Rushing v. Griffin

121 So. 2d 229, 240 La. 31, 13 Oil & Gas Rep. 977, 1960 La. LEXIS 1004
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMay 31, 1960
DocketNo. 44199
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 121 So. 2d 229 (Rushing v. Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rushing v. Griffin, 121 So. 2d 229, 240 La. 31, 13 Oil & Gas Rep. 977, 1960 La. LEXIS 1004 (La. 1960).

Opinion

VIOSCA, Justice.

Clayton T. Rushing and Mrs. Jewel Por-terfield, plaintiffs and appellants, lessors, seek cancellation of an oil, gas and mineral lease on seven acres more or less of land in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, executed by them in favor of Dr. Edward P. Griffin, Jr., defendant and appellee, lessee.

The lease which is attached to and made part of the petition is dated June 9, 1955 and states in the opening paragraph that it is between “Clayton T. Rushing, wife of Irene Isgate Rushing * '* * and Jewel Rushing Porterfield, a widow, * * * lessor (whether one or more), and Edward P. Griffin, Jr., a single man, lessee * * * ”. Although Clayton T. Rushing is stated to be the wife of Irene Isgate Rushing he is, in fact, her husband. The lease is signed by Clayton T. Rushing and Jewel Rushing Porterfield. Irene Isgate Rushing’s signature does not appear thereon.

The lease is for a primary term of five years, and it contains the following provision :

“If operations for drilling are not commenced on said land on or before one year from this date, the lease shall then terminate as to both parties unless [230]*230on or before such anniversary date lessee shall pay or tender to lessor or to the credit of lessor in Commercial National Bank at Shreveport, Louisiana (which bank and its successors are lessor’s agent and shall continue as the depository for all rentals payable hereunder regardless of changes in ownership of said land or the rentals) the sum of Seven and No/100 Dollárs ($7.00), (herein called rental) which shall cover the privilege of deferring commencement of drilling operations for a period of twelve (12) months. In like manner and upon like payments or tenders annually the commencement of drilling operations may be further deferred for successive periods of twelve (12) months each during the primary term. The payment or tender of rental may be made by the check or draft of lessee mailed or delivered to lessor or to said bank on or before such day of payment. * * * ”

Plaintiffs allege that drilling operations were not cpmmenced within one year from the date of the lease and that defendant did not properly pay or tender payment of the renewal rental of $7 within the time fixed in the lease or at any other time. They allege that under date of June 2, 1956, defendant forwarded to Commercial National Bank of Shreveport, Louisiana, a check in the amount of $7 payable to Clayton T. Rushing, Irene Isgate Rushing and Jewel Rushing Porterfield; that under date of June 7, 1956, Clayton T. Rushing returned the check to defendant informing him that there was an error in the names of the payees; that on August 2, 1956, Clayton T. Rushing again advised defendant of his failure to pay the rentals properly; that under date of January 16, 1957, lessors demanded a release of the lease in view of the nonpayment of rental and that on March 27, 1957, their attorney demanded a release of the lease, all of which demands were ignored.

Plaintiffs further allege that the lease rights have a value in excess of $7,000 and that they are entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the sum of $1,500 incurred by them in bringing suit. They pray for judgment ordering the cancellation of the lease, awarding the sum of $1,500 as reasonable attorney's fees and reserving their rights to claim an accounting as a result of production and damages under LSA-R.S. 30:-102.

In answer to the suit defendant alleges that he properly paid the delay rentals in the sum of $7 before the expiration date and that the error in making the check payable to three persons instead of the two lessors was the error of Commercial National Bank of Shreveport, the depository named in the lease and the agent of plaintiffs. Defendant alleges that he returned to plaintiff, Clayton T. Rushing, the check which had been erroneously made out in the name of three payees instead of two. He accordingly prays that the suit be dismissed.

The district court concluded that all the rentals due and owing under the lease were properly paid and accordingly rendered judgment decreeing the lease to be in full force and effect and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit. From this judgment plaintiffs have appealed.

According to the record in the case, it appears that on or about June 1, 1956, defendant, desiring to pay the delay rentals, went to his bank, the First National Bank in Mansfield, and asked that bank to issue a rental check in payment of the delay rental. That bank, in a letter of transmittal dated June 1, 1956, wrote the Commercial National Bank at Shreveport, the depository named in the lease, as follows:

“Mr. Edward P. Griffin asked us to issue Lease rental check to Mr. Clayton Rushing et als but we noticed that this was payable at your bank so we have issued our Bank Money order No. 37165 in the amount of $7.50 to cover. The $7.00 to be paid to Mr. Rushing and .50^ for service charge.
[231]*231“When you have issued this check .we will appreciate it if you will return the Oil, Gas and Mineral lease, together with the copy of your check to Mr. Griffin, P. O. Box 432, Mansfield, La.”

On June 2, 1956, the Commercial National Bank acknowledged receipt of the check in a communication reading as follows:

“This will acknowledge your cashier’s check Number 37165 in the amount of $7.50 pajmble to our order for oil and gas lease rental by Mr. E. P. Griffin to be credited to the account of Mr. Clayton T. Rushing and others.
“As instructed in your letter we are returning the lease which was enclosed in your letter direct to Mr. Griffin.”

The Commercial National Bank of Shreveport under the same date issued its check for $7 payable to the order of Clayton T. Rushing, Irene Isgate Rushing and Jewel Rushing Porterfield.

From the foregoing it will be noted that defendant did not comply with the terms of the lease in making the rental payment. The lease provided that “lessee shall pay or tender to lessors or to the credit of lessors in Commercial National Bank of Shreveport, Louisiana” the sum of $7, whereas defendant’s bank, the First National Bank in Mansfield, advised the depository bank that defendant had asked it to issue “lease rental check to Mr. Clayton Rushing et ais” and specifically instructed Commercial National Bank, the depository: “The $7.00 to be paid to Mr. Rushing”. The $7 therefore was never credited to the account of the lessors Clayton T. Rushing and Jewel Rushing Porterfield. Notwithstanding the instructions of the First National Bank in Mansfield to the Commercial National Bank, the money was credited to the two lessors and the wife of one of the lessors.

In Le Rosen v. North Central Texas Oil Company, Inc., 169 La. 973, 974, 126 So. 442, we held that where a married man is the lessor and the deposit is made to the credit of the lessor and his wife, this is not a compliance with the terms of a contract requiring that the deposit be made to the lessor’s credit and we declared the lease terminated. We ruled similarly in Clingman v. Devonian Oil Company, 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59.

It is true that in Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Company, 213 La. 1051, 36 So.2d 34, 38, we overruled the Le Rosen case in one respect. In the Jones case we held:

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Related

Richard v. Tarpon Oil Co.
269 So. 2d 261 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1972)
Miller v. Kellerman
228 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Louisiana, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
121 So. 2d 229, 240 La. 31, 13 Oil & Gas Rep. 977, 1960 La. LEXIS 1004, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rushing-v-griffin-la-1960.