Rusk v. Whitmire

541 P.2d 1097, 91 Nev. 689, 1975 Nev. LEXIS 751
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 30, 1975
DocketNo. 7734
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 541 P.2d 1097 (Rusk v. Whitmire) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rusk v. Whitmire, 541 P.2d 1097, 91 Nev. 689, 1975 Nev. LEXIS 751 (Neb. 1975).

Opinion

[690]*690OPINION

Per Curiam:

Respondent was employed as a deputy sheriff by the sheriff’s office of Washoe County, Nevada, on April 12, 1971, and resigned from that position on November 30, 1972. It was stipulated that during that period of time he worked 357 hours of overtime for which he had not received compensatory time off.

At the time of respondent’s resignation neither the statutes of Nevada, the ordinances of Washoe County, nor the rules of the sheriff’s office contained any provision for payment of compensation to deputy sheriffs of that county for hours worked in excess of those prescribed.

There was no agreement to pay the respondent any extra compensation and he so testified.1 While it had been the practice to award compensatory time off to deputy sheriffs when they had worked overtime, if approved by their superior officers, such practice was entirely voluntary and gratuitous within the sheriff’s office and not in any way compelled.

After resigning, respondent filed a claim with Washoe County demanding payment for extra compensation for hours worked in excess of the eight-hour work day. When that claim was denied he filed suit alleging entitlement to monetary compensation. The trial court sitting without a jury found respondent to be entitled to $1,723.56 at “straight time rate” for 357 hours of overtime and accordingly entered judgment from which this appeal has been taken.

Reliance by the district court and respondent on Dunn v. City of Carson City, 88 Nev. 451, 499 P.2d 653 (1972), is misplaced. In Dunn this court reversed the judgment of the lower court dismissing a claim for declaratory relief on the issue of compensation for overtime. There a city ordinance governing the employment of Carson City police officers [691]*691specifically authorized payment for overtime, and we held that cognizable causes of action were stated by appellants under that ordinance for work already completed. Likewise, respondent’s reliance on Mullen v. Clark County, 89 Nev. 308, 511 P.2d 1036 (1973), is misdirected. The question in Mullen was whether the Clark County Director of Juvenile Court Services was an “official” or an “employee.” Here there is no dispute about respondent’s status as a deputy sheriff who was specifically excluded from the limitations and restrictions delineated in NRS 281.1002 concerning hours of employment.

“The fact that normal hours of work are established and compensating time off is provided for work beyond those hours does not, of itself, give the employee a right to payment for [692]*692overtime. [Citation omitted.]” Pootel v. City and County of San Francisco, 270 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal.App. 1954). “The denial of payment is bottomed on the theory that as such compensation is not budgeted by the employer, it would be disruptive of budgeting procedures to increase the employee’s pay by cash for vacation or overtime.” Lombardi v. City of New York, 359 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (Sup.Ct. 1974). “Municipal employees are not entitled to compensation for overtime work in absence of a valid contract or law authorizing it.” State Ex Rel. Beck v. Carter, 471 P.2d 127, 130 (Wash.App. 1970); 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, § 12.194(a) (3d ed. 1968). Accord Grossman v. City of New York, 335 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup.Ct. 1972), reversing Grossman v. City of New York, 316 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y. City Civ.Ct. 1970) (upon which respondent relies); Donohue v. Police Commissioner of Baltimore City, 298 A.2d 437 (Md.App. 1973); City of Homestead v. DeWitt, 126 So.2d 582 (Fla.App. 1961).

Here there was no statutory or other authority for payment of cash compensation to respondent, valid contract for such, or collective bargaining agreement covering the situation.3

The judgment is reversed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
541 P.2d 1097, 91 Nev. 689, 1975 Nev. LEXIS 751, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rusk-v-whitmire-nev-1975.