25CA0589 Russell v Dept of Local Affairs 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0589 State Personnel Board Case No. 2024G98
Ebony Russell,
Complainant-Appellant,
v.
Colorado Department of Local Affairs,
Respondent-Appellee.
and
State Personnel Board,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Ebony Russell, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Eric W. Freund, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 Complainant, Ebony Russell, appeals the decision of the State
Personnel Board (Board) denying her petition for a discretionary
hearing. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
¶2 The Colorado Department of Local Affairs (DOLA) works with
public and private housing developers, housing organizations, and
local governments to develop and finance affordable and safe
housing. Russell worked for DOLA’s Division of Housing on the
Housing Assistance Team as a Housing Asset Manager. In this
capacity, she managed a portfolio of projects receiving state and
federal funds, including funds from the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was responsible for
ensuring that the proper documents were completed and filed for
each project and that deadlines were being met. Russell also
maintained and managed record files for each project she oversaw.
All completed federal projects had to be “closed out.” Russell was
responsible for creating “closeout letters” — required, official
government documents sent to a loan grantee indicating the project
was completed and closed. Russell would prepare the closeout
1 letters for her projects and submit them to her supervisor for her
supervisor’s signature; the signed letters were then sent to the loan
grantee to notify them of the project’s status change.
1. Russell’s Emails with Bowman
¶3 In September 2023, Russell exchanged multiple emails with
Dave Bowman, Deputy Director for the Division of Local
Government at DOLA. Russell and Bowman discussed a guidance
memorandum they were drafting for the Impact Development Fund
(IDF). The IDF was providing financial assistance to homeowners
who were rebuilding their homes after the Marshall Fire. During
the email exchange, Russell told Bowman that federal regulations
required the IDF or the homeowners to maintain documentation
that general contractors were properly bonded and insured. Russell
was concerned that a failure to maintain the general contractors’
proof of insurance in the IDF files could damage the state’s
relationship with HUD in the event of an audit or that it could
expose homeowners to potential harm if a general contractor wasn’t
insured.
¶4 Bowman disagreed and told Russell that such documentation
wasn’t necessary because (1) the projects in question weren’t
2 federally funded; (2) the loans to the individual homeowners were
below the regulatory threshold; and (3) general contractors were
already required to be insured to obtain construction permits from
their local governments. Bowman also noted that adding an
additional requirement for the IDF and homeowners would be overly
burdensome.
2. Allegations of Russell’s Misconduct
¶5 In August 2023, DOLA conducted a routine review of the asset
managers’ federal projects to ensure that the required monitoring
was being conducted.1 During the review, DOLA discovered
multiple deficiencies and missing documents in project files for
projects managed by Russell. Specifically, one of Russell’s projects
(Project 17-056) had been closed out but didn’t have a closeout
letter and was missing other documentation. After being notified
about the deficiency, Russell drafted a closeout letter and copied
and pasted the signature of her former supervisor, Julia Zaffarano,
on the letter without Zaffarano’s authorization. Russell later
1 Once a federal project had been closed out by the asset manager,
the project was moved to the long-term monitoring team for the ongoing monitoring required by federal programs.
3 admitted that she falsified the closeout letter and added it to the file
for Project 17-056.
¶6 Separately, around this time, DOLA discovered that Russell
had failed to report mileage tracking for the state-owned vehicle
that she was assigned to use and share with two other employees.2
Per DOLA’s policy and the Vehicle Use Agreement that Russell
signed, assigned drivers were required to report their odometer
readings monthly, which Russell failed to do from February 2023
through October 2023.
¶7 In October 2023, Alison George, the Director of the Division of
Housing, delegated authority to Maulid Miskell, the Deputy Division
Director, to contact Russell and schedule a “Rule 6-10 meeting.” A
Rule 6-10 meeting is held when an appointing authority finds
performance issues or conduct that may warrant a disciplinary
action; the meeting allows the employee an opportunity to respond
to the alleged performance or conduct concerns prior to a final
determination. Berumen v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Wheat Ridge Reg’l
Ctr., 2012 COA 73, ¶ 20. Because DOLA’s Human Resources
2 Russell is Black.The other state employees who she shared the vehicle with are White.
4 Department needed more time to gather relevant information and
investigate the allegations against Russell, the Rule 6-10 meeting
was postponed. Russell was placed on paid administrative leave on
November 1, 2023, pending investigation into the alleged
misconduct. Russell’s administrative leave was extended in
January 2024 and again in March 2024 to allow the investigation to
be completed.
