Russell v. Jones

135 F. 929, 68 C.C.A. 487, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4382
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 21, 1905
DocketNo. 1,398
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 135 F. 929 (Russell v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Russell v. Jones, 135 F. 929, 68 C.C.A. 487, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4382 (5th Cir. 1905).

Opinion

McCORMICK, Circuit Judge.

Mary B. Russell, the appellant, was the surviving sister of Martha Bliss Warren, deceased, and her nearest of kin. The appellees are the executors of the will of John A. Warren, deceased. John A. Warren and Martha Bliss Warren were married about 1880. She had been a widow for a number of years, and had a considerable estate, which she was much interested in managing, and managed with skill. He.had a larger estate, and they chose that their separate estates should be kept separate, and that she should continue to manage hers, which she did during their joint lives, keeping both the corpus and its income separate from the corpus and income of her husbandls estate. She died in December, 1899, testate. In her will her husband was named as the executor, in which capacity he came into possession of her estate, and as her residuary legatee he received the greater portion of it in absolute ownership. He died March 24, 1901.

The bill in this case avers, substantially, that John A. Warren represented and promised to his wife, Martha, that if she would make a last will and testament devising to him the bulk of her estate, after giving some specific legacies to certain friends and relatives, that he would at his death, by his last will and testament, give to complainant so much of the estate as was then remaining in his hands and not spent in his. comfortable, decent, and necessary support; and that his wife Martha,, having confidence in her husband, and induced by these promises, executed her last will and testament, giving the greater part of her estate to him; that, but for the promises made by John A. Warren, his wife would have provided by her will for the ultimate gift of her estate to» the complainant, who was her sister and nearest of kin, which fact wás well known to John A. Warren, who induced and persuaded his wife [930]*930to make a will devising and bequeathing the greater part of her estate to him, upon his solemn promise and agreement to make and leave a will giving so much of said estate as should remain unexpended in his reasonable and comfortable support to the complainant; that John A. Warren received under the last will of his wife, and upon the promises hereinbefore set forth, an estate of $30,000, which estate remained in his hands at his death, unimpaired and undisposed of, except by the gift by him to complainant of $6,500, which estate it was the duty of John A. Warren, and by the contract and agreement with his wife he was legally and equitably bound, to bequeath to complainant, but which property, in violation of such agreement and contract, he devised to others. The bill prays that an account may be taken of the amount and value of the estate received by John A. Warren under the last will and testament of his deceased wife which remained in his hands at his death, and that a decree be rendered against the executors and trustees for the full value thereof, with interest thereon at 6 per cent, per annum .from the 24th day of March, 1901, the day of the death of the said John A. Warren, and costs of court. The appellees answered the bill fully, and appellant joined issue by a general replication. The case proceeded in due order to a hearing in the Circuit Court, and that court passed the decree from which this appeal is taken, announcing therein its opinion and judgment that the complainant had failed to make a case for relief in the premises, and that she is not entitled to relief, and adjudging and decreeing that her bill and suit be dismissed out of court. The judge filed a written opinion, which the assignment of errors practically treats as a part of the decree.

The errors assigned are: (1) That the court erred in holding that the complainant by her pleadings, and evidence introduced in support thereof, sought to contradict the terms of the will of Mrs. Warren by parol, while the bill of complaint does not contradict the will, but seeks only to show a collateral parol agreement on the part of Dr. John A. Warren, the testator of the appellees, in consideration whereof the will of Mrs. Warren was executed or permitted to remain unrevoked ; (4) that the court erred in giving consideration to only a part of the testimony for the complainant (specifying particulars fully); (6) that the court erred in considering incompetent and illegal testimony (specifying particulars); (11) that the evidence introduced by the complainant established the contract averred in the bill, and the will of Dr. Warren established its breach, and the court should have decreed accordingly. There are thirteen errors assigned, but they are all, we think, substantially embraced in those we have specified.

It has been said that in passing upon a case brought before an appellate court on writ of error the judge of the lower court is on trial, while in a case on appeal the case itself is on trial. With that distinction in view, and without intending the least disrespect to the very distinguished solicitor who represented the appellant in this case, we will treat his assignment of errors as a warning to us to avoid the mistakes which it appears to him the other judge has committed in the trial of this case.

It is urged for the appellant that only one question of fact is presented by the record, and that is whether the contract alleged in the [931]*931bill has been proved by the testimony. It is assumed that, if the contract is established by the testimony, the complainant is entitled to relief ; if not in a court of equity, then in her suit at law for breach of contract. Her suit was brought in the state court having full jurisdiction of the whole subject, both at law and in equity, and upon removal to the Circuit Court the pleadings were adjusted to the jurisdiction of that court.' The assumption just referred to embraces the assumption that such a contract may be made and may be established by parol proof. Accepting this for the present, we proceed to consider the terms of the contract as averred, and the testimony offered to support it. It is in substance averred that John A. Warren and his wife, Martha, entered into an agreement by which each was to make a will in favor of the other, with the oral agreement or understanding that the survivor should by last will and testament leave to certain relatives of the one dying first all of the property which the survivor had at the time of her or his death, and which he or she had acquired from the one dying first; that is to say, if Mrs. Warren died first, then Dr. Warren was, under the alleged agreement, to make a will leaving to the complainant all the property which he acquired through the will of Mrs. Warren and which remained in his hands at the time of his death.

The complainant offered four witnesses on whose testimony she relied to establish the contract as averred. It relates to admissions made by John A. Warren before and after the death of his wife.

Martha Plummer, who was a nurse in the sanitarium at Glen Springs, Watkins, N. Y., acted as Dr. Warren’s nurse first, and then as nurse of Mrs. Warren, and, after Mrs. Warren’s death, on the second visit of Dr. Warren to the sanitarium, acted as his nurse and private secretary, and when he left the sanitarium continued with him in both capacitiés, from May to the latter part of September, says:

“I know that Dr. Warren and his wife made their wills for each other; the one surviving the other was to have the use of their property their lifetime, and that was in the will. Then they had a verbal contract that what remained of the property—Dr. Warren’s property was to go to Dr. Warren’s relatives, and what remained of Mrs. Warren’s was to go to Mrs.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
135 F. 929, 68 C.C.A. 487, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/russell-v-jones-ca5-1905.