Petition denied by published opinion. Judge GREGORY wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Rutilio Lopez-Soto (hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Lopez-Soto”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “BIA”) order denying his asylum request and denying him relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States in 1999, having fled Guatemala with his cousin because the gang Mara 18 posed a threat to their lives. Previously, Mara 18 killed Petitioner’s older brother, and gang members threatened to kill Lopez-Soto, his other brother and his cousin if they did not join the gang. As Petitioner and his cousin attempted to flee to the United States, his cousin was apprehended by Mexican authorities then deported to Guatemala. Shortly after the cousin returned to Guatemala, Mara 18 murdered him as well.
While it is clear that Petitioner has an objectively reasonable fear for his life if he is to return to Guatemala, the BIA’s determination that Petitioner was not persecuted “on account of’ his familial membership is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we must deny Petitioner’s asylum claim. Furthermore, we find that the BIA properly rejected Petitioner’s Convention Against Torture claim. For the detailed reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review.
[231]*231I.
A.
Petitioner was born in Quesada, Jutiapa, Guatemala in 1982. When he was eight-years-old, members of Mara 18 — a violent street gang formed in Los Angeles, California, but which now also has a strong presence in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala1 — recruited and harassed his two brothers, Edgar (then twenty-two) and Rubilio (then twenty). Both brothers had served in the Guatemalan army, and Mara 18 believed that they had military training and access to weapons. The Mara 18 threat, as is consistent with the gang’s practice, was to join or die. Both brothers refused to join.
In April 1990, members of Mara 18 killed Edgar by stabbing him eighteen times at Rio de Paz, a town in Jutiapa. Witnesses to the death notified his family and identified the two killers. Petitioner’s father filed a police report in May 1990, stating the names of the individuals believed to be the killers. The killers were never apprehended. Petitioner’s father declined offers from Edgar’s military friends to “take care” of the killers.2 After receiving letters from Mara 18 threatening his life, Rubilio fled to the United States. In his affidavit filed before the IJ in Petitioner’s case, Rubilio stated: “Because of my family’s continued opposition to Mara 18, gang members have targeted young male members of my family for recruitment. ... Because of our continued resistance, Mara 18 has threatened and attempted to kill off the young male members of my family.” J.A. 45-46¶ 5.
In January 1999, after Petitioner turned sixteen, the first incident in which Mara 18 threatened Petitioner occurred when members of the gang threatened Petitioner and his cousin, Elmer Estuardo Lopez Mejia (“Elmer”) in a park. In his affidavit,3 Petitioner stated that when members of Mara 18 confronted and threatened Petitioner and Elmer in the park, the boys, fearing violence, falsely said that they were “going to think about [joining the gang]” so that the gang would let them leave the park. Id. at 16. He also stated that his “parents were terrified that if I left the house, I would be killed like Edgar.” Id. During his testimony before the IJ, Petitioner recounted the park incident similarly and stated that when he told his parents about it, “they remembered what happened to my brother.” Id. at 412-15.4
[232]*232After this incident, the gang made continuous threats. During the summer of 1999, Mara 18 mailed the boys threatening letters at their homes. The IJ found that the letters stated the boys could either “join [Mara 18] and have everything, or refuse and you will be killed.” Id. The IJ further recognized that Petitioner and his father “both feared that [Petitioner] would be killed by [Mara 18], as his brother had been killed in 1990.” Id.
B.
Because of such fears, Petitioner’s father and Elmer’s parents arranged for the boys to flee Quesada, with the intention of fleeing Guatemala entirely. In September 1999, Petitioner and Elmer drove seven hours (roughly northeast) to the city of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala to stay with a friend of Petitioner’s father while the family arranged for the boys to leave the country. The boys stayed in Puerto Barrios for approximately one month, and Petitioner did odd jobs while there to support himself. During that time in Puerto Barrios, Petitioner did not have personal trouble with Mara 18. However, while he was in Puerto Barrios, Petitioner’s parents received two more threatening letters, the last one of which stated that Petitioner would be stabbed like Edgar if he did not join the gang and warned him that attempts to escape would be futile.5
On November 2, 1999, the boys left for the United States, traveling northward through Mexico. The boys attempted to avoid Mexican Immigration authorities because they feared being deported. On November 16, 1999, at a bus stop in Oaxaca, Mexico, immigration officials stopped the boys for questioning. Petitioner escaped by running, but Elmer was caught and deported. Petitioner continued onward to the United States, and he was detained by INS near the Texas border on December 22,1999.
