Rutherford v. Armstrong

572 P.2d 1331, 31 Or. App. 1319, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2875
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 27, 1977
Docket32691, CA 8053
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 572 P.2d 1331 (Rutherford v. Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rutherford v. Armstrong, 572 P.2d 1331, 31 Or. App. 1319, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2875 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

*[1321] JOHNSON, J.

Petitioner appeals the trial court’s affirmance on writ of review of a decision by the Yamhill County Board of Commissioners approving a variance from the county’s comprehensive plan.

The variance is to construct a single family residence on a five-acre parcel which was partitioned in 1969. In 1975, the county adopted its comprehensive plan designating the area in which the parcel is located as "agricultural/forestry.” The plan further provides that in such areas residences cannot be constructed on tracts containing less than 20 acres. In conjunction with the adoption of the comprehensive plan, the comity also enacted an ordinance allowing for variances upon consideration of several factors, including "the provisions of ORS 215.213.” 1 That statute is part of a legislative scheme providing for the establishment of farm use zones. See ORS 215.203 to 215.273; ORS 308.370 to 308.403. The legislative history indicates that the primary purpose of the statutes was to provide property tax relief for farm land and thus protect such land from being diverted to other uses. See Masters v. Dept. of Rev., 5 OTR 134, 139 (1972). 2

ORS 215.203(1) provides that counties may establish farm use zones and that lands within such zones *[1322] "shall be used exclusively for farm use except as provided in ORS 215.213.” The issue here is whether the subject five-acre parcel comes within the exception provided in ORS 215.213(3) which provides:

"(3) Single-family residential dwellings, not provided in conjunction with farm use, may be established, subject to the approval of the governing body of the county, in any area zoned under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 and 215.402 to 215.422 for farm use upon a finding by the governing body that each such proposed dwelling:
"(a) Is compatible with farm uses described in subsection (2) of ORS 215.203 and is consistent with the intent and purposes set forth in ORS 215.243; and
“(b) Does not interfere seriously with accepted farming practices, as defined in paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of ORS 215.203, on adjacent lands devoted to farm use; and
"(c) Does not materially alter the stability of the overall land use pattern of the area; and
"(d) Is situated upon generally unsuitable land for the production of farm crops and livestock, considering the terrain, adverse soil or land conditions, drainage and flooding, vegetation, location and size of the tract; and
"(e) Complies with such other conditions as the governing body of the county considers necessary.”

Petitioner contends in one assignment of error that the Board failed to consider paragraph (c) quoted above. We disagree. The Board’s findings include the following:

"3. Use of the parcel as a non-farm dwelling site would not materially alter the overall land use pattern of the area as there are presently four (4) homes on adjacent lots in this immediate vicinity and three (3) of these homes are in the same subdivision as the applicant’s parcel. "‡ * * * *
"5. Appropriate procedures have been followed as required under the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance and the Plan does acknowledge that there are non-conforming lots of record that the County may wish to recognize as potential residential building sites.”

*[1323] The thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the parcel in question is part of an eleven-parcel subdivision in which only three of the parcels presently have homes, and that approval of this variance would be precedent for homes on the seven others. It is apparent from the record and Finding Number 3 that the Board was aware of the status of the subdivision. In Finding Number 5, the Board acknowledged the plan provision for non-conforming lots and states, in effect, that the county may or may not approve other non-conforming lots.

The remaining assignments concern the application of paragraph (d) of ORS 215.213(3). The Board made the following finding:

"The soils on the property are Class II soils but the parcel in question is not generally suited for economic production of farm crops and livestock, as the parcel is too small in size to be an economic unit as a single parcel and this is a consideration to be looked at under ORS 215.213(3)(d).”

There is no dispute between the parties that the subject property is presently in agricultural use, is generally suitable for such use and is surrounded, at least in part, by operating farms. Petitioner also concedes that a five-acre parcel is too small in size to independently constitute an economically profitable farm unit. His contention is that the county erred by concluding that size alone may render a parcel "generally unsuitable for the production of farm products and livestock.” ORS 215.213(3)(d). He argues that, considering the nature of the soil and location of the property, it could be sold, leased or contracted to another for the production of crops or livestock and thus is suitable for the production of farm crops and livestock.

In response, the county contends that, although paragraph (d) speaks only in terms of suitability for agricultural production, the section must be read in conjunction with and incorporate the definition of *[1324] "farm use” in ORS 215.203, which in pertinent part provides:

"(2)(a) As used in this section, 'farm use’ means the current employment of land including that portion of such lands under buildings

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Bluebook (online)
572 P.2d 1331, 31 Or. App. 1319, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rutherford-v-armstrong-orctapp-1977.