¶8 The investigation focused on four allegations against Russell:
(1) the unauthorized use of Zaffarano’s signature in the Project 17-
056 closeout letter; (2) incomplete letters and project files; (3)
communication issues related to the emails with Bowman; and (4)
not reporting mileage tracking for the assigned state vehicle. The
investigation report was completed in March 2024. Although the
investigator couldn’t confirm or rule out the second or third
allegations, he was able to substantiate the first and fourth
allegations — that Russell falsified Zaffarano’s signature and failed
to report mileage for her state-assigned vehicle.
¶9 While the investigation was ongoing, Zaffarano discovered a
second falsified document in another of Russell’s project files.
Specifically, Zaffarano found that the Contract Monitoring Letter in
5 the file for Project 18-009 contained an unauthorized signature and
was backdated. The document bore Kim Snetzinger’s signature and
was dated October 15, 2020, on the first page and October 15,
2019, on the second page. A review of the electronic file revealed
that Russell created the document for the letter on April 20, 2021,
and uploaded it to the electronic file on August 1, 2023. However,
Snetzinger’s last day of employment with DOLA was March 27,
2020.
¶ 10 Based on the investigation and discovery of the second
falsified document, in early April 2024, Miskell contacted Russell to
schedule the Rule 6-10 meeting. After exchanging several emails,
the Rule 6-10 meeting was scheduled for May 3, 2024. On April 23,
2024, George notified Russell that she was rescinding Miskell’s
delegation authority and that George would be conducting the Rule
6-10 meeting instead of Miskell. The meeting was held on May 3,
2024, and June 25, 2024. George terminated Russell’s employment
in July 2024.
B. Procedural History
¶ 11 On April 23, 2024, Russell filed a consolidated appeal and
dispute with the Board alleging retaliation (based on her
6 disagreement with Bowman) in violation of the State Employee
Protection Act (Whistleblower Act), , §§ 24-50.5-101 to -108, C.R.S.
2025, and racial discrimination in violation of the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-400.2 to -408, C.R.S. 2025.3
She also asserted that Miskell should have been precluded from
conducting the Rule 6-10 meeting based on a conflict of interest —
namely, that Bowman complained to Miskell about Russell’s
performance.
¶ 12 Russell and DOLA submitted information sheets outlining
information and evidence regarding their appeal allegations,
defenses, underlying facts, and arguments. See Dep’t of Pers. &
Admin. Rule 8-35, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. Russell sought
reinstatement, back pay, compensation for emotional distress,
punitive damages, and an investigation into DOLA’s bad faith
actions. DOLA asked the Board to deny Russell’s petition for a
3 Russell initially filed a whistleblower complaint form.At the Board’s direction, she later filed her consolidated appeal and dispute form on May 8, 2024, to comply with the State Personnel Board Rules and Personnel Director’s Administrative Procedures. See Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-21(A), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1 (“Employees shall file both the [appeal form] and the Whistleblower Complaint Form.”).
7 hearing and to dismiss her appeal because the Board lacked
jurisdiction and Russell failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation or discrimination.
¶ 13 The ALJ issued a preliminary recommendation that first
concluded that Russell had abandoned her CADA retaliation claim
and her claim that DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures
by failing to present any evidence to support these claims in her
information sheet. Next, the ALJ concluded that Russell’s
whistleblower and discrimination claims were filed more than ten
days after the alleged discriminatory practices; therefore, the Board
lacked jurisdiction to hear them. Even if the Board had jurisdiction
to hear the claims, however, the ALJ concluded that Russell failed
to establish prima facie claims of whistleblower retaliation and
racial discrimination.
