Ruth v. A.O. Smith Corp.

N.D. Ohio

Ruth v. A.O. Smith Corp.

615 F. Supp. 2d 648, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17667, 2005 WL 6293396

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio

DecidedAugust 23, 2005

DocketCase 1:04-CV-18912

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 615 F. Supp. 2d 648 (Ruth v. A.O. Smith Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ruth v. A.O. Smith Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 648, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17667, 2005 WL 6293396 (N.D. Ohio 2005).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATHLEEN McDONALD O’MALLEY, District Judge.

Hobart and ESAB, who are the only remaining defendants in this case, have moved to exclude from evidence a number of documents. On August 10, 2005, the Court heard arguments from the parties on each document; after substantial analysis and particularized review, the Court now issues its rulings on admissibility. The attached chart shows whether the defendants’ motion to exclude is sustained (document will be excluded at trial) or overruled (document will be admitted at trial) for each document.

The Court adds this brief explanation of its reasoning. In order to be adduced at trial, each document must be both relevant, under Fed.R.Evid. 401, and also otherwise admissible, under all of the Rules of Evidence. In determining relevance, the Court assessed whether each document tended to establish any fact that was “of consequence to the determination of the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. The Court concluded that many of the documents were relevant because they tended to establish facts consequent to the following arguments made by the parties:

• Defendants have asserted that the manganese contained in welding fumes cannot cause neurological injury to welders. Accordingly, documents tending to show that one of the defendants believed that manganese in welding fumes can cause neurological injury to welders are relevant. Furthermore, for reasons discussed below, documents revealing that other industry participants believed that welding fumes can cause neurological injury to welders are also relevant, even if those participants are no longer (or never were) defendants in this particular case.

• Defendants have asserted that industry standards relating to manganese in welding fumes — both as to the amount of manganese in welding fumes and as to warning language — issued by the Occu *651 pational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), and other organizations are relevant, because: (1) defendants’ adherence to those standards suggests non-negligence and also lack of bad mens rea; and (2) comparison of the industry standards to the Navy’s Military Specifications demonstrates that the government exercised discretion when ordering welding rods (which is relevant to the government contractor defense). Accordingly, documents tending to show involvement by industry participants in setting or manipulating those industry standards are relevant.

• Defendants have asserted that Ruth’s employer (“Ingalls”) was a “learned intermediary,” because Ingalls received full knowledge of the risks of manganese in welding fumes; defendants further assert that Ingalls had a responsibility to inform its employees, including Ruth, of those risks. Accordingly, documents tending to show that employers may have received less information than was available to the manufacturing defendants, or received misleading information, is relevant to Ingalls’ status as a learned intermediary.

• Plaintiffs ■ have asserted they will ultimately establish a right to punitive damages. Under Mississippi law, punitive damages “may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-65(l)(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, documents that tend to show one of the defendants in this case acted'with the requisite mens rea are relevant. 1

In addition to assessing relevance, the Court also determined whether the documents were otherwise admissible. The Court’s determinations took into account the following rules of evidence, among others:

• whether statements contained in a document were hearsay exceptions by virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 803(16), referring to statements contained in ancient documents. 2

• whether statements contained in a document were hearsay exceptions by .virtue *652 of Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), referring to records of regularly conducted business activity.

• whether statements contained in a document were offered for non-hearsay purposes — that is, other than “to prove the truth of. the matter asserted,” Fed. R.Evid. 801(c) — such as: (1) to show industry involvement in'the development of governmental and other standards; (2) to show the state of industry knowledge regarding the risks of manganese in welding fume, (3) to show the state of industry knowledge regarding the efficacy of existing warnings and historical warnings; or (4) to show the state of industry knowledge regarding its own transmission of relevant knowledge to learned intermediaries.

• whether statements contained in a document had a degree of probative value that substantially outweighed any prejudicial value, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403.

The Court also notes that, when reviewing the documents for relevance and admissibility — especially documents authored by industry participants who are not now (or never were) defendants in this case— the Court was guided by several other cases, including: Gonzalez v. Digital Equipment Corp., 8 F.Supp.2d 194 (E.D.N.Y.1998); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.1985); and Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir.1973). Generally, these cases explain that documents produced by non-party manufacturers may be relevant in a case against a defendant manufacturer in the same industry, even if the documents are purely internal materials. The reason is that these documents may support an inference that, given the state of the art, defendant-members of the industry had, or should have had (given their duty to have the knowledge and skill of an expert), the same “state of mind” with respect to possible damage to users of their product, and/or the adequacy of warnings in connection with such dangers.

In other words, evidence regarding a non-party manufacturer’s knowledge of: (a) risks posed by its product, (b) the efficacy of its warnings, and (c) the level of knowledge of learned intermediaries, may be relevant to the defendant manufacturer’s knowledge on those issues, as well.

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