On January 10, 2000, while in INS custody, Petitioner spoke with his parents by phone, and they informed him that Elmer had been deported and killed by Mara 18 upon his return to Guatemala. On February 20, 2000, Mara 18 shot Elmer’s younger brother Danny.
C.
On January 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the INS children’s facility in Texas into his brother Rubilio’s custody. Petitioner traveled with his brother to Los Angeles where he lived. Petitioner testified that he left L.A. out of fear, because he saw people that “resembled” the Mara 18,6 and moved to Virginia to stay with another family member.
On November 8, 2000, Petitioner admitted deportability at his deportation hearing, but requested relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture, or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. At his hearing on April 17, 2001, the IJ heard testimony from Petitioner and Jan Perlin, an expert qualified in the affairs of the Guatemalan justice system. The IJ also accepted numerous documents, including the aforementioned affidavits as well as other affidavits, copies of official documents, reports on Guatemala and those concerning Mara 18 itself.
[233]*233Although the IJ held that Petitioner was credible, Oral Decision at 4-5 (J.A. 500-01),7 and gave the documentary evidence “great weight,” id. at 3-4 (J.A. 499-500), he issued an oral decision declining to grant Petitioner relief. Based on the State Department’s Country Reports and Perlin’s testimony, the IJ found that the Guatemalan “justice system is dysfunctional” and that while the Guatemalan government “is willing to protect its citizens from these Mar[ ]a gangs ... they are unable to protect the citizens.” Id. at 9 (J.A. 505). However, the IJ found that Petitioner would not suffer persecution “on account of’ his membership in a particular social group, namely his family, because “there is no nexus between the killing of [Edgar] and the threats to [Petitioner] or the threats to [Petitioner’s] family, and that the [Petitioner’s] family in this case does not constitute a particular social group.” Id. at 11 (J.A. 507). In short, the IJ found that while Petitioner had a reasonably objective fear of harm from the gang, he determined that Petitioner was being recruited and harassed because he was a teenaged male living in the area, not on account of “any family reasons.” Id.8
Additionally, the IJ found that Petitioner was not entitled to protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture because the torture feared was not government sponsored. While the IJ acknowledged Mara 18’s grip on the country and law enforcement’s inability to control them, the IJ concluded that Convention Against Torture protection “does not extend to persons who fear entities that the government is unable to control.” Id. at 13 (J.A. 510).
On appeal, the BIA affirmed. In re Lopez-Soto, No. A77-693-585, slip op. at 1 (BIA Feb. 20, 2003) (per curiam) (J.A. 517). The BIA held that, “respondent has failed to establish that the harm he fears is on account of a protected ground. We also agree that respondent has failed to establish eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture because he has not shown that the government acquiesces in the torturous activities of the gang, the Mara 18.” Id. This petition for review followed.
II.
Our review of a BIA asylum eligibility determination is most narrow. See Gonahasa v. U.S. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir.1999). Our standard of review recognizes the respect we must accord the BIA’s expertise and its status as the Attorney General’s designee in deportation decisions. Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir.1992); see also M.A. A26851062 v. U.S. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 313-14 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc). Specifically, BIA determinations concerning asylum eligibility are conclusive “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir.2004). We have noted, “[t]he possibility of [234]*234drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Gonahasa, 181 F.3d at 541 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard is extremely deferential to the BIA’s determinations; indeed, we will uphold the BIA determination unless a petitioner can “show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfin-der could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84 (emphasis added); accord Blanco de Belbruno, 362 F.3d at 278; Huaman-Cornelio, 979 F.2d at 999. Finally, we review legal issues determined by the BIA de novo. Blanco de Belbruno, 362 F.3d at 278 (citing Nwolise v. U.S. INS, 4 F.3d 306, 309 (4th Cir.1993)).
