Ruth Suzan Lamberson Revocable Trust No. CV-24-00341-TUC-SHR Agreement Dated April 2, 1999 v. John Elliott Mayer, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 19, 2024
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00341
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ruth Suzan Lamberson Revocable Trust No. CV-24-00341-TUC-SHR Agreement Dated April 2, 1999, 10 Order Remanding Eviction Case Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 John Elliott Mayer, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Plaintiff filed this case in Pima County Consolidated Justice Court as a state action 17 for eviction.1 (Doc. 1-2 at 7–8.) On July 12, 2024, pro se Defendant filed a Notice of 18 Removal (Doc. 1) asserting this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under federal question 19 jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Defendant filed two subsequent amended notices of 20 removal. (Docs. 6, 10.) Although it is difficult to summarize exactly how the amended 21 notices differ from the original notice, the Court finds the same analysis applies to all 22 notices. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction according to the information 23 contained in every notice, the Court will remand this case. 24 “[A] district court is under a duty to examine, on its own motion, whether a removed 25 case should be remanded to state court; the court need not wait for a motion to remand.” 26 Raytheon Co. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., No. CIV 13-1048-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 29106, 27 at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2014) (citing Kattalla Co. v. Rones, 186 F. 30 (9th Cir. 1911) (noting 28 1 The case number for the underlying state action at issue is CV24018950. 1 a district court may, on its own motion, decline to exercise jurisdiction over removed 2 action)). If at any time before final judgment it appears the district court lacks subject 3 matter jurisdiction over a case removed to federal court, the case shall be remanded. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 5 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they have subject matter jurisdiction 6 only over the matters specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution. Kokkonen 7 v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party may remove an action from 8 state court only if the action could have originally been brought in the district court. 9 Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 28 10 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 11 of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 12 defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 13 the place where such action is pending.”). The removal statute is strictly construed against 14 removal jurisdiction and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to 15 the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 16 1992). 17 “A case ‘arises under’ federal law . . . if ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes that 18 federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 19 depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’” Proctor v. Vishay 20 Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1219 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Empire Healthchoice 21 Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2006)). Federal question jurisdiction 22 exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. 23 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The rule makes the plaintiff the 24 master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state 25 law.” Id. 26 Here, Defendant is attempting to remove this case to federal court based on federal 27 question jurisdiction. However, every notice of removal is largely indecipherable. It 28 appears Defendant has copied and pasted various statutes with no cognizable legal 1 || explanation of why such statues are mentioned. Based on Plaintiff's claims and allegations || in its Complaint, this a special/forcible detainer action arising entirely under state law. See A.R.S. §§ 33-1485, 33-1377. Even if Defendant were to assert a counterclaim based on 4|| federal law, such a counterclaim would not create a federal question for jurisdictional □□ purposes. See Takeda v. Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1985) || (holding federal question jurisdiction does not arise from defenses or counterclaims alleged 7\| by defendant). 8 In sum, Plaintiff's claim is purely a state-law action, and Defendant cannot create 9|| federal question jurisdiction by filing federal defenses or counterclaims. Due to the lack 10 || of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court must remand. 11 Accordingly, 12 IT IS ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall REMAND this action to Pima County 13 |} Consolidated Justice Court for all further matters. This Order is effective immediately, such that any pending actions, orders, or writs, may proceed immediately. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendant's Application for Leave to Proceed In 16 || Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3.) and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party Appearing 17 || Without an Attorney (Doc. 9) are DENIED AS MOOT. 18 Dated this 19th day of July, 2024. 19 ‘

21 Honorable Scott H. Rash 92 “_/ United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

-3-