Russell Johnson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01874
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 NO. 25-cv-1874-BJR RUSSELL JOHNSON, et al., 8 ORDER RE MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 9 MOTION TO DISMISS v. 10 CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., 11 Defendants. 12

13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against the City of Seattle, Bruce Harrell, in his official 15 capacity as Mayor of the City, and Shon Barnes, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the 16 Seattle Police Department, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages for alleged 17 violations of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Compl., ECF No. 1. Now pending before the Court 18 is Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 9, and Defendants’ motion for partial 19 dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), ECF No. 17. Having 20 reviewed the materials1 and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion for 21

22 1 Including the Plaintiffs’ motion, ECF No.9; Defendants’ response in opposition, ECF No. 18; Plaintiffs’ reply, ECF No. 19; Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 17; Plaintiffs’ response in opposition, ECF No. 22; and Defendants’ reply, ECF 23 No. 24; together with the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 1, and attached exhibits.

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 a preliminary injunction, and deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause 2 claim. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Allegations 5 To host an event on streets, sidewalks, or public parks in the City of Seattle, applicants are 6 required to apply for and be granted a permit. Compl. ¶ 47 (citing Seattle Ordinance § 15.52.040). 7 On February 5, 2025, Plaintiffs applied for a permit to host the MAYDAY USA worship event in 8 Seattle, requesting to host the event on Pike Street in downtown Seattle for 300-500 people. Id. ¶ 9 61; see Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2 (emails referencing an attached “special events permit”). On February 10 26, 2025, Plaintiffs followed up on their permit application and were informed that “the City did 11 not believe Plaintiffs’ requested location was acceptable for the planned event,” and alternative 12 locations were suggested. Id. ¶¶ 65-68, Ex. B. Plaintiffs allege that they were informed that they 13 should consider alternate locations to avoid the objections that businesses along Pike Street had to 14 religious events in the prior year. Id. ¶¶ 79-80, Ex. B. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, however, 15 the referenced exhibit does not indicate any issue with the prior year’s event being religious but 16 rather states: “Some feedback our office received in 2024 included overcrowding on Pike St which 17 led to some local businesses closing early due to patrons having challenges in accessing their 18 businesses, placement of portajohns directly adjacent to a business’s outdoor patio which led to that 19 patio space being closed for the afternoon, and insufficient neighborhood notifications being 20 issued.” Id. Ex. B. 21 On March 7, 2025, the City informed Plaintiffs that they would not be permitted to use Pike

22 Street and suggested some alternate locations for the proposed Mayday worship event on May 24, 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2025. Compl. ¶¶ 82-83. They were referred to the Downtown Seattle Association and the Seattle 2 Parks Department. Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs’ permit application for Pike Street was officially denied on 3 March 14, 2025, “due to the size and scope of the proposed event being too large to be safely 4 accommodated at the proposed location.” Id. ¶ 85, Ex. B. Plaintiffs received a permit from the 5 Seattle Parks Department on April 8, 2025, to host an event at Cal Anderson Park. ¶ 88, Ex. C, ECF 6 No. 1-3. The permit approved Plaintiffs to host the MAYDAY USA event, “a worship and prayer 7 event,” from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., including the use of amplified sound at certain time periods. 8 Id. ¶ 90, Ex. C. 9 At the event on May 24, 2025, Plaintiffs allege that although they complied with all 10 applicable rules and laws, a large group of protestors came to the park to agitate, disrupt, and assault 11 Plaintiffs for the views, message, and content of their event. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. At 3:15 p.m., shortly after

12 the event had begun, event organizers were approached by the police and told to shut down the 13 event because of violent protestors that the police could not control. Id. ¶¶ 94-97. Two protestors 14 attacked the event’s stage, ripped down the fabric banners and kicked over equipment, and other 15 protestors exposed body parts, engaged in lewd behavior in front of minor children, threw urine- 16 filled water balloons, sprayed attendees with pepper spray and tear gas, and harassed Plaintiffs with 17 curse words and violent threats. Id. ¶¶ 99-103. Some protestors exhibited violent behavior including 18 brandishing a weapon, and Plaintiffs were forced to evacuate their prayer tent out of fear for their 19 safety. Id. ¶¶ 104-07. Even as Plaintiffs attempted to shut down the event at the behest of police, 20 they continued to be harassed and violently threatened. Id. ¶¶ 108-114. 21 On the same day, Mayor Harrell issued a press release stating that Plaintiffs’ event was an