III.
Petitioner argues that the BIA’s ruling that he is not eligible for asylum is not supported by substantial evidence. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is one “who is unable or unwilling to return to ... [his or her native] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). In short, to qualify for asylum, one must show: (1) a well-founded fear of persecution; (2) on account of one of the above described enumerated statutory grounds; (3) by an organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control.9 See generally Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481-83; see also M.A. A26851062, 858 F.2d at 218 (stating asylum is warranted if petitioner can show the “government is unwilling or unable to control the offending group”) (citing Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir.1987)). Petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to his eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004). Regarding the level of proof required by a petitioner seeking asylum because of future persecution who, as here, has not demonstrated past persecution,10 the statute is less clear than one might hope. The most reasonable reading of the statute, however, is that a petitioner must demonstrate fear of persecution based on a protected characteristic by a preponderance of the evidence. See Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 521, 528 n. 6, 2004 WL 1854553, at *6 n. 6 (5th Cir.2004).
In this case, there is no dispute that Petitioner has a well-founded fear of persecution by an organization which the government is unable to control. The IJ found as much, and the BIA did not disturb his holding. Oral Decision at 12 (J.A. 508) (“[Lopez-Soto] has a subjective fear of persecution and based upon the evidence presented, there is an objective fear of harm by the Ma[]ra 18 gang to this [235]*235respondent.”); see also Chen v. U.S. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 203-05 (4th Cir.1999) (discussing well-founded fear). Further, the IJ held that the Guatemalan government is “unable to protect the citizens from the Ma[]ra gangs,” Oral Decision at 9 (J.A. 505), thus satisfying the third prong.
However, the IJ rejected Lopez-Soto’s claim on the ground that there “is no nexus between the possible harm to this respondent and any of the grounds listed under the Act,” id. at 12 (J.A. 508), and the BIA affirmed because Petitioner “failed to establish that the harm he fears is on account of a protected ground.” BIA slip op. at 1 (J.A. at 517). Thus, the narrow question presented for review is whether the persecution at issue is “on account of’ Petitioner’s status as a member of a protected group. Accordingly, we turn to Petitioner’s claim that the BIA’s determination that he was not persecuted “on account of’ his family membership is unsupported by substantial evidence.
1.
The BIA denied Lopez-Soto’s asylum claim on the ground that he does not face persecution “on account of a protected ground.” Slip op. at 1 (J.A. 517). As noted above, to establish a viable asylum claim, Petitioner must show his persecution was “on account of’ his “membership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To make such a showing, the applicant must (1) specify the particular social group, (2) show that he is a member of that group, and (3) show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in that group. Id.; see generally Huaman-Cornelio, 979 F.2d at 999. Petitioner argues that the BIA’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence . because he claims that there is evidence that he was persecuted on account of his membership in two particular social groups: his family and the young male members of his family.
We have never reached the issue of whether “family” constitutes a cognizable “particular social group” within the meaning of the statute. However, our sister circuits that have considered the issue all appear to have recognized that “family” so qualifies. See Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1997) (citing cases); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d Cir.1993) (accepting BIA’s ruling in Acosta, infra, that “kinship ties” qualify as a particular social group); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.1993) (“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir.1986) (“Perhaps a prototypical example of a ‘particular social group’ would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for most people.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233, 1985 WL 56042 (BIA 1985) (describing membership in a particular social group and stating “[t]he shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color or kinship ties”) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 1987 WL 108943 (BIA 1987). We join our sister circuits in holding that “family” constitutes a “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).11 Thus, we must turn to [236]*236the question of causation and determine whether Petitioner’s persecution was “on account of’ such family membership.
2.
