode gives rise to more than one crime.”).
Here, Appellant contends that, although we no longer hold that
inconsistent verdicts necessarily require reversal, the verdicts in
this case should nonetheless be reversed. However, the guilty
verdicts on felony murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree
cannot be classified as “inconsistent verdicts” or “repugnant
verdicts” because the felony murder and homicide by vehicle verdicts
consist only of guilty verdicts, rather than a guilty verdict and a not
guilty verdict. Thus, Appellant’s claim has no merit.
Although two or more guilty verdicts cannot be “inconsistent
verdicts” or “repugnant verdicts” as we have defined those terms,
they could be “mutually exclusive.” See McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2)
(b). But guilty verdicts are not mutually exclusive with one another
unless they “cannot legally exist simultaneously.” Id. An example of
“mutually exclusive” verdicts is when a defendant is convicted of
5 malice murder, an offense requiring a showing of the presence of
malice aforethought, and vehicular homicide, an offense requiring a
showing of the absence of malice aforethought. See Dumas v. State,
266 Ga. 797, 799 (2) (471 SE2d 508) (1996).
Here, the guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by
vehicle involve levels of mental culpability that are different in
degree but not ones that, as in Dumas, “cannot legally exist
simultaneously.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2) (b). See also OCGA §
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315 Ga. 521 FINAL COPY
S22A0916. RUTLAND v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Israel Rutland was convicted of felony murder in
connection with the deaths of Kelly Marie Prescott and Matthew
Dean Horton resulting from a vehicular collision following a high-
speed police chase.1 On appeal, Appellant contends in two related
1 Prescott and Horton died on November 12, 2013. On February 2, 2015,
a Berrien County grand jury indicted Appellant for the following counts: felony murder of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 1); felony murder of Horton, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 2); homicide by vehicle in the first degree of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 3); homicide by vehicle in the first degree of Horton, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 4); serious injury by vehicle of Heidi Mancil (Count 5); fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Counts 6-11); aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12 and 13); reckless conduct (Count 14); reckless driving (Count 15); driving under the influence (Count 16); driving while license suspended (Count 17); and failure to stop at a stop sign (Count 18). Prior to trial, the driving under the influence count (Count 16) was dismissed. Jury selection occurred from September 20 to 21, 2016, and Appellant was represented by counsel during jury selection. At a trial from December 6 to December 15, 2016, Appellant represented himself, and his stand-by counsel presented closing argument. The jury found Appellant not guilty of two counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12 and 13) claims that his convictions for felony murder and homicide by
vehicle in the first degree constitute “inconsistent verdicts”
requiring reversal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that on November 12,
2013, Appellant was driving through Tift County when a law
enforcement officer attempted to pull him over to execute a pending
arrest warrant. Appellant refused to pull over and led officers on a
high-speed chase spanning multiple counties. Once in Berrien
County, the Nashville Police Department deployed “stop sticks.”
Though Appellant ran over the “stop sticks,” he never reduced his
speed, lost control of his vehicle, or left his lane of travel. Shortly
thereafter, he drove through an intersection with a stop sign and
collided with a Trailblazer driven by Heidi Mancil. Mancil’s siblings,
and reckless conduct (Count 14), but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court merged the two counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Counts 3 and 4) into the two felony murder counts (Counts 1 and 2), and Appellant was sentenced to serve life in prison plus six years. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial. After the motion-for-new-trial hearing, the trial court vacated one of Appellant’s convictions for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Count 6), re-sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison plus five years, and otherwise denied the motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Prescott and Horton, were also occupants of the vehicle. Prescott and
Horton were declared dead at the scene, and their cause of death
was determined to be severe trauma as a result of the collision.
Although Mancil survived, she suffered serious injuries and had to
be life-flighted to the nearest hospital to treat her injuries.
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it
accepted the jury’s guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by
vehicle in the first degree because they were “inconsistent verdicts.”
He argues that these verdicts were “inconsistent” because the felony
murder convictions required a finding that Appellant “acted with
criminal intent” and the homicide by vehicle convictions required a
finding that Appellant “acted . . . [with] criminal negligence.” For
the reasons explained below, this claim has no merit.
“As a general rule, inconsistent verdicts occur when a jury in a
criminal case renders seemingly incompatible verdicts of guilty on
one charge and not guilty on another.” McElrath v. State, 308 Ga.
104, 108 (2) (a) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (emphasis in original). See
also State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 216 (1) (a) (862 SE2d 125) (2021).