22 “Extreme Right-Wing Rally”, and that Plaintiffs were responsible for the violence that had been 23 perpetrated against them. Compl. ¶ 116. Plaintiffs allege that they were blamed for deliberately

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 provoking the reaction “by promoting beliefs that are inherently opposed to our city’s values, in the 2 heart of Seattle’s most prominent LGBTQ+ neighborhood.” Id. ¶ 117 (quoting Ex. A, ECF No. 1- 3 1). Mayor Harrell issued another press release on May 27, 2025, which contained statements from 4 the City’s “Christian and Faith Leaders” condemning Plaintiffs for their event and blaming them 5 for the violence perpetrated against them. Id. ¶ 123, Ex. D, ECF No. 1-4. According to the City’s 6 faith leaders, Plaintiffs targeted the LGBTQ+ community. Id. ¶¶ 124-34. 7 Plaintiffs allege that the City’s permitting scheme is discriminatory on its face and as applied 8 against the Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 137. They allege that the termination of their event was impermissibly 9 based on Plaintiffs’ speech, expression, and religious exercise. Id. ¶ 144. Plaintiffs assert five causes 10 of action: (1) Count I – Violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United 11 States Constitution; (2) Count II – Violation of the Peaceable Assembly Clause of the First

12 Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 13 Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 14 Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (5) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 15 the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary 16 injunction and permanent injunction, restraining and enjoining Defendants from enforcing, the 17 City’s permitting requirements. Compl. 38-40. Plaintiffs also ask for a declaratory judgment 18 declaring the permitting schemes are unconstitutional. Id. at 40. 19 B. Challenged Permitting Ordinances 20 The Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 15.52 governs "Crowd Control Events," establishing 21 the regulatory framework for permitting events in public places that require significant city 22 resources. Plaintiff specifically challenges §§ 15.52.040, 15.52.050, 15.52.060, 15.52.070. 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 SMC § 15.52.040 mandates that a special event permit must be obtained for any gathering 2 on city property expected to exceed 50 people, require substantial public services, or necessitate 3 the temporary closure of a public waterway or street. SMC § 15.52.050 defines the powers and 4 duties of the Special Events Committee, authorizing them to determine necessary city services, set 5 conditions, and issue or deny permits based on objective criteria such as neighborhood impact and 6 previous permit compliance. The Special Events Committee must consider anticipated impacts of 7 the event, but “[c]onditions shall not be determined or issued based on the programming content of 8 the event or message that the proposed event may convey.” 9 Decisions regarding permit applications and the assessment of fees are handled under SMC 10 § 15.52.060 and SMC § 15.52.070. Section 15.52.060 establishes grounds for denying a permit, 11 such as providing false information or a failure to comply with reasonable safety conditions;

12 notably, it carves out an exception for “spontaneous free speech events” occurring within one week 13 of a news event, which cannot be denied solely due to insufficient processing time. Section 14 15.52.070 details the fee structure, which scales based on anticipated attendance and event type 15 (e.g., sporting event vs. parade). While fees are generally required, this section presumes that 16 political or religious activities intended for the expression of ideas are constitutionally protected, 17 though the committee may still consider factors like commercial activity when determining if 18 certain fees apply. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 21 Plaintiffs contend that a preliminary junction should issue because Defendants’ permitting 22 schemes unconstitutionally discriminate against Plaintiffs’ viewpoint, represent unconstitutional 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 prior restraints that impermissibly vest Defendants and their officials with unbridled discretion, and 2 impermissibly violate Plaintiffs’ right to free speech. Pls.’ Mot. 15, ECF No. 9. Defendants move 3 for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction claim, asserting that Plaintiffs lack standing for 4 injunctive relief. Defs.’ Mot. 2, ECF No. 17. 5 1. Preliminary Injunction Standard 6 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never awarded as of 7 right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff must 8 make a “clear showing” that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) in the absence of an 9 injunction, he would likely suffer irreparable harm; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and 10 (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 11 (2008).2 The Ninth Circuit follows a “‘sliding scale’ approach to evaluating the first and third 12 Winter elements, [where] a preliminary injunction may be granted when there are ‘serious questions 13 going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff,’ so long as ‘the 14 other two elements of the Winter test are also met.’” Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 15 Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 16 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 17 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to the original Winter standard and the “sliding scale” 18 variant, the Court stated: “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must meet one of two variants 19 of the same standard.”). 20

21 2 “Due to the urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction at a point when there has been limited factual development, the rules of evidence do not apply strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings.” Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida 22 Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2013). “In deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court ‘is not bound to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.’” Int'l Molders’ & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Dymo Indus., 23 Inc. v. Tapewriter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir.1964)).