As detailed above, the IJ concluded that “there is no nexus between the killing of the respondent’s brother and the threats to the respondent or the threats to the family,” and the BIA affirmed, holding that Petitioner “has failed to establish that the harm he fears is on account of a protected ground.” Instead, the IJ found that Petitioner was being recruited and threatened by Mara 18 because he was a 16-year-old male living in the area, and not because he was a member of a particular family. Petitioner, however, argues that the determinations of the IJ and the BIA ignored the applicable legal standard in reaching their conclusions. Lopez-Soto argues that the BIA examined his evidence and erroneously required him to show that Mara 18 was motivated solely by Petitioner’s family membership, rather than merely showing that his persecution had some nexus to a protected ground. Thus, Petitioner argues that while part of Mara 18’s motivations may have been that he was a young male living in Guatemala, the BIA erred in failing to recognize that his family membership was another causal aspect of his persecution.
Petitioner is correct that to qualify for asylum, the persecution feared falls within the statute so long as the illicit motive was a cause — not necessarily the sole cause — of the persecution. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir.2003) (“A persecutor may have multiple motivations for his or her conduct, but the persecutor must be motivated, at least in part, by one of the enumerated grounds.”) (citing Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir.1997)); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that proof of persecution “solely” on account of protected status is not required); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that “persecution on account of’ does not mean “persecution solely on account of’); see also Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667-68 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (following Borja and Osorio and applying a “mixed motive analysis”). However, the Immigration and Naturalization Act “makes motive critical,” and the applicant “must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. As noted above, the statute requires an applicant to prove such motivation by a preponderance of the evidence.
In support of his claim that Mara 18 was motivated in part by his familial membership, Appellant points to three pieces of evidence within the record: first, the testimony of an expert witness, credited by the IJ, who testified in an affidavit that “Mara 18 teaches that refusing to join ... will result in their death or the deaths of their loved ones.” J.A. 70 ¶ 5; second, the testimony of his brother Rubilio that every young member of his family has been targeted by Mara 18; lastly and relatedly, Petitioner’s testimony that Mara 18 sent a letter to his family with an explicit reference to his brother Edgar.
Our determination of whether an illicit motive exists such that the persecution falls within the ambit of the statute presents a narrow factual inquiry. In this respect, our hands are tied by the great deference owed to the Attorney General’s determination. In this case, while Pett-[237]*237tioner presented expert testimony that Mara 18 targets family members of those who refuse to join, the expert further testified regarding Mara 18’s reasons for doing so. He stated: “Mara 18 will target a family member of an individual who they have already killed for refusing to join the gang. This is because the gang fears that if it does not target that person, that person will seek revenge on Mara 18 by joining a rival gang.” J.A. 70 ¶ 6. The IJ, however, found as a matter of fact that Mara 18 did not target Petitioner for such reasons, explicitly refuting that proposition. Supra note 7. Specifically, the IJ stated:
There is no evidence that [Mara 18] believed that [Petitioner] would take revenge in 1999, nine years later.... And it is, as I’ve stated in my credibility finding, implausible that [Mara 18] would believe that he could take revenge on them, and revenge was not mentioned in any of the letters.
There is no evidence that the respondent was going to join a rival gang and take revenge on the Ma[]ra 18 group. There is no evidence that the group believed he would join a rival gang. As I’ve stated, if they believed that, it is the opinion of the Court he would have been killed earlier.
Oral Decision at 10-11 (J.A. 506-07). Similarly, the IJ found that at least one of Mara 18’s threats to Petitioner did refer to Edgar, but the IJ concluded that it did not demonstrate that Petitioner was recruited “on account of’ Edgar, as opposed to the fact that Petitioner was a 16-year-old male living in the area whose brother happened to have been killed by the same gang. In fact, undisputed record evidence indicates that gang violence in Guatemala has reached pandemic proportions and that over 10,000 children are in gangs in Guatemala and that “young males” are a target of gang violence. Indeed, Petitioner’s expert witnesses gave affidavit testimony stating that Guatemalan gang violence is an “epidemic” and that boys and young men “often face torture or murder if they do not join.” See J.A. 59-62, 69-70.
