Russell Mathis, Jordan Chong Moua, Ying Susanna Va, Mai Nou Vang, and all others similarly situated v. County of Siskiyou and Jeremiah Larue, in his official capacity as Sheriff

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01378
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUSSELL MATHIS, JORDAN CHONG No. 2:22-cv-01378 KJM AC MOUA, YING SUSANNA VA, MAI 12 NOU VANG, and all others similarly situated, 13 ORDER Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 COUNTY OF SISKIYOU and JEREMIAH 16 LARUE, in his official capacity as Sheriff, 17 Defendants. 18 19 This case is before the court on three discovery motions: plaintiffs’ motion to increase 20 deposition limits (ECF No. 150; joint statement at ECF No. 171), plaintiffs’ motion for remedy of 21 violation of discovery substantial completion deadline (ECF No. 157; joint statement at ECF No. 22 172), and plaintiffs’ motion to compel the deposition of Ray Haupt (ECF No. 167; joint statement 23 at ECF No. 174). These discovery motions were referred to the magistrate judge pursuant to E.D. 24 Cal. R. 302(c)(1). The motions are fully briefed and were taken under submission. ECF No. 175. 25 I. Relevant Case Background 26 The factual background of the case is well known to the parties and the court and need not 27 be recited here in detail. Only a brief synopsis is necessary to provide context for the discovery 28 rulings that follow. 1 Plaintiffs allege that Siskiyou County and its Sheriff Jeremiah LaRue (together 2 “Defendants”) are engaged in a sweeping campaign to harass and intimidate Hmong and other 3 Asian Americans, often cloaked under the pretense of enforcing water- and cannabis-related laws. 4 ECF No. 140 at 2. Siskiyou County is an expansive, rural county at the northernmost reach of 5 California that is mostly undeveloped, with much of the County’s land being forest or wilderness 6 area. Id. at 5. The County is home to fewer than 45,000 people, 85% of whom are white and 7 1.6% of whom are Asian American according to the latest U.S. Census. Id. In Siskiyou County, 8 many Asian Americans, especially Hmong residents, have settled in and around the “Shasta 9 Vista” subdivision and in smaller communities in the north of the County (by the towns of Dorris 10 and Macdoel). Id. Many residents live in multi-generational family units, and many live in 11 unpermitted structures or recreational vehicles, as a water well is a prerequisite for a septic 12 system and building permit, and their properties do not have wells. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs contend 13 that defendants have engaged in unlawful racial targeting and profiling of Asian Americans 14 through motor vehicle stops, improper lien practices, and unlawful water-related regulations. See 15 generally, ECF No. 140. 16 II. Relevant Procedural Background 17 This case was filed on August 3, 2022. ECF No. 1. The operative Second Amended 18 Complaint was filed on February 28, 2025. ECF No. 140. The parties have long been engaging 19 in discovery. On May 20, 2025, Senior District Judge Kimberly J. Muller signed a stipulation 20 continuing discovery deadlines. ECF No. 147. This order set a deadline for “substantial 21 completion of document production” on July 7, 2025. Id. at 4. Fact discovery closed on 22 September 30, 2025, and expert discovery is set to close on December 18, 2025. Id. 23 III. Motion to Exceed Deposition Limits 24 Plaintiffs have noticed 10 depositions: (1) a Rule 30(b)(6) witness from the County of 25 Siskiyou, (2) Defendant Sheriff Jeremiah LaRue, (3) Undersheriff James Randall, (4) Lieutenant 26 Gary Pannell, (5) Former Lieutenant Behr Tharsing, (6) Seargeant Scott Stock, (7) Deputy 27 Marquise Williams, (8) Code Enforcement Officer John Ottenberg, (9) Former Assistant District 28 Attorney Martha Aker, and (10) Supervisor Ray Haupt. ECF No. 171 at 4-6. Plaintiffs state they 1 have identified fourteen (14) additional fact witnesses whom they contend have discoverable 2 information relevant to the claims and defenses in this case, though they only list 12 proposed 3 additional deponents. Id. at 7-9. Plaintiffs seek leave to conduct any eight (8) additional 4 depositions from the list. Id. This list contains three current and former County Supervisors 5 (Brandon Criss, Michael Kobseff, and Ed Valenzuela), four traffic-related officers and managers 6 (Deputy John Langford, Former Deputy Mouksavanh Phonepaseuth, Dispatch Manager Krysta 7 Labbe, Lieutenant Cory Persing), and five water-ordinance related officials (Community 8 Development Department (“CDD”) Director Richard Dean, Code Enforcement Officer Andrea 9 Fox, Agricultural Commissioner James Smith, Office of Emergency Services (“OES”) Director 10 Bryan Schenone, and Geographic Information Systems (“GIS”) Coordinator Brandon Konicke. 