3 An example of “inconsistent verdicts” is when a defendant is
convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of the
crime of aggravated assault, but found not guilty of aggravated
assault. See Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295-296 (4) (687 SE2d
427) (2009). Although this Court once viewed inconsistent verdicts
as impermissible, we now allow inconsistent verdicts to stand,
reasoning that “it is not generally within the court’s power to make
inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the
reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty
verdicts.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 109 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation
omitted). But, we have acknowledged that “repugnant verdicts”
require reversal. See id. at 111 (2) (c). “Repugnant verdicts” “occur
when, in order to find the defendant not guilty on one count and
guilty on another, the jury must make affirmative findings shown
on the record that cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.”
Id. at 111 (2) (c) (emphasis omitted). An example of “repugnant
verdicts” is when a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill of
felony murder and aggravated assault and not guilty of malice
4 murder by reason of insanity. See id. at 112 (2) (c) (“Put simply, it is
not legally possible for an individual to simultaneously be insane
and not insane during a single criminal episode against a single
victim, even if the episode gives rise to more than one crime.”).
Here, Appellant contends that, although we no longer hold that
inconsistent verdicts necessarily require reversal, the verdicts in
this case should nonetheless be reversed. However, the guilty
verdicts on felony murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree
cannot be classified as “inconsistent verdicts” or “repugnant
verdicts” because the felony murder and homicide by vehicle verdicts
consist only of guilty verdicts, rather than a guilty verdict and a not
guilty verdict. Thus, Appellant’s claim has no merit.
Although two or more guilty verdicts cannot be “inconsistent
verdicts” or “repugnant verdicts” as we have defined those terms,
they could be “mutually exclusive.” See McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2)
(b). But guilty verdicts are not mutually exclusive with one another
unless they “cannot legally exist simultaneously.” Id. An example of
“mutually exclusive” verdicts is when a defendant is convicted of
5 malice murder, an offense requiring a showing of the presence of
malice aforethought, and vehicular homicide, an offense requiring a
showing of the absence of malice aforethought. See Dumas v. State,
266 Ga. 797, 799 (2) (471 SE2d 508) (1996).
Here, the guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by
vehicle involve levels of mental culpability that are different in
degree but not ones that, as in Dumas, “cannot legally exist
simultaneously.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2) (b). See also OCGA §
16-5-1 (c) (defining “felony murder” as “in the commission of a felony,
. . . caus[ing] the death of another human being irrespective of
malice”); OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) (defining “first-degree homicide by
vehicle” as “caus[ing] the death of another person through [certain
traffic offenses]” “without malice aforethought”). We have made
clear that “multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are
based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive.”
State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 382 (1) (774 SE2d 106) (2015).2
2 We note that Springer explicitly overruled Walker v. State, 293 Ga. 709
(749 SE2d 663) (2013), which reversed the defendant’s convictions for felony
6 Accord Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 391-392 (2) (850 SE2d 41)
(2020). Thus, the verdicts here are neither inconsistent nor mutually
exclusive, and Appellant’s claim also fails for this reason.
2. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury that it could not find Appellant guilty of both
felony murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree. This claim
fails.
“Where a defendant does not request that the trial court give a
jury instruction,” as Appellant did not here, “this Court only reviews
for plain error.” Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 722 (3) (873 SE2d 166)
(2022).
To show plain error, the appellant must demonstrate that the instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be.
Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 325 (1) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (citation
murder based on aggravated assault and homicide by vehicle based on reckless driving because they were “mutually exclusive.” See Springer, 297 Ga. at 383 (2) n.4. 7 and punctuation omitted). This Court does not have to analyze all
elements of the plain-error test where an appellant fails to establish
one of them. See id.
For the reasons set forth in Division 1, we conclude that there
was no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury that it could not find Appellant guilty of both felony
murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree and that any such
instruction by the trial court would have been error. Cf. Booth v.
State, 311 Ga. 374, 375, 376 (1) (858 SE2d 39) (2021) (concluding
that the trial court made an “incorrect determination at trial that
the verdicts were mutually exclusive” when it vacated the verdicts
and “charged the jury that they could not enter guilty verdicts on
both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter and could not
enter guilty verdicts on both neglect to an elder person and reckless
conduct”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
8 Decided February 7, 2023.
Murder. Berrien Superior Court. Before Judge Tomlinson.
The C. B. King Law Firm, Chevene B. King, Jr., for appellant.
Chase L. Studstill, District Attorney, Laura A. Wood, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Parisa F. Sarfarazi, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.