Rushing v. Kicklighter

Supreme Court of Georgia

Rushing v. Kicklighter

164 S.E. 49, 174 Ga. 746, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 129

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedApril 16, 1932

DocketNo. 8709

StatusPublished

This text of 164 S.E. 49 (Rushing v. Kicklighter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rushing v. Kicklighter, 164 S.E. 49, 174 Ga. 746, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 129 (Ga. 1932).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

1. The motion to dismiss the writ of error is denied.

2. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition. A cause of action was set forth; and under the principle that one partner can collect a debt due to the partnership, Dubberly was bound by the action of Kicklighter, as a partner in the firm of Kicklighter & Dubberly, in agreeing to pay money in his hands sufficient to have discharged the indebtedness of the petitioners in this case upon a note. The authorities upon which reliance is placed, which require the consent of all partners to the act of another partner in order to apply any portion of the partnership assets to the payment of his' individual liability, are not in point under the facts as alleged in the petition in this case.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

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Per Curiam.

1. The motion to dismiss the writ of error is denied.

2. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition. A cause of action was set forth; and under the principle that one partner can collect a debt due to the partnership, Dubberly was bound by the action of Kicklighter, as a partner in the firm of Kicklighter & Dubberly, in agreeing to pay money in his hands sufficient to have discharged the indebtedness of the petitioners in this case upon a note. The authorities upon which reliance is placed, which require the consent of all partners to the act of another partner in order to apply any portion of the partnership assets to the payment of his' individual liability, are not in point under the facts as alleged in the petition in this case.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

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Bluebook (online)

164 S.E. 49, 174 Ga. 746, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rushing-v-kicklighter-ga-1932.