¶ 14 At a public meeting on March 18, 2025, the Board reviewed
the ALJ’s preliminary recommendation. It found sufficient basis to
adopt the preliminary recommendation and denied Russell’s
petition for a hearing.
8 II. Analysis
¶ 15 On appeal, Russell contends that the Board erred by adopting
the ALJ’s determination that (1) the Board lacked jurisdiction to
hear her whistleblower and discrimination claims; (2) she failed to
establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation and racial
discrimination; and (3) she abandoned her CADA retaliation claim
and her claim that DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures.
We address and reject each contention in turn.
A. Appellate Rules
¶ 16 As an initial matter, Russell’s opening brief does not comply
with several of the appellate rules for briefing. See C.A.R. 28. For
instance, for each issue Russell raises, the brief lacks a statement
of the applicable standard of review and a statement of
preservation, and it infrequently cites the record. See C.A.R.
28(a)(7)(B) (The appellant must provide reasoning, “with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies. . . .”).
¶ 17 The appellate rules are not technicalities; they are designed to
enable appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.
A party’s pro se status doesn’t excuse the failure to comply with the
9 appellate rules. See Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners
Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (noting that while courts may
consider a party’s pro se status, pro se parties are still bound by
the rules). Nevertheless, we recognize that it’s challenging for a
person who isn’t a lawyer to represent themselves in legal
proceedings. Taking that into account, see id., we elect to address
Russell’s arguments as best we understand them.
B. Russell’s Whistleblower and Discrimination Claims Were Not Filed Within the Jurisdictional Filing Period
¶ 18 Russell argues that the Board erred by concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review her claims for whistleblower retaliation
and racial discrimination. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 19 We review the Board’s final orders under Colorado’s
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). § 12-20-408(1), C.R.S. 2025
(providing that judicial review shall be conducted in accordance
with section 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. 2025). Under the APA, we may
overturn the Board’s decision only if it was arbitrary or capricious,
was unsupported by the record, was contrary to law, or exceeded
the Board’s authority. See § 24-4-106(7)(b); Lawley v. Dep’t of
10 Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001); see also § 24-4-
106(11)(e) (directing the reviewing court to apply the standard of
review set forth in section 24-4-106(7)). “Where the challenge is to
the Board’s resolution of an ultimate conclusion of fact, a reviewing
court must determine whether the record contains sufficient
evidence showing a reasonable basis in law for the Board’s
conclusion.” Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Maggard, 248 P.3d 708,
712 (Colo. 2011). The correctness of a legal conclusion drawn by
the Board from undisputed facts is a matter for the appellate court,
and when the Board’s decision is based on an improper application
of the law, we may set the decision aside. See Coates, Reid &
Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993).
¶ 20 “Any employee in the state personnel system may file a written
complaint with the [Board] within ten days after the employee knew
or should have known of a disciplinary action . . . .” § 24-50.5-
104(1), C.R.S. 2025; see also Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-7, 4
Code Colo. Regs. 801-1 (“Appeals or petitions for hearing are timely
if received by the Board or postmarked no later than ten (10) days
after receipt of the written notice of the action, or if no notice was
required, no later than ten (10) days after the employee knew or
11 should have known of the alleged improper action.”). The Board
does not have jurisdiction to review an action that is not timely
appealed. State Pers. Bd. v. Gigax, 659 P.2d 693, 694 (Colo. 1983).
2. Analysis
¶ 21 Russell was first notified of a disciplinary action on October
16, 2023, when she was told of the initial Rule 6-10 meeting.
Miskell reissued the notice on October 25, 2023, and Russell was
placed on paid administrative leave on November 1, 2023.
Following the investigative report, Miskell contacted Russell on April
4, 2024to schedule the Rule 6-10 meeting. Russell responded the
next day, acknowledging that she had received the April 4 email.
Russell also responded to a separate email on April 4 and 5, 2024,
objecting to Miskell’s role in the hearing. Using April 5, 2024, as
the calculation date for when Russell “knew . . . of a disciplinary
action,” § 24-50.5-104(1), Russell should have filed her complaint
and appeal by April 15, 2024. Because Russell didn’t file the
complaint and appeal until April 23, 2024, her whistleblower claim
was untimely.
