IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-IA-01185-SCT
RUSH HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., D/B/A RUSH FOUNDATION HOSPITAL
v.
MONICA SPARROW
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/07/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES W. WRIGHT, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL FALGOUT ROBERT D. JONES J. RICHARD BARRY RIMEN BRAR SINGH COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: J. RICHARD BARRY RIMEN BRAR SINGH ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL FALGOUT ROBERT D. JONES NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 04/16/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Monica Sparrow slipped and fell on a drainage grate while exiting an employee
parking garage at Rush Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a Rush Foundation Hospital (Rush). The
trial court denied Rush’s motion for summary judgment and found that genuine issues of
material fact remained in dispute. Because Sparrow presented testimony that she was
specifically directed by a nurse to exit the employee parking garage, that the parking garage was poorly lit, that the drainage grate was partially concealed, and that the metal grate was
very slick to the touch and shifted when body weight was placed upon it, we affirm the
decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In August 2020, Sparrow’s daughter Kristen Carlisle was pregnant and was having
blood-pressure issues that limited her ability to drive. Therefore, Sparrow accompanied
Carlisle to an appointment at Rush. At that time, the hospital was operating under COVID-19
restrictions and had limited entrances into the hospital in order to screen the public and
employees when they entered the building for COVID symptoms. Sparrow testified that
medical personnel had instructed Carlisle to enter the hospital through the emergency room
so they could be checked for COVID symptoms before entering the obstetrics area.
Accordingly, Sparrow parked in front of the emergency-room entrance. After entering the
hospital, Carlisle and Sparrow were checked for COVID symptoms and were then escorted
to the obstetrics floor.
¶3. Because Carlisle’s blood pressure was elevated, her doctor instructed her to stay so
that she could be monitored. Sparrow testified that, while Carlisle was being monitored, it
began to rain. There was also a light fog. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Carlisle was released
to leave and was put in a wheelchair that was being pushed by Carlisle’s obstetrics nurse.
Sparrow stated that she asked the nurse where she needed to move the car in order to pick
up Carlisle. According to Sparrow, the nurse stated that COVID policies required the staff
to take patients out of certain exits. Sparrow testified that the nurse asked if she knew where
2 the employee parking deck beside the emergency room was located. Sparrow responded that
she knew where the parking deck was but not how to get there. Sparrow stated that the nurse
informed her that she could follow her to the employee parking deck. According to Sparrow,
when they arrived at the exit leading to the parking deck, the nurse told Sparrow to go
through the parking deck and then to take a left at the opening to get back to the emergency-
room entrance where she had parked. Sparrow did not know the name of the nurse but
testified that she had been her daughter’s nurse that day and had long blonde hair. This nurse
has not yet been identified.
¶4. At the time that Sparrow began to exit the hospital, it had stopped raining but was
misting. Sparrow, who was wearing a pair of flip flops, walked through the employee parking
deck and through the left side of the large automobile exit. The automobile exit measured
approximately twenty-six feet wide. From Sparrow’s viewpoint, a metal drainage grate was
located on the left side of the automobile exit and measured four-feet, nine-and-a-half inches
deep and five-feet, five-and-a-half inches wide. The metal grate was approximately six
inches from the left concrete walkway outside the parking garage. As Sparrow reached the
end of the parking deck, she stepped on the metal grate; her right foot slipped out from under
her, and her left knee buckled, causing her to fall onto her left knee. Sparrow testified that
she had been worried about her daughter and grandson and that she had not seen the grate
before she stepped on it. Thereafter, Sparrow was unable to move from her position on the
drainage grate. A Rush employee found Sparrow sitting on the grate after her fall and called
a security officer. The security officer then arrived with a wheelchair, but medical staff had
3 to lift Sparrow to put her into the wheelchair and take her to the emergency room. Sparrow’s
fall resulted in a complete transverse fracture of the mid-waist left patella that required
surgery two days later.
¶5. Sparrow filed a complaint against Rush and claimed that Rush had required her to exit
the hospital through an unreasonably dangerous route and had failed to warn her of the
unreasonably dangerous area. Rush subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment and
argued that the metal grate was open and obvious and that no unreasonably dangerous
condition existed. Rush further argued that Sparrow was a licensee and that no evidence had
been presented that Rush willfully or wantonly injured her.