Moreover, in examining the motivation of Mara 18, the record reflects that the gang did not threaten Petitioner concerning his brother’s death until, at the earliest, September 1999, when Petitioner’s parents received a letter from the gang instructing Petitioner to meet the gang on November 15, 1999 at Rio de Paz, the place where the gang killed his brother. See id. 18, 415-16. This letter arrived after Petitioner had left for Puerto Barrios and at least eight months after the gang’s initial contact with Petitioner in the park in January 1999. During this eight month period, from the initial incident to the last letter, Petitioner testified that the gang continuously threatened him:
They said that if I didn’t join them, that they were going to kill me. They said that I would have everything with them, money, drugs, everything. I never listened. I never paid attention to them. But by seeing that they were threatening- threatening me by death and that I couldn’t leave, I- we decided that I had to leave the country.
Id. at 414. However, none of these repeated threats ever mentioned Petitioner’s brother until after Petitioner had fled his home. Id. If the gang was motivated even in part by Petitioner’s familial relationship, the evidence in the record should show that at some point during these continuous threats the gang threatened him because o/his relationship with his brother.12
[238]*238On these bases, we are not compelled to conclude that the IJ’s determination that Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence is one a reasonable judge could not make. On this record there is no evidence so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find causation. Specifically, the only piece of evidence Petitioner presents regarding causation is his brother’s affidavit, stating:
Because of my family’s continued opposition to Mara 18, gang members have targeted young male members of my family for recruitment. I believe that Mara 18 is particularly attracted to young male members of my family because of our demonstrated resistance to joining. Because of our continued resistance, Mara 18 has threatened and attempted to kill off the young male members of my family.
J.A. 45-46 ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Besides that affidavit, Petitioner largely presents evidence of correlation. In finding that Petitioner’s evidence would not compel a reasonable fact finder to conclude that he was persecuted “on account of’ his family membership, we recognize that a reference to an event does not demonstrate that what follows is “because of’ that event. To illustrate: stating that Petitioner would be killed “like Edgar” is not necessarily the same as declaring he would be killed “because” Edgar was killed. Rather, the reference to Edgar — as the IJ found— could be observation, not a statement germane to causation.
For Mara 18 to threaten Petitioner in the letter by reminding him of Edgar’s death is admittedly vicious and terrifying. However, the IJ and the BIA reached the factual conclusion that, in this context, such a comment was essentially a normative, anecdotal statement that put Petitioner on notice that Mara 18 knew his brother was Edgar, whom they killed nine years earlier. In that regard, the statement is materially different than one compelling a finding of causation, e.g., “because your brother did not join our gang nine years ago, we will kill you.” Compare Gonzales-Neyra v. INS, 122 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.1997) (reversing a BIA determination and holding applicant was persecuted “on account of’ his political opinion where threats to his life and business “were made after the guerillas learned of his political orientation”), and Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 36 (finding persecution “on account of’ family membership where Ethiopian security forces persecuted applicant in an effort to force him to reveal his brother’s whereabouts).
Thus, under our limited and deferential standard of review, we cannot say that it is unreasonable to find as did the BIA on these facts. We take pains to make our reasoning as clear as possible: we do not find that evidence like the Petitioner’s could not support a determination by the IJ and the BIA that Lopez-Soto was targeted on account of his family status among other variables. Rather, we hold only that the evidence does not compel such a conclusion. For, of course, if an applicant “seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder” could find otherwise. Elias-Zacarias, 502 [239]*239U.S. at 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812.13 Stated otherwise, we do not conclude that the BIA’s determination, that Mara 18’s desire to harm Petitioner was not on account of his relationship to Edgar, is unsupported by substantial evidence.14
IV.