¶ 22 Russell’s assertion that these actions constituted “continuing
violations” is unavailing. Each alleged violation — the issuance of a
12 disciplinary notice, the placement on administrative leave, and the
notice of who would conduct the hearing — occurred on discrete,
identifiable dates. The harm, if any, arose from the notifications
themselves and was complete when the notices were sent,
regardless of the duration of any resulting leave. Because these
were not continuing violations, Russell’s whistleblower claim is time
barred. See Subryan v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 789 P.2d 472,
475 (Colo. App. 1989) (“A completed act, such as termination, is not
a continuing violation.”).
¶ 23 Russell’s discrimination claim, which alleged disparate
treatment because other White coworkers weren’t disciplined for
also failing to report mileage for a state-owned vehicle, similarly
fails. Under section 24-50-125.3, C.R.S. 2025, Russell was
required to file her discrimination claim within ten days of the
alleged discriminatory practice. Again, even using April 5, 2024, as
the notice date, Russell didn’t file her discrimination claim until
April 23, 2024.
¶ 24 Because Russell’s whistleblower and discrimination claims
were untimely, the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear them. We
13 therefore discern no error with the Board’s decision to dismiss those
claims on that basis.
C. Russell Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case for Her Whistleblower and Discrimination Claims
¶ 25 While we conclude that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear
Russell’s whistleblower and discrimination claims, because of her
pro se status, we elect to address their merits.
1. Russell’s Whistleblower Claims
¶ 26 Russell contends that the Board incorrectly concluded that
she failed to establish a prima facie case for whistleblower
retaliation. We disagree.
a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 27 We affirm the Board’s decision to adopt the ALJ’s
determinations if the ultimate conclusion is supported by the
evidentiary record and has a reasonable basis in the law.
Velasquez v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 93 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. App.
2003).
¶ 28 The Whistleblower Act protects state employees from
retaliation by an appointing authority or supervisor when an
employee discloses “information on actions of state agencies that
14 are not in the public interest.” § 24-50.5-101(1); see § 24-50.5-103,
C.R.S. 2025. To establish a prima facie case of whistleblower
retaliation, an employee must establish that (1) they disclosed
information pertaining to a matter of public interest; (2) they were
disciplined as defined by the Whistleblower Act; and (3) the
disciplinary action occurred because of the disclosure of
information. See Ward v. Indus. Comm’n, 699 P.2d 960, 966-68
(Colo. 1985); § 24-50.5-103(1).
b. Analysis
¶ 29 To establish the first element of a prima facie case of
whistleblower retaliation, Russell had to disclose a matter of public
interest. Matters of public interest are those “regarding any action,
policy, regulation, practice, or procedure, including, but not limited
to, the waste of public funds, abuse of authority, or
mismanagement of any state agency.” § 24-50.5-102(2), C.R.S.
2025; accord Ward, 699 P.2d at 967. Disclosures that “do not
concern matters in the public interest, or are not of ‘public
concern,’ do not invoke [the Whistleblower Act].” Ferrel v. Colo.
Dep’t of Corr., 179 P.3d 178, 186 (Colo. App. 2007).
15 ¶ 30 Russell’s disclosures didn’t relate to a matter of public
concern. Rather, they involved an internal disagreement she and
Bowman had over regulatory interpretation. In Russell’s view, the
IDF or the homeowners should have maintained documents
demonstrating that their general contractors were properly bonded
and insured. But in Bowman’s opinion, such documentation was
unnecessary because the projects weren’t federally funded; the
loans to the individual homeowners were below the regulatory
threshold level; and in order to obtain construction permits from
local governments, general contractors were already insured. Such
a dispute doesn’t implicate an abuse of authority, unethical
conduct, or a waste of public funds and therefore does not
constitute a matter of public concern. § 24-50.5-102(2); see Ward,
699 P.2d at 967. Although Russell asserted that Bowman’s actions
could harm homeowners and damage the state’s relationship with
HUD, her concerns were speculative. As a result, Russell failed to
establish that her disclosure addressed a matter of public concern
and, consequently, failed to satisfy the first element of a prima facie
case of whistleblower retaliation.