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2. Plaintiffs Lack Standing for Injunctive Relief 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack the requisite Article III standing to seek injunctive 3 relief. Defs’ Mot. 3. The Court shall address this issue first, because “[s]tanding is a threshold matter 4 of jurisdiction.” LA All. for Human Rights v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 956–57 (9th Cir. 5 2021) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)). A district court has 6 no authority to grant relief in the form of a preliminary injunction if the party lacks standing for 7 injunctive relief. See id. at 957 (“[P]laintiffs ‘must demonstrate standing separately for each form 8 of relief sought.’” (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 9 167, 185 (2000))). 10 To demonstrate standing, plaintiffs must show that they “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) 11 that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be

12 redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016). To seek 13 injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege that the injury in fact is concrete, particularized, and “actual 14 or imminent.” Am. Encore v. Fontes, 152 F.4th 1097, 1111 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 15 at 560). Past injury is insufficient; the plaintiff must show that “the threatened injury is certainly 16 impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Id. (citations omitted). And vague 17 allegations of an intent to apply for permits in the future “is too speculative to meet the standing 18 requirements.” Diamond S.J. Enter., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 100 F.4th 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2024). 19 Plaintiffs “may rely on the allegations in their Complaint and whatever other evidence they 20 submitted in support of their [preliminary-injunction] motion to meet their burden.” City & Cnty. 21 of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773, 787 (9th Cir. 2019)

22 (alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (per 23 curiam)).

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 As Plaintiffs argue, in First Amendment cases such as this, relaxed standing principles apply 2 because free expression is considered uniquely fragile, so courts permit broader access to prevent 3 a chilling effect on speech. American Encore, 152 F.4th at 1113-14; see Santa Monica Food Not 4 Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[S]pecial standing 5 principles apply in First Amendment cases.”). “A plaintiff has standing to vindicate First 6 Amendment rights through a facial challenge when it ‘argue[s] that an ordinance . . . impermissibly 7 restricts a protected activity.’” Diamond S.J. Enter., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 100 F.4th 1059, 1066 8 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1033). 9 However, it remains necessary for plaintiffs to allege a credible or substantial risk that the 10 law in question will be enforced against them. American Encore, 152 F.4th at 1114. Here, the dearth 11 of allegations of intended future conduct, threat of future enforcement, or self-censorship, clearly

12 does not satisfy a pre-enforcement injury in fact. See id. (“Nor does the mere existence of a 13 proscriptive statute or a generalized threat of prosecution satisfy the case or controversy 14 requirement.” (citations omitted)); see also, e.g., Seattle Pac. Univ. v. Ferguson, 104 F.4th 50, 59 15 (9th Cir. 2024) (listing three benchmarks3 for determining whether there is “a credible threat of 16 enforcement.”); Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 793 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because [plaintiff] fails to 17 establish the necessary injury in fact, he cannot raise the claims of third parties as part of an 18 overbreadth challenge.”). 19 20

21 3 “(1) [A] plaintiff must allege ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,’ (2) a plaintiff’s intended future conduct must be ‘arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute’ it wishes to 22 challenge, and (3) the threat of future enforcement must be ‘substantial.’” Seattle Pac. Univ. v. Ferguson, 104 F.4th 50, 59 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 161-62 (2014)).