¶6. Sparrow contended that the employee parking deck had been poorly lit and that the
metal grate had been partially concealed due to rain water. Sparrow additionally argued that
the metal grate was not securely flat and flush in its housing and that it had shifted upward
when she had stepped on it. The trial court denied summary judgment and found that the
evidence presented by Rush was insufficient to show that Sparrow would be unable to prove
any facts to support her claim.
¶7. Rush appealed and raised two issues: 1) whether Sparrow produced evidence that she
was injured by a dangerous condition; and 2) whether, in the alternative, Sparrow was a
licensee and failed to show that Rush had willfully or wantonly injured her.
ANALYSIS
¶8. “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment de
novo.” City of Jackson v. Maxie ex rel. M.Y., 412 So. 3d 1156, 1159 (Miss. 2025) (citing
4 Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss. 2005)). All evidence is taken into
consideration, “including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions,
affidavits and exhibits.” Id. (citing Turner v. Johnson, 498 So. 2d 389, 391 (Miss. 1986)).
“The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion has been made, and the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Anderson v. Wiggins, 331 So. 3d 1, 4 (Miss. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., 23 So. 3d 541,
544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). “[I]f there is doubt as to whether or not a fact issue exists, it
should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Neely v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 996 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 2008)).
I. Whether Sparrow produced evidence that she was injured by a dangerous condition.
¶9. Rush first argued that Sparrow failed to produce evidence that her fall can be
attributed to a dangerous condition. In contrast, Sparrow avers that the slick, partially
concealed drainage grate was a dangerous condition that caused her to fall and sustain
injuries.
¶10. “Premises liability is a ‘theory of negligence that establishes the duty owed to
someone injured on a landowner’s premises as a result of “conditions or activities” on the
land . . . .’” Venture, Inc. v. Harris, 307 So. 3d 427, 432 (Miss. 2020) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Goodson, 267 So. 3d 774, 777 (Miss.
2019)).
5 Mississippi applies a three-step process to determine premises liability. The first step consists of classifying the status of the injured person as an invitee, licensee, or a trespasser. Following this identification, the duty which was owed to the injured party is determined. The third step is to determine whether this duty was breached by the landowner or business operator. The determination of which status a particular plaintiff holds can be a jury question, but where the facts are not in dispute the classification becomes a question of law for the trial judge.
Id. at 433 (quoting Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d 152, 156 (Miss. 2004)).
¶11. Because Sparrow walked through an employee parking garage, Rush does not concede
that Sparrow was an invitee at the time that she fell. For purposes of the first issue, however,
Rush alleges that even assuming that Sparrow was an invitee, she still failed to show that the
drainage grate was a dangerous condition. “[A]n invitee is a person who goes upon the
premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant
for their mutual advantage . . . .” Corley v. Evans, 835 So. 2d 30, 37 (Miss. 2003) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Hoffman v. Planters Gin Co., 358 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Miss.
1978)). If Sparrow was an invitee, Rush owed her a duty “to keep its premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to warn . . . of dangerous conditions that are not readily
apparent.” Thomas v. Boyd Biloxi LLC, 360 So. 3d 204, 213 (Miss. 2023) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clinton Healthcare, LLC v. Atkinson,
294 So. 3d 66, 71 (Miss. 2019)). “[T]here is no liability for injuries, where the condition is
not dangerous . . . .” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Harris, 307 So. 3d at 433).
¶12. This Court has distinguished cases that “involved dangers which are usual and which customers normally expect to encounter on the business premises, such as thresholds, curbs, and steps” from those cases involving a “physical defect
6 on the defendant’s premises condition which may be found to be unusual and unreasonably dangerous . . . .”
Harris, 307 So. 3d at 433 (alteration in original) (quoting Tate v. S. Jitney Jungle Co., 650
So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1995)). “In general, undamaged common architectural conditions
such as thresholds are not dangerous conditions.” Lasseter v. AWH-BP Jackson Hotel, LLC,
380 So. 3d 232, 236 (Miss. 2024) (citing McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So. 2d 1225, 1228
(Miss. 1990)).
¶13. After Carlisle’s doctor released her, her nurse brought in a wheelchair for her to exit
the hospital. Sparrow testified that she asked her daughter’s nurse where she needed to drive
her car in order to pick her daughter up:
And [the nurse] said,[b]ecause of COVID, there’s only certain exits we can take you out—patients out. She said, [d]o you know where the employee parking deck is beside the emergency room? I said, I do know where it’s at, but I don’t know how to get to it because I’ve never been there. She said, [w]ell, this is what we’ll do. You just follow me out. And we went to that exit that takes you to that parking deck, employee parking deck, and she said, [y]ou can go out this door, go out the end. It takes you right around to the emergency room where you’re parked, and you can come back in and loop through and pick [your daughter] up here at this exit. I said okay.
Sparrow did not know the name of the nurse who had instructed her to exit through the
employee parking garage but testified that she had long, blonde hair, that she worked on the
OB floor, and that she had been her daughter’s nurse that day.
¶14. Sparrow testified that she had no idea how to get to where the nurse wanted her to go
because the nurse told her: “We can only exit out certain exits. This is one, and this one. But
I’m going to—we’re going to use this one.” Thus, she followed the nurse’s instructions.
According to Sparrow, when the nurse arrived at the employee parking garage exit, she
7 opened the door leading into the parking garage and stated, “[y]ou go down this way, and at
the end, you’re going to take a left and you’re going to be right there at the ER. There’s a
sidewalk, and you can walk right across to your vehicle.” She testified that the nurse told her
that when she got “down to the end down where the open tunnel is, you take a left.”
¶15. Sparrow stated that, as she was walking out, she walked to the left side of the large
opening because the nurse had instructed her to do so and because it was a parking deck and
she did not want to walk out in the middle of the opening. Sparrow admitted that she had not
seen the drainage grate before she stepped on it. She said that she had been in “unfamiliar
territory” and was walking and was not looking down. When opposing counsel asked
Sparrow if she had been looking at the grate before she walked on it, she responded: “I was
not looking at the grate. I’m just going to tell you this. My daughter had just come from
the—she was carrying my grandson. My mind was not on this at the time, I’m just going to
be honest.” Opposing counsel then asked Sparrow if she would have walked around the grate
if she had been looking. Sparrow answered: “Maybe. I don’t know. Sometimes when I’m
parked in a parking deck, I don’t walk around a grate. Maybe, maybe not. I’m not going to
tell y’all what would have happened . . . .”
¶16. Sparrow stated that when she stepped on the grate it was slick and that it had moved
when she stepped on it. During Sparrow’s deposition, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Okay. Why are you claiming Rush is negligent in this lawsuit?
A. Why do I think they’re negligent?
Q. Yes, ma’am.
8 A. I think they’re negligent because they didn’t have anything there letting people know that that grate was there. And it was slippery. It was very slippery. It was like slime.
Q. But it wasn’t hidden, was it?
A. No, it was out there in sight. But you know what? They sent me out that door in unfamiliar territory, sir, that I was not—I had no idea that that grate was there.
Q. Yes, ma’am. But you were also supposed to be watching where you were going, weren’t you?
A. Yes, and I was watching where I was going.
Q. Were you watching as you walked?
A. Do you always watch where you walk?
Q. I do.
A. Uh-huh. When you got something on your mind, you walk—well, let me just see where I’m going. I try to focus ahead, but, you know, like I said, I had been in the hospital with my daughter. My daughter was not doing well. I had a lot on my mind, and I was just wanting to go and get the vehicle to get my daughter home where she could rest.
Q. Do you put any percentage of fault on yourself?
....
A. No, I don’t. I don’t think I’m at fault here because I think that if I had been in familiar territory—because like I said, I’ve worked for Rush. I’ve used Rush. I’ve always used Rush. I’m familiar. This place, I was not familiar. For one, I wasn’t allowed in this place.
A. You get that, right? And I was told to go out this place that I had no idea where I was going, and it was dark. You’ve got to understand that, too.
9 Q. There weren’t lights in the garage?
A. It was very, very dim. And, you know, if you don’t believe me, you go over there—unless they fixed it, go over there and look and go out there when it’s dark and see how dimly lit.
Q. It wasn’t so dark if you had been watching you would have seen the grate, would you?
A. No, I’m not—look, I’m not going to answer that because I don’t believe—I don’t believe Rush handled any of this in the correct way, sir.
Counsel for Rush continued to ask Sparrow whether she would have seen the grate if she was
looking, and Sparrow continued to state that she did not know or that she was not answering.
¶17. Sparrow additionally testified that when she came back to the hospital for surgery two
days after her fall, there was a “[b]ig yellow slippery sign standing right there beside that
grate.” Sparrow testified that if she had not been instructed by Rush personnel on how to
leave the premises, she would not have exited the same way. She stated that she would have
exited through the emergency room because that is where she had parked.
¶18. Kennedy, president of Rush at the time, was questioned as to any policies or
procedural guidelines that were in effect to establish the entrances and exits of Rush on
August 25, 2020. He responded:
[I] honestly don’t remember. We had so many changes to the way that we were allowing people in and what entrances to come in throughout COVID, I can’t remember—I honestly don’t remember this specific day, but all of – those changed so many times I cannot – I can’t remember exactly what the policy would have been on what particular day in the craziness that was COVID.
Kennedy testified as follows:
10 Q. [O]n that particular day, if the plaintiff testifies that she was instructed on an exit route to take, would you have any reason to believe that she’s not telling a true statement saying she was provided an exit route?
Any particular exit. But in this case, the actual parking garage. If she said she was instructed to exit Rush Hospital through the parking garage, would you have any reason to believe that that would not be a true statement from her?
A. There’s no way for me to know what she would have been told by one of our 3,000 employees.
In Kennedy’s interrogatory responses, however, he asserted that Sparrow was giving an
untruthful statement by saying that she was instructed on Rush’s exit routes for her
daughter’s hospital appointment on August 25, 2020. He explained that Rush’s standard
operating procedure “is always to not take visitors out through that area.”
¶19. Kennedy admitted that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the hospital attempted to
narrow down the number of entrances into the hospital in order to protect its patients,
employees, and visitors and to comply with federal requirements. Kennedy testified that Rush
would have published which entrances were open on its website.
¶20. Jason Barksdale, Sr., a security officer for Rush, testified that he filled out the incident
report after Sparrow’s fall. Barksdale stated that he had not seen any standing water or
puddling around the drainage grate. He stated, however, that the metal grate was slick to the
touch and had no traction. Barksdale additionally testified that during the COVID-19
pandemic, it was practice that individuals would enter the hospital through one area and exit
the hospital through another area. He stated that people would come into the hospital through
11 the emergency room to be screened but that they would leave through a different exit.
Barksdale testified that people who entered through the emergency room would usually leave
from a specialty exit at the back of the building, which resulted in a longer walk back to the
emergency-room parking lot.
¶21. Shaun Miles, expert for Sparrow, submitted an affidavit stating that on May 14, 2024,
he visited and inspected Rush’s employee parking garage. Miles stated that the metal grate
was not one solid piece but was comprised of three individual panels. According to Miles,
the metal grate was “extremely slick to the touch” on a dry day; he asserted that the slickness
would have been exacerbated if it had been wet. Further, Miles stated that when he placed
his body weight on the individual sections of the grates, two of the three moved, shifted,
and/or raised out of the housing they were sitting in. He noted that the area to the right of the
metal grate, leaving the parking garage, had “very high and significant speed bumps” affixed
to the concrete that, in his opinion, would cause a walking hazard to traverse.
¶22. A man door was located on the left side of the parking garage, if exiting the hospital,
approximately fourteen feet from the garage entrance. Miles opined that the door on the left
side of the parking garage would not have been clearly visible to a pedestrian exiting the
parking garage if there had been cars parked in the parking spots by the door. He could not,
however, testify as to whether or not there were any cars parked in those places on the date
and time of Sparrow’s fall. Miles stated that during his May 2024 visit, he inspected the side
door and found that the door was jammed and could not be opened from either side without
using his body weight to push against and open the door. Further, no signage indicated that
12 pedestrians should not exit the parking garage in the manner that Sparrow had exited. Miles
opined that Sparrow had traveled the most reasonable path of least resistence that was not
hindered by speed-bump hazards. Miles expressed his opinion that the metal grate that
Sparrow walked across was not reasonably safe, especially on a wet day, due to its slick
character and nature in addition to the movement of the grates when body weight was placed
on them. Miles found the grates to be unsafe for pedestrian traffic.
¶23. Brad Carter prepared an expert report for Rush. The report stated in part that, in
Carter’s opinion, Sparrow had ignored the normal personnel exit door and had ample room
to exit the parking garage without the need to walk over the metal grate. Gregory Miller,
Carter Miller Sansing, Ltd., testified that he was designated as an expert after his partner
Carter had passed away. Miller testified that he did not add to or subtract from Carter’s
report. Miller stated that before his deposition, he had visited the employee parking garage
and had observed the metal grate for approximately five minutes but had not taken any notes.
¶24. Miller stated that the large door in the parking garage was for the purposes of vehicle
ingress and egress. He testified that engineers include man doors in parking garages to
comply with building codes. When asked how Sparrow would have known to take the man
door, Miller testified that he believed that there was an exit sign above the door but could not
recall if the exit sign was illuminated or not when he visited. Miller also could not state
whether the sign had been illuminated on the night that Sparrow fell. Miller admitted that
Sparrow’s shortest path would have been to walk out of the large door instead of taking an
immediate left and walking almost fourteen feet to exit through the smaller side door. Miller
13 testified that he walked on the grate and noticed “a deflection” but stated that deflection
normally happens with grating. Miller did not measure the deflection rate, however. Miller
testified that he would say the deflection rate was acceptable based on the fact that metal
grates are designed for cars to run over, and he did not weigh as much as a car. He also stated
that he could not give an opinion as to whether the metal grate was slick or rough to the
touch.
¶25. Miller also said in his deposition:
Q. Okay. Your report goes on further to say—and this is the crux of it—it is my opinion that plaintiff ignored the normal personnel exit door and had ample room to exit the parking garage without the need to walk over the metal grate where she claims she fell. Do you remember that sentence in the report?
A. May I see that, please?
Q. Yes. That’s going to be the end of the second full paragraph.
A. Can I have a moment with the attorney, please?
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. All right. Mr. Miller, you’ve now had an opportunity to either review or re-review the expert opinion that Brad Carter gave, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I need to ask you this question again just for clarification purposes. Prior to today, have you had an opportunity to review the expert report provided by Brad Carter?
A. I reviewed a report in the file and it is not this report.
Q. It is not this report?
14 A. No.
Q. It is another report done by Brad Carter?
A. I apologize for the misunderstanding. I took the file as Brad left it on the conference room table and pulled what I thought was the report out. And I don’t remember if what I was looking at was before or after this, but it’s not the same.
Therefore, serious concerns are apparent from the record regarding whether Miller had even
reviewed Carter’s report before his deposition testimony.
¶26. In its motion for summary judgment, Rush argues that the drainage grate was not
defective. It contends that drainage grates are inherently meant to collect water and are
supposed to get slick. Further, Rush argues that the drainage grate was obvious and was a
common architectural feature. According to Rush, drainage grates are not supposed to be
prime places to step onto and that Sparrow, through her own lack of attention, did not
appreciate the existence of the drainage grate. Rush also points out that the drainage grate
had been there for more than twenty years without any known issues or incidences.
¶27. Sparrow argues that Rush violated its duty to keep its premises in a reasonably safe
condition in the following ways:
A. failing to provide a dry, secure, well lit exit route from services provided from Rush Health Systems, Inc., specifically Rush Foundation Hospital;
B. failing to provide alternate safe exit routes on the day in question from services provided from Rush Health Systems, Inc., specifically Rush Foundation Hospital.
C. requiring Plaintiff to exit Rush Health Systems, Inc., specifically Rush Foundation Hospital through an unreasonably dangerous route;
15 D. failing to have enough employees to secure and monitor the required wet, unstable, and poorly lit exit route;
E. failing to inspect and guard against the multiple hazards present at the required exit route;
F. failing to implement a reviewable Covid-19 policy for ingress and egress which can be verbified by others.
G. such other acts of negligence as may be show in discovery or at trial.
¶28. Rush stresses that “our law ‘has long recognized that normally encountered dangers
such as curves, sidewalks, and steps are not hazardous conditions. Often such pathways
contain cracks and changes in elevation; and, as such, they do not become hazardous
conditions simply because they contain minor imperfections or defects.’” Cross v. Attala
Cnty. Coop., 302 So. 3d 205, 208 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores
LP, 187 So. 3d 1100, 1104 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). In Cross, the plaintiff tripped on a
transition in the floor in front of a shelf of flowers. Id. at 206. The plaintiff alleged that the
transition had been “cracked, chipped, un-level, and unmarked” but stated that she did realize
the transition was there and that she did not have difficulty maneuvering the transition. Id.
at 208. The plaintiff’s expert also opined that there was nothing in particular about the
shelving configuration would lead a customer reaching for plant to fall. Id. at 209. The Court
of Appeals concluded that any defect or imperfection in the floor was minor and that the
plaintiff had failed to show the existence of a dangerous condition in the floor. Id.
¶29. Rush also cites Hill v. Central Sunbelt Federal Credit Union, 349 So. 3d 1181, 1185
(Miss. App. 2022) (quoting Harris, 307 So. 3d at 433), and its is holding that a “plaintiff
must present evidence to prove the existence of a dangerous condition.” There, the plaintiff
16 slipped on wet concrete on the porch area of a credit union. Id. at 1183. The plaintiff testified
that “the wet surface and the smoothness of the concrete area” had contributed to his fall. Id.
at 1186 (internal quotation mark omitted). A surveillance video showed that, although the
concrete was wet, no puddles or accumulated rain were present on the covered porch area.
Id. The Court of Appeals found that no evidence had suggested an unreasonably dangerous
condition had existed at the time of the plaintiff’s fall. Id. at 1187.
¶30. Lastly, Rush cites McCullar v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 50 So. 3d 1009, 1010 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2010), in which a woman had been in the bathroom of a casino’s hotel room when a
seal broke and water began flowing down from the ceiling above the bathtub, potentially
causing the woman to fall. The Court of Appeals concluded that no evidence showed that the
casino had created the dangerous condition or that the casino had prior notice of the leak. Id.
at 1013. The appeals court also pointed out that the leak “took place in a bathroom where
employees obviously were neither present nor instructed to monitor continuously.” Id.
¶31. Here, Sparrow presented evidence to demonstrate issues of material fact, and the trial
court correctly denied summary judgment. Sparrow did not merely allege that the drainage
grate was a dangerous condition. Sparrow alleged in her complaint that she was instructed
that “she had to exit the premises through a certain area, and/or route” and that her daughter’s
nurse had directed her and escorted her to the route that was through the employee parking
garage. She testified that the parking garage had been poorly lit, that the drainage grate had
been partially concealed by rain, and that the drainage grate had been very slippery, “like
17 slime.” She further alleged that the grate was not securely flat and flush in its housing and
that it had shifted upward when she stepped on it.
¶32. Moreover, although Sparrow’s expert visited the premises years later, he corroborated
Sparrow’s testimony and wrote that the drainage grate had been “extremely slippery” on the
dry day he visited and that rain would have exacerbated the slickness. Sparrow’s expert also
testified that the drainage grate panels had shifted when body weight was placed upon them.
In contrast, the plaintiff in Hill had not presented expert testimony to support his claim.
¶33. Barksdale, a security officer for Rush, testified that it was practice during the COVID-
19 pandemic that individuals would enter the hospital through one area and exit the hospital
through another area. He stated that during August 2020, the hospital was admitting people
through the emergency room only and that people would leave from areas other than the
emergency room. Barksdale also testified that, although he did not see any standing water in
the area, the metal grate was smooth, without traction, and slick to the touch.
¶34. Miller, Rush’s expert, testified that he had not prepared the expert report and that he
had only visited the scene once for five minutes prior to his deposition. Miller had not taken
any photos or make any diagrams and had not known under what weather conditions the
photos in the report had been taken.
¶35. In Thomas, this Court found that a pool deck area that “was slippery and dipped
inward” could constitute a dangerous condition. Thomas, 360 So. 3d at 214. This Court
reasoned that “while water may be a danger ‘which [is] usual and which customers normally
expect to encounter’ on a deck near a swimming pool, a reasonable jury could find that an
18 area that holds water due to how it dips inward and that is slippery due to the substances it
holds is a dangerous condition.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Harris, 307 So. 3d at 433).
¶36. Like in Thomas, a drainage grate might be a usual danger; however, a reasonable jury
could find that a drainage grate in a poorly lit parking garage that is slippery to the point of
being “like slime” and that shifts when it is stepped on is a dangerous condition. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Sparrow, genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether the metal grate was a dangerous condition. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of summary judgment.
II. Whether Sparrow remained an invitee when she attempted to exit the hospital through an employee-only parking garage.
¶37. Rush alternatively argues that Sparrow became a licensee once she entered the
employee parking garage. It argues that when Sparrow decided to use the parking garage
meant for employees she became a licensee.1
¶38. The status of a plaintiff in a premises-liability case may be determined using the
following guidelines:
An invitee enters “the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage.” A licensee, however, enters “the property of another for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit pursuant to the license or implied permission of the owner.” When circumstances surrounding the victim’s purpose on the property are in dispute, status will be a fact question for a jury to decide. But where there are no factual disputes, status is a question of law for the trial court’s determination.
1 Although not precedential to this Court, the Court of Appeals has held that a