11 Id. at 7-10. 12 A. Applicable Legal Standards 13 The scope of discovery in federal cases is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 26(b)(1). The current Rule states: 15 Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 16 matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 17 the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 18 the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 19 benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. 20 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 22 less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 23 determining the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevancy to the subject matter of the litigation “has 24 been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to 25 other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. 26 v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Relevance, however, does not establish discoverability; in 27 2015, a proportionality requirement was added to Rule 26. Under the amended Rule 26, 28 //// 1 relevance alone will not justify discovery; discovery must also be proportional to the needs of the 2 case. 3 With respect to depositions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 presumptively limits a 4 party to ten depositions; a party may only exceed this number with leave of court or by stipulation 5 of the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i). The presumptive limit is intended to “promote cost- 6 effective discovery and promote the federal rules’ policy of minimizing ‘unreasonably cumulative 7 or duplicative’ discovery.” Thykkuttathil v. Keese, 294 F.R.D. 597, 599 (W.D. Wash. 2013) 8 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 Advisory Committee’s Note (1993)). “A 9 party seeking to exceed the presumptive limit bears the burden of making a ‘particularized 10 showing’ of the need for additional depositions.” Thykkuttathil, 294 F.R.D. at 600. In making an 11 evaluation, courts consider “whether (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 12 duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome or 13 less expensive; (2) the party seeking discovery has ample opportunity to obtain the information 14 sought; or (3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking 15 into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the party’s resources, and the 16 importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” Andamiro U.S.A. v. Konami 17 Amusement of Am., Inc., No. CV00-8561, 2001 WL 535667, at *2, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 11168 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2001). 19 B. Depositions in Excess of the Presumptive Limit are Not Warranted 20 Here, plaintiffs’ need for additional depositions is not sufficiently supported; plaintiffs 21 have not shown good cause to exceed the presumptive limit. First, plaintiffs identify 12 22 individuals who are alleged to have information about different categories of topics but are 23 seeking to depose any 8 of those individuals. This position may be intended to demonstrate a 24 spirit of compromise, but it also indicates that there is no particular additional deposition which 25 plaintiffs specifically need. This cuts against the notion that the burden of additional depositions 26 outweighs the benefit. Second, the requested depositions are largely duplicative of those noticed 27 in the original 10. For example, plaintiffs do not contend that any of the additional supervisors 28 they seek to depose has unique knowledge; indeed, plaintiffs seek to depose Supervisor Michale 1 Kobseff so that he can testify to his encounters with noticed deponent Supervisor Haupt. ECF 2 No. 171 at 7. Plaintiffs do not adequately explain why the additional supervisors (Criss, Kobseff, 3 and Valenzuela) possess unique information such that they must be deposed in addition to noticed 4 supervisor Haupt. 5 The additional requested depositions of traffic-stop deputies are likewise duplicative and 6 disproportionate to the needs of the case. Plaintiffs have already noticed depositions for Sheriff 7 LaRue, Undershiriff Randall, Former Lieutenant Tharsing, Seargent Stock, Deputy Williams and 8 Lieutenant Pannell. Defendants confirm that plaintiffs already have the body-worn camera for 9 each of the named-plaintiff stops. ECF No. 121 at 21. Plaintiffs again do not identify unique 10 knowledge possessed by the proposed additional deponents (Phonepaseuth and Langford), and 11 the court agrees with defendants that deposing multiple deputies per stop is cumulative. 12 Additional code enforcement and water ordinance depositions are likewise unwarranted. 13 Defendants state they have produced Rick Dean, who is identified by plaintiffs as an additional 14 proposed deponent, as a 30(b)(6) witness for a full-day deposition; there is no good cause to 15 depose Dean again individually based on the same document set. ECF No. 171 at 22. 16 Defendants have made clear that they will schedule the deposition of Ottenberg (a noticed 17 deponent), and the additional requested deponent Fox is “like Ottenberg, directly responsible for 18 enforcing the ordinances at issue in this litigation” and plaintiffs only seek her testimony to the 19 extent they are “prevented form deposing Ottenberg.” ECF No. 171 at 9. Plaintiffs may bring a 20 motion to compel the deposition of Ottenberg if necessary, but this is not a reason to exceed the 21 presumptive 10 deposition limit. 22 The need for the remaining additional deponents is not sufficiently well defined. 23 Dispatch Manager Labbe’s deposition, in excess of the presumptive 10, is excessive in light of the 24 fact that defendants represent, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that plaintiffs already have extensive 25 CAD exports and RIPA data, and questioned Undersheriff Randall on dispatch fields. Further, 26 there is a discrete system field requiring clarification, a short 30(b)(6) on CAD schema is an 27 option defendants indicate they will make available in lieu of a deposition, and the court agrees 28 that this is a less burdensome option. Additional deponent Persing’s cannabis enforcement work 1 is not at issue for the water class given plaintiffs’ own framing that cannabis uses are excluded, 2 and further, plaintiffs do not adequately give a particularized need for this deposition. The 3 proposed additional depositions of Smith and Schenone are based on the fact that these 4 individuals were referenced in document productions. ECF No. 171 at 9-10. Plaintiffs indicate 5 they need these depositions to enhance and clarify information in the document productions, but 6 the argument for these depositions is speculative and vague. Id. Finally, the additional 7 deposition of Konicke, the GIS coordinator, to testify to the “underlying methodology for GIS 8 mapping” is unsupported; such technical clarifications can be obtained in less burdensome ways. 9 C. Conclusion 10 Plaintiffs do not adequately demonstrate their need to exceed the presumptive deposition 11 limit, and the motion (ECF No. 150) is therefore DENIED. 12 IV. Motion to Compel Deposition of Ray Haupt 13 On June 16, 2025, plaintiffs noticed the deposition of Ray Haupt, a Supervisor for 14 Defendant County of Siskiyou, for July 23, 2025. ECF No. 174 at Ex. 1 (Haupt Notice). The 15 County identified Haupt and the other four sitting supervisors as prospective witnesses in their 16 initial disclosures. Id. at Ex. 2 (Initial Disclosure pp. 1-2). Defendants objected to Haupt’s 17 deposition, stating he was an “apex” deponent. Id. at Ex. 3. On July 1, defendants restated this 18 position in a formal “Objection to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposition of Ray Haupt.” Ex. 4 (July 1 19 email from D. Forgeur to Plaintiffs’ Counsel with attached Objection). 20 That same day, the parties met and conferred. Ex. 12 (Vees Decl.) at ¶ 5. Plaintiffs 21 inquired as to the legal significance of the Objection, noting it was not a motion for protective 22 order. Id. Defendants stated they did not need to file a motion “anytime soon” and suggested 23 informal resolution through written discovery in lieu of a deposition; defendants then reiterated 24 their interest in learning plaintiffs’ purpose in deposing Haupt. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs summarized 25 their intention as follows: the Board of Supervisors was integral to County policies that plaintiffs 26 challenge under Equal Protection and State-created danger theories, both of which require proof 27 of a culpable mental state; plaintiffs have circumstantial evidence on point, but the best direct 28 evidence of what the Supervisors were thinking lies with the Supervisors themselves. Defendants 1 responded that they would confer with their client. Id. at ¶ 7. 2 On July 9, the parties met and conferred. Plaintiffs asked about the Haupt deposition, and 3 defendants stated that they needed additional time to determine their course of action. Id. at ¶ 8. 4 On July 18, the parties again conferred. Plaintiffs again inquired about Haupt, and defendants 5 stated that they would not object to written discovery in lieu of a deposition. Plaintiffs refused. 