Russell v. McKay

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Russell v. McKay

37 A.D.3d 698, 828 N.Y.S.2d 908

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 20, 2007

StatusPublished

This text of 37 A.D.3d 698 (Russell v. McKay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Russell v. McKay, 37 A.D.3d 698, 828 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a real estate contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), dated August 3, 2005, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that the contract at issue was unambiguous and clearly contradicted the assertions made by the plaintiff in her complaint (see W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra). Accordingly, the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Crane, J.E, Goldstein, Lifson and Garni, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a real estate contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), dated August 3, 2005, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that the contract at issue was unambiguous and clearly contradicted the assertions made by the plaintiff in her complaint (see W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra). Accordingly, the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Crane, J.E, Goldstein, Lifson and Garni, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

37 A.D.3d 698, 828 N.Y.S.2d 908, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/russell-v-mckay-nyappdiv-2007.

Opinion

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