Petitioner further argues that he is entitled to withholding of removal and protection pursuant to Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (the “Convention” or “CAT”). See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Under the Convention, the United States will not “expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231); see Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir.2004) (discussing implementation of the Convention); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 162-63, 166-71 (2d Cir.2004) (discussing the Convention with exhaustive detail). The Convention was made judicially enforceable through 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 208.18(b)(2). Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir.2004).
As we have recently noted in Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir.2004), Convention claims are analytically distinct from asylum claims and judged under a different standard. In this case, to be entitled to relief under the Convention, Petitioner must establish that “it is [240]*240more likely than not” that he would be tortured15 if returned to Guatemala, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), and such torture “is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” id. § 208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Here, neither the IJ nor the BIA disputed that it was more likely than not that Lopez-Soto would be tortured if removed. Rather, the BIA concluded that Petitioner “failed to establish eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture because he has not shown that the government acquiesces in the torturous activities of the gang, the Mara 18.” BIA slip op. at 1 (J.A. 517); see also Oral Decision at 13-14 (J.A. 509-10) (IJ’s holding that Lopez-Soto was not eligible). The only question, then, is whether the conclusion that the government does not acquiesce in such torturous activities is supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner argues that the BIA and IJ committed legal error in focusing exclusively on the national government’s acquiescence — rather than that of local authorities — which requires, at minimum, a remand to the BIA for it to determine whether local government officials acquiesced in the torturous activities of Mara 18. See Br. for Pet. at 32; see also Li Chen Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1191-92 (9th Cir.2003) (discussing acquiescence of local Chinese officials in smuggler’s torturous acts); Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir.2001) (finding no acquiescence based on actions of the local level of a national police force). The government argues that Petitioner is barred from raising the argument regarding acquiescence of local government because he failed to raise it before the IJ or BIA. Br. for Gov’t at 25. The government’s argument is misplaced; the record demonstrates that Petitioner has continuously advanced his CAT claims with reference to local as well as national authorities. See J.A. 6; Supp’l App. 18, 32. Despite this, even accepting arguen-do Petitioner’s argument that the IJ and the BIA committed a legal error by not analyzing acquiescence of local government officials, we find that the BIA’s holding that the government does not “acquiesce” in Mara 18’s activities is supported by substantial evidence.
“Acquiescence” as used in 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 does not require “knowing acquiescence” in or “willful acceptance” of such torture. See Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1194. Rather, “[acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (emphasis added); accord Zheng, supra. To qualify for relief under the Convention, Petitioner must “prove that the torture inflicted by [Mara 18] would be carried out with the awareness of the [local] government officials. That awareness includes ‘both actual knowledge and “willful blindness.” ’ ” Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1194 (citations omitted); see also Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 170 (following Zheng and applying willful blindness standard); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354 (5th Cir.2002) [241]*241(“ ‘Willful blindness’ suffices to prove ‘acquiescence.’ ”) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner made no such showing.
While the BIA affirmed the IJ, who acknowledged that the Guatemalan government is powerless to stop Mara 18 and has a dysfunctional justice system, supra at 283, the record nonetheless lacks evidence in support of local “acquiescence.” Rather, the IJ found — as is clear from Petitioner’s testimony — that other than reporting the death of Edgar to authorities,16 Petitioner’s family did not seek help of the police or other authorities. See Oral Decision at 7 (J.A. 503) (“[Petitioner] did not go to the police with that letter because he believed that it would do no good to go to the police and feared that there might be retaliation on his family if he went to the police.”). While the record may show that, in the abstract, government officials know of Mara 18’s activities, and are generally unable to stop them, it does not show — as Petitioner must — that local government officials demonstrate “willful blindness” to the torture of their citizens by third parties. Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1196. Here, Lopez-Soto failed to make the appropriate showing that the local officials were aware of, let alone willfully blind to, the harassment suffered by Petitioner, his cousin Elmer, or other family members.17 Accordingly, we deny Lopez-Soto’s petition for review of his CAT claim.
V.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the BIA did not err in denying Lopez-Soto’s claims for asylum relief or protection under the Convention. Accordingly, we deny Lopez-Soto’s petition for review.
PETITION DENIED