Russell v. Lyons

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 30, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-01863
StatusUnknown

This text of Russell v. Lyons (Russell v. Lyons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Russell v. Lyons, (W.D. Wash. 2023).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 VINCENT RUSSELL, CASE NO. 2:22-CV-1863-RAJ-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DECLINING SERVICE AND 12 v. DENYING REQUEST FOR COUNSEL 13 BELLINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 14 Defendants. 15

The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Plaintiff Russell Vincent, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights 17 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s Complaint under 18 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 19 granted, but provides Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading by February 28, 2023, to cure 20 the deficiencies identified herein. 21 I. Background 22 In the Complaint, Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee housed in the Whatcom County Jail, 23 alleges Defendants, the Bellingham Police Department and several Bellingham Police Officers, 24 1 used excessive force against him during an arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 2 Dkt. 8. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief and release from custody. Id. 3 II. Discussion 4 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen

5 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 6 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 7 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 8 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 9 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 10 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). 11 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 12 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the 13 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 14 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to

15 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 16 (1994). 17 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually 18 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the 19 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 20 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right when 21 committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to perform an 22 act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Sweeping 23 conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer, 844 F.2d

24 1 at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but must allege the 2 defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 3 378, 385-90 (1989). 4 In the Complaint, Plaintiff provides generalized allegations that “Defendants” harmed him

5 during an unlawful arrest. Dkt. 8. Beyond stating that Defendant C. Johnson asked Plaintiff his 6 name during a traffic stop, Plaintiff does not name any individuals in the statement of facts 7 supporting his claims for relief or link his factual claims to the named Defendants. Plaintiff does 8 not explain what actions the named Defendants took or failed to take which violated his rights. 9 Rather, Plaintiff provides only generalized statements alleging Defendants violated his 10 constitutional rights during a traffic stop that resulted in the alleged use of excessive force. 11 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to show Defendants personally participated in 12 the alleged constitutional violations. As Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show a person acting under color of state law violated his constitutional rights, he has failed to state a claim 13 upon which relief can be granted. See Jones v. Community Development Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 14 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague and mere conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are not 15 sufficient to state section 1983 claims). 16 The Court also notes Plaintiff requests release from custody. Dkt. 8. An “action lying at 17 the core of habeas corpus is one that goes directly to the constitutionality of the prisoner’s 18 physical confinement itself and seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the 19 shortening of its duration. With regard to such actions, habeas corpus is now considered the 20 prisoner’s exclusive remedy.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 503 (1973) (internal quotation 21 omitted). “A civil rights action, in contrast, is the proper method of challenging conditions of 22 confinement.” Badea v. Cox, 931 F.3d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s challenges to the fact 23 or duration of his physical confinement are properly raised in a habeas petition, not a §1983 24 1 complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s requests for release from custody are not cognizable in this 2 §1983 action. To proceed with this action, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint that seeks 3 appropriate relief under § 1983. 4 III. Request for Counsel

5 Plaintiff has also filed a Motion requesting Court-appointed counsel. Dkt. 5. No 6 constitutional right to appointed counsel exists in a § 1983 action. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 7 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); see United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 8 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[a]ppointment of counsel under this section is discretionary, not mandatory”). 9 However, in “exceptional circumstances,” a district court may appoint counsel for indigent civil 10 litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)). Rand v. Roland, 11 113F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Albright v. Oliver
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Ralph Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hospital
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Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.
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Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America
390 F.3d 1101 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

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Russell v. Lyons, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/russell-v-lyons-wawd-2023.