6 Defendants then stated they were unsure of whether they intended to file a motion for protective 7 order and needed to speak to County Counsel. Plaintiffs noted that Haupt’s deposition was then 8 scheduled for the following week. Id. at ¶ 9. 9 On July 23, the date noticed, the parties met and conferred. At that time, defendants 10 stated that they intended to file a motion for protective order regarding Haupt’s deposition, 11 relying on the apex doctrine. Defendants did not file such a motion. Id. at ¶ 10 12 On August 1, the parties met and conferred, and plaintiffs indicated they would move to 13 compel. Id. at Ex. 12 (Vees Decl.) at ¶ 11. On August 4, defendants wrote that they objected to 14 depositions of any supervisors “as an inappropriate invasion of deliberative process, and improper 15 apex depositions,” adding, “[w]e are also struggling to see any relevance to these depositions 16 insofar as the Water Ordinances were either repealed or, in one case, substantially altered[.]” Id. 17 at Ex. 5 (Aug. 4 email of M. Lopez). 18 On August 8, plaintiffs noticed the underlying motion to compel. ECF No. 167. The joint 19 statement in support of this motion was due August 27. The parties agreed to exchange initial 20 drafts on August 22, and proposed finals on the filing day. ECF No. 174 at Ex. 12, ¶ 12. On 21 August 22, the parties exchanged drafts as agreed; at that time, defendants’ section cited only the 22 apex doctrine and deliberative process privilege as bases for objection. Id. at ¶ 13. On August 23 27, at 1:00 p.m., the parties exchanged proposed final drafts. At that time, for the first time, 24 defendants included a two-page argument based on the legislative privilege. Id. at ¶ 14. 25 Plaintiffs argue that the objections to Haupt’s depositions were waived because defendants failed 26 to file a timely motion for protective order, and accordingly failed to appear for his deposition, 27 warranting sanctions. 28 In the joint statement, defendants assert Haupt’s deposition is barred by (1) the apex 1 doctrine, (2) legislative process privilege, and (3) deliberative process privilege. Id. at 22-27. 2 Defendants argue that their objections were not waived because Haupt did not “fail to appear,” 3 rather, the parties were in negotiations. ECF No. 174 at 21. 4 A. Legal Standard 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 governs depositions by oral examination. Rule 6 30(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any 7 person, including a party, without leave of court[.]” When a party fails to comply with discovery 8 obligations, an opposing party may move for an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 37(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “Rule 37(a) encompasses an order to attend a 10 deposition.” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2018). If a party fails 11 to attend their properly noticed deposition, “Rule 37 explicitly authorizes the court to sanction 12 parties for failing to attend their own depositions.” Id. “A failure described in Rule 37(d)(1)(A) 13 is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing 14 to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2). 15 Available sanctions are any listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), including directing “matters 16 embraced in the order” be taken as established “for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party 17 claims.” “A finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite for awarding expenses under Rule 37(d), 18 although a lack of bad faith may be considered in determining whether the imposition of 19 sanctions would be unjust. The Court has ‘great latitude’ in imposing sanctions under Rule 37.” 20 ProDox, LLC v. Pro. Document Servs., Inc., 341 F.R.D. 679, 683 (D. Nev. 2022). 21 B. The Deposition of Haupt is Compelled and Defendants’ Objections are Waived 22 The court agrees with plaintiffs that Haupt failed to appear for his deposition, and that as 23 an appropriate Rule 37 sanction, objections to the deposition are waived. “It long has been settled 24 in the Ninth Circuit that a party may not unilaterally refuse to appear for properly noticed 25 depositions but instead must obtain a protective order that postpones or dispenses with his duty to 26 appear.” Hendricks v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2024 WL 4720802, at *5, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27 206260 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2024); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th 28 Cir. 1964) (“unless [the party] has obtained a court order that postpones or dispenses with his 1 duty to appear, that duty remains”); ProDox, LLC v. Prof. Document Servs., Inc., 341 F.R.D. 679, 2 684 (D. Nev. 2022) (“The failure to seek a protective order in a timely manner will preclude later 3 objection.”). Simply objecting is not sufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2). 