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Plaintiffs certainly have standing to pursue their other challenges and claims; Defendants 2 do not argue otherwise. But Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a finding of the imminent injury 3 that Article III requires for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion 4 for a preliminary injunction for lack of standing. 5 B. Motion to Dismiss Establishment Clause 6 Defendants have also moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, their claim 7 under the Establishment Clause, for failure to state a claim. Defs.’ Mot. 2, ECF No. 17. 8 1. Dismissal Standard 9 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is properly granted if 10 the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 11 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 12 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the 13 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 14 “A complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a cognizable legal theory or by 15 lacking sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 16 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must 17 accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe such allegations in the light most 18 favorable to the plaintiff. Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886-87 (9th Cir. 19 2018). However, the Court is not “required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits 20 attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are 21 merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. 22 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2. Establishment Clause Violation 2 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action asserts that Defendants permitting scheme violates the 3 Establishment Clause. Compl. ¶¶ 209-19. Plaintiffs allege that on its face and as applied, the 4 Permitting Ordinance allows Defendants to display hostility towards religious gatherings and show 5 favoritism towards certain non-religious expressive activities. Id. ¶¶ 209-13. Plaintiffs also allege 6 that the permitting scheme excessively entangles the government with religion. Id. ¶ 214. 7 Defendants argue that nothing in SMC § 15.52 clearly meets the standard set forth by the Supreme 8 Court in Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 534 (2022). Id. at 13. Defendants also 9 argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are more appropriately brought under their Free Speech and Free 10 Exercise challenges and have not moved to dismiss those claims. See Defs,’ Reply 3, ECF No. 24. 11 The Establishment Clause prohibits governments from making any “law respecting an

12 establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “The clearest command of the Establishment 13 Clause is that the government may not officially prefer one religious denomination over another.” 14 Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisc. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 605 U.S. 238, 247 (2025) 15 (citation omitted). Conversely, neither may the government show hostility toward religion. See 16 Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 541. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court “instructed that the Establishment Clause 17 must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.” 597 U.S. at 535 18 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has subsequently stated that government action that expresses 19 hostility towards a plaintiff’s religion inflicts injury to support standing for an Establishment Clause 20 claim. See Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, 148 F.4th 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing 21 Kumar v. Koester, 131 F.4th 746, 755 (9th Cir. 2025)). Courts have explained that the

22 Establishment Clause forbids the government from being hostile to religion or preferring irreligion 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 over religion. Hunter v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 115 F.4th 955, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2024); Sch. Dist. of 2 Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220-22 (1963). 3 Plaintiffs argue that their allegations of Defendants’ denial of the requested Pike Street 4 permit because of past religious events are sufficient to demonstrate religious hostility. Pls.’ Opp’n 5 14. But the exhibits provided with Plaintiffs’ Complaint do not support their allegations that their 6 permit application for the Pike Street venue was denied due to religious hostility, but rather “due to 7 the size and scope of the proposed event being too large to be safely accommodated at the proposed 8 location.” Compl. Ex. B. The City recommended alternate venues, such as parks, that would be 9 better suited, and a permit was granted for the alternate venue. Id. Ex. C. Plaintiffs make no 10 allegations of non-religious events nor other religious events being granted a permit under similar 11 constraints, which may have demonstrated expressed hostility to Plaintiffs or an expressed

12 preference to another religion. Certainly, the Permitting Ordinance, on its face, does not contain 13 any preference for programs that are non-religious or a denominational preference. 14 However, Plaintiffs also argue that the statements made by Defendant Harrell after the event 15 was shut down are laden with hostility toward religion, and the condemning statements made by 16 other religious sects and cited in the second press release demonstrates Defendants’ preference for 17 other religions. Pls.’ Opp’n 14-15. These statements were made in formal press releases from the 18 “Office of the Mayor.” Compl. Exs. A, D. Official expressions of hostility directly connected to 19 Plaintiffs and their event, combined with the supporting hostile statements made by City religious 20 leaders that are officially approved by the City, can have the effect of showing that the City is failing 21 its duty of neutrality, invalidating the facial neutrality of an ordinance. See Church of Lukumi

22 Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 23 C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 636 (2018).

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 1 As stated by the Supreme Court in Kennedy, the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Exercise 2 Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment and 3 have “complementary” purposes. 597 U.S. at 532-33. It remains to be seen whether Plaintiffs can 4 prove their Establishment Clause claim, but in evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must draw 5 all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Interpipe Contracting, 898 F.3d at 886-87, and 6 the Court deems it unnecessary to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim at this time while 7 the Free Exercise and Free Speech claims proceed. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 8 Count IV is denied. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons: 11 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 9, is DENIED; 12 2. Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; 13 a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief is 14 GRANTED; 15 b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause cause of action, Count IV, is DENIED; 16 3. This case shall proceed pursuant to the Case Scheduling Order, ECF No. 26. 17 DATED this 18th day of February 2026. 18 A 19 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23

24 ORDER RE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS