Russo v. Harnett

Connecticut Superior Court

Russo v. Harnett

419 A.2d 351, 36 Conn. Super. Ct. 315, 36 Conn. Supp. 315, 1980 Conn. Super. LEXIS 222

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedJuly 24, 1980

DocketFile 23319

StatusPublished

This text of 419 A.2d 351 (Russo v. Harnett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Russo v. Harnett, 419 A.2d 351, 36 Conn. Super. Ct. 315, 36 Conn. Supp. 315, 1980 Conn. Super. LEXIS 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinion

John F. Shea, Jr., J.

The plaintiffs instituted this action for damages against the defendants based on the failure of the defendants as real estate agents timely to transmit an offer to purchase property listed with the defendants for sale. It is claimed that the defendants were guilty of negligence and misrepresentation by omission.

The defendant Lois Harnett has filed a counterclaim in the present action alleging that the plaintiffs sent a letter to the real estate commission charging her wdth improper conduct and a lack of integrity wdth the use of words which clearly intended to mean that she was dishonest, deceitful and disreputable in her profession. Harnett further stated that the letter was printed, published and circulated by the plaintiffs wdth express and implied malice and wdth design and intent to injure her reputation. Damages and exemplary damages were claimed as a result. The plaintiffs have moved to strike the counterclaim on the grounds that it is not pertinent to the plaintiffs’ cause of action and raises new issues.

Section 116 of the 1978 Practice Book provides that any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff provided that such counterclaims arise out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint. In Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67, the court held that relevant considerations in determining whether the “transaction test” of *317 the Practice Book had been met include “whether the same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the cross claim and whether separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts.” The allegations contained in the counterclaim, such as the allegation that the plaintiffs circulated the letter in question with express and implied malice with the intent to injure the defendant’s reputation and professional standing, raise different issues of fact and law from those presented in the main complaint. The issues raised in the counterclaim would unnecessarily complicate the main complaint and should be separately tried.

The motion to strike is, therefore, granted.

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John F. Shea, Jr., J.

The plaintiffs instituted this action for damages against the defendants based on the failure of the defendants as real estate agents timely to transmit an offer to purchase property listed with the defendants for sale. It is claimed that the defendants were guilty of negligence and misrepresentation by omission.

The defendant Lois Harnett has filed a counterclaim in the present action alleging that the plaintiffs sent a letter to the real estate commission charging her wdth improper conduct and a lack of integrity wdth the use of words which clearly intended to mean that she was dishonest, deceitful and disreputable in her profession. Harnett further stated that the letter was printed, published and circulated by the plaintiffs wdth express and implied malice and wdth design and intent to injure her reputation. Damages and exemplary damages were claimed as a result. The plaintiffs have moved to strike the counterclaim on the grounds that it is not pertinent to the plaintiffs’ cause of action and raises new issues.

Section 116 of the 1978 Practice Book provides that any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff provided that such counterclaims arise out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint. In Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67, the court held that relevant considerations in determining whether the “transaction test” of *317 the Practice Book had been met include “whether the same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the cross claim and whether separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts.” The allegations contained in the counterclaim, such as the allegation that the plaintiffs circulated the letter in question with express and implied malice with the intent to injure the defendant’s reputation and professional standing, raise different issues of fact and law from those presented in the main complaint. The issues raised in the counterclaim would unnecessarily complicate the main complaint and should be separately tried.

The motion to strike is, therefore, granted.

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Bluebook (online)

419 A.2d 351, 36 Conn. Super. Ct. 315, 36 Conn. Supp. 315, 1980 Conn. Super. LEXIS 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/russo-v-harnett-connsuperct-1980.

Opinion

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