16 ¶ 31 To establish the second element of a prima facie case of
whistleblower retaliation, Russell had to show that she was
disciplined. A “disciplinary action” as defined in the Whistleblower
Act is “any direct or indirect form of discipline or penalty, including,
but not limited to, . . . suspension . . . or withholding of work, or the
threat of any such discipline or penalty.” § 24-50.5-102(1). Russell
was issued multiple Rule 6-10 meeting notices, which, when viewed
collectively, could reasonably be perceived as threatening
disciplinary action. And Russell was placed on administrative
leave, which effectively suspended her employment and removed
her from the workplace. Accordingly, Russell satisfied the second
element of a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, but only
as to the issuance of multiple Rule 6-10 meeting notices and her
placement on administrative leave.
¶ 32 To establish the third element of whistleblower retaliation,
Russell had to show that the protected disclosure was a substantial
or motivating factor in her adverse action. Ward, 699 P.2d at 968.
We have already concluded that there was no protected disclosure
here. But even if Russell’s communication with Bowman was
protected, the record doesn’t support a finding that it was the
17 motivating factor behind the Rule 6-10 meeting notices or her
placement on administrative leave. While the email prompted
concerns about the appropriateness of Russell’s tone, our review of
the record reflects that DOLA’s actions were driven by independent
and serious allegations, including that Russell forged her
supervisor’s signature — an allegation that, on its own, warranted
investigation — and Russell’s failure to report mileage on the
shared vehicle. These matters presented legitimate operational and
compliance concerns separate from any protected communication.
While the timing of the notices and administrative leave coincided
with Russell’s disclosure, they were also directly linked to the
discovery of Russell’s other alleged misconduct. Under these
circumstances, the temporal proximity appears coincidental rather
than causal, and the record does not suggest that Russell’s
communication was the determinative or motivating factor in the
adverse action.
¶ 33 Because Russell failed to establish the first and third elements
of a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, her claim
necessarily fails, and the Board did not err by adopting the ALJ’s
recommendation to deny a hearing.
18 2. Russell’s Racial Discrimination Claim
¶ 34 Russell also argues that the Board erred by concluding that
she failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
We disagree.
¶ 35 As discussed above, we will affirm the Board’s decision to
adopt the ALJ’s recommendation if it has a reasonable basis in law
and is supported by the evidentiary record. Velasquez, 93 P.3d at
542.
¶ 36 CADA prohibits an employer from taking any adverse action
against an employee based on race, national origin, or ancestry.
§ 24-34-402, C.R.S. 2025. To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, an employee must show that (1) they belong to a
protected class; (2) they were qualified for the job at issue; (3) they
suffered an adverse employment decision despite their
qualifications; and (4) all the evidence in the record supports or
permits an inference of unlawful discrimination. Bodaghi v. Dep’t of
Nat. Res., 995 P.2d 288, 297 (Colo. 2000).
19 b. Analysis
¶ 37 Russell contends that similarly situated White coworkers
weren’t threatened with discipline for failing to track mileage on a
shared vehicle. This argument, however, overlooks several material
facts. First, Russell had signed an acknowledgment expressly
assigning her the responsibility for reporting vehicle mileage, yet
she failed to do so for several months. Russell also failed to track
the vehicle’s mileage well before she started sharing it with her
coworkers. Moreover, as discussed above, the October 16 and
October 23, 2023, Rule 6-10 meeting notices didn’t rest on the
mileage issue alone; they also cited the allegation that Russell
forged her former supervisor’s signature on a closeout letter. That
allegation, standing alone, provided an independent and sufficient
basis for the issuance of the Rule 6-10 meeting notices and
Russell’s placement on administrative leave. The missing mileage
issue was added later, after Russell was already aware of the Rule
6-10 meeting. Notably, Russell was never formally disciplined for
the mileage tracking issue itself.
¶ 38 Russell also points to a White employee who was not
disciplined after missing a contract renewal deadline. We agree
20 with the ALJ’s conclusion that this comparison is inapt. While the
cited conduct may have constituted negligence, it isn’t comparable
to Russell’s alleged conduct of intentionally forging her supervisor’s
signature.
¶ 39 Accordingly, Russell failed to identify a similarly situated
employee who engaged in comparable misconduct and was treated
more favorably. She therefore did not establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination.
D. Russell Abandoned Her CADA Claim
¶ 40 Russell also argues that the Board erred by concluding that
she abandoned her CADA retaliation claim and her claim that
DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures. We disagree.
¶ 41 Again, where the Board adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, we
affirm the Board’s decision if it is supported by the evidentiary
record and has a reasonable basis in law. Velasquez, 93 P.3d at
¶ 42 An applicant or employee who alleges discriminatory or unfair
employment practices in the state personnel system may appeal by
filing a complaint in writing with the Board. § 24-50-125.3. That
21 complaint is then referred to an ALJ, who reviews the information
presented by both parties. Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-26(A), 4
Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The complainant “has the burden to
persuade the Board that it appears the employment action violate[d]
[their] rights,” id. at Rule 8-25(D). The ALJ then makes “a
[p]reliminary [r]ecommendation” to the Board as to whether a
hearing should be granted or denied. Id. at Rule 8-26(B). From
there, the Board considers the preliminary recommendation and
renders its decision to grant or deny a hearing. Id. at Rule 8-27(A).
¶ 43 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under CADA, a
complainant must either provide direct evidence of retaliation or
show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed
between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action.
22 Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 83 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo. App. 2003); see
Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008).4
¶ 44 We conclude that Russell failed to establish a prima facie case
of unlawful retaliation under the CADA. Russell provided no direct
evidence of retaliation. Therefore, her claim rested on her ability to
demonstrate each element of the prima facie case. To satisfy the
first element of such a claim, Russell was required to demonstrate
that she engaged in activity protected by CADA prior to the alleged
adverse action. Bodaghi, 995 P.2d at 297; see Dep’t of Pers. &
Admin. Rule 8-25(D), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The record
contains no such evidence. Russell’s information sheet and reply
don’t address this claim or present argument or evidence showing
that she engaged in any CADA-protected activity before filing her
4 These cases concern retaliation claims under Title VII. However, we may rely on federal law when it is helpful in construing Colorado law. Because the applicable language in CADA is substantially similar to Title VII language that prohibits retaliation, we rely on cases interpreting Title VII. Colo. C.R. Comm’n v. Big O Tires, Inc., 940 P.2d 397, 399 (Colo. 1997); see also Dep’t of Pers. and Admin. Rule 9-4, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1 (noting that state and federal case law should be referenced in determining whether discrimination occurred).
23 appeal. Apart from checking the box for CADA retaliation on the
Board’s standard appeal form, Russell took no action to pursue or
develop a CADA claim. Russell therefore failed to establish any of
the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. Under these
circumstances, Russell failed to meet her burden, and the Board
correctly concluded that her claim was abandoned.
¶ 45 Russell likewise failed to establish any violation of the
grievance procedures. To prevail on such a claim, she was required
to show both that she invoked the grievance process and that DOLA
failed to comply with the required procedures. See Dep’t of Pers. &
Admin. Rule 8-23, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The grievance process
requires an employee to submit a grievance to their supervisor,
meet with the supervisor, and receive a written “Step One Decision.”
Id. at Rule 8-13(A). If no Step One Decision is issued, or if the
employee is dissatisfied, the employee must submit a written “Step
Two” grievance to the appointing authority and receive a written
“Step Two Decision.” Id. at Rule 8-13(B). Only after completion of
these steps, or a failure to issue a Step Two Decision, may the
employee appeal to the Board. Id. at Rule 8-14. The record
contains no evidence that Russell initiated or participated in the
24 grievance process at any stage. As with her CADA claim, Russell’s
information sheet and reply do not address the grievance claim and
present no evidence that DOLA failed to act or otherwise violated
the grievance procedures. Russell’s sole action was checking the
box for a grievance claim on the Board’s standard appeal form,
which is insufficient to preserve or develop the claim. We agree that
Russell abandoned her grievance claim.
III. Disposition
¶ 46 We affirm.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.