4 Here, Haupt’s deposition was properly noticed over a month in advanced, and experienced 5 defense counsel knew or should have known that they were under an obligation to move for a 6 protective order if they wished to challenge the deposition. Indeed, they indicated several times 7 that a motion for a protective order was forthcoming, but they never filed one. Defendants were 8 not at liberty to simply let the appearance date for the Haupt deposition to pass, drag their feet, 9 and hope that nothing would come of it. 10 The merits of defendants’ objections are, under the circumstances, irrelevant. M.S. v. 11 Angus, 2025 WL 1711403, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102434 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2025) 12 (“policy considerations and the potential for discovery abuse” trump “potential merit” of 13 objection absent protective order); accord Novitzky v. Transunion LLC, 2025 WL 819621, at *2, 14 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27428 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025). It is also immaterial that defendants 15 gave notice that Haupt would not appear. Paige v. Consumer Programs Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 275 16 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (party failed to appear despite “notice stating he would not appear at his 17 deposition”); Reel v. City of El Centro, 2024 WL 3094628, at *3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108544 18 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2024) (phone call to the court and letter to opposing counsel are “insufficient 19 to absolve the [witnesses] of their duty to appear under the federal rules”). 20 Further, it does not matter that plaintiffs were not “sitting in a conference room waiting” 21 and continued to confer with defendants after Haupt failed to appear. Henry v. Gill Industries, 22 Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We reject the suggestion that an unreasonable refusal to 23 be deposed must be met with an unreasonable refusal to reschedule in order to warrant sanctions 24 under Rule 37.”); accord Khalaj v. City of Phoenix, 2021 WL 222408, at *10, 2021 U.S. Dist. 25 LEXIS 12006 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2021) (“sanctions . . . [are] appropriate, even when the opposing 26 party’s counsel was willing to work with the party to reschedule the deposition”); see also M.S., 27 2025 WL 1711403, at *2 (witness failed to appear though parties had “begun conferring 28 regarding the instant motion for a protective order prior”). 1 The court is unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that the court should not find that 2 Haupt “failed to appear” because the concept of “failure to appear” is “not a mechanical trigger 3 but a legal conclusion.” The court is not applying the concept mechanically. Rather, application 4 of the law to the facts—here, circumstances of defendants’ making—compels the conclusion that 5 Haupt failed to appear at his deposition within the meaning of the Federal Rules, and that his 6 conduct is sanctionable. Because Haupt’s deposition was properly noticed and his appearance 7 was not excused (no motion for a protective order was ever even filed, let alone granted1), Haupt 8 did fail to appear, and plaintiffs may assert their right to depose Haupt by motion to compel under 9 Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i). Plaintiffs ask that the court finds the objections to Haupt’s deposition 10 waived, and the court agrees that is a fair and reasonable sanction permitted under the Rules. 11 C. Conclusion 12 The motion to compel the deposition of Ray Haupt (ECF No. 167) is GRANTED. 13 Defendants are ORDERED to produce Haupt for a deposition within 30 days of this order. 14 V. Motion to Find Violation of Substantial Completion Deadline 15 Pursuant to the scheduling order currently in place, issued by a court-approved stipulation, 16 defendants were obligated to substantially complete document production by July 7, 2025. 17 Defendants take the position that they have substantially completed production, having produced 18 more than 307,000 documents since the start of discovery. ECF No. 172 at 16. Defendants assert 19 that the production spans nine County departments, includes over 7,000 files of body-worn 20 camera footage, and cost the County approximately $2 million in legal and vendor fees. Id. 21 Plaintiffs contend that despite the County’s production, several key categories of documents have 22 not been produced. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs ask the court to order defendants to produce the following: 23  Documents of defendant Siskiyou County located at the County District Attorney’s 24 Office (“DAO”), which the County previously stated that it would search for and 25 produce; 26 1 “Several courts have explained that a party has no basis to refuse to attend a properly noticed 27 deposition unless they actually obtain a protective order, or at least a temporary stay of the deposition while a motion for protective order is pending, prior to the deposition.” Novitzky, 28 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27428 at *4. 1  Traffic incident reports, written warnings, and traffic citations defendants have agreed 2 to produce but have not yet produced; 3  Computer-Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) logs defendants have agreed to produce but have 4 not yet produced; 5  Data collected pursuant to the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (“RIPA”) that 6 defendants agreed to produce but have not yet produced; 7  Responsive body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage dating earlier than 2022; 8  Text messages and other documents collected from County-issued and/or personal 9 mobile devices (to the extent the devices contain responsive documents) of certain 10 current or former County employees; and 11  Training documents and reports specific to interdiction, including but not limited to 12  training documents associated with Department-funded training through Relentless, 13 LLC, d/b/a Desert Snow. 14 Id. at 3-4. 15 Defendants do not dispute that these categories of documents have not yet been produced. 16 Instead, they argue that (1) they have already produced a substantial volume of documents (ECF 17 No. 172 at 15), (2) the burdens of compliance on a strict timeline are significant and therefore an 18 order forcing compliance is unwarranted (id. at 16-17), (3) the County does not administer or 19 control the databases of the DAO related to prosecutions and investigations, and therefore the 20 County lacks custody and control over those records (id. at 18-19), (4) plaintiffs themselves failed 21 to meet the July 7th deadline (id. at 19-21), and (5) the motion is premature (id. at 21-22). 22 First, the fact that defendants produced a significant number of documents does not negate 23 the fact that a significant number of responsive documents remain admittedly unproduced. 24 Second, concerns about the cost and burdens of compliance are not persuasive; defendants 25 themselves stipulated to the July 7th deadline and have not requested any extension. ECF No. 26 147. Defendants can and should be expected to meet a deadline they agreed to and have not 27 sought to move. Third, the court agrees with plaintiffs that defendants’ arguments about 28 possession of DAO investigative and prosecutorial records arguments are not on point; plaintiffs 1 | seek documents pertaining to DAO’s roles acting on the County’s behalf, and plaintiffs could 2 || obtain such documents through PRA requests (the costs of responding to which would be borne 3 || by the County in any event). Fourth, plaintiffs’ production conduct is not the subject of this 4 || motion and is not relevant to defendants’ conduct. If the defendants wish to challenge plaintiffs’ 5 || productions, they must file their own motion. Finally, this motion is plainly not premature 6 || because the deadline for substantial production has already passed. 7 The court concludes that defendants have not complied with the stipulated July 7, 2025 8 | substantial production completion deadline, and plaintiffs’ motion to compel (ECF No. 157) is 9 | GRANTED. Defendants are ORDERED to produce all remaining responsive documents 10 || described above within 30 days of this order. 11 VI. Conclusion 12 For the reasons set forth above, the court orders as follows: 13 1. Plaintiffs’ motion to increase deposition limits (ECF No. 150) is DENIED; 14 2. Plaintiffs’ motion to remedy defendants’ violation of the substantial document 15 completion deadline (ECF No. 157) is GRANTED and defendants are 16 ORDERED to produce all remaining responsive documents within 30 days of 17 this order, and 18 3. The motion to compel the deposition of Ray Haupt (ECF No. 167) is 19 GRANTED and defendants are ORDERED to produce Haupt for a deposition 20 within 30 days of this order. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 | DATED: November 6, 2025 * 23 Htttenr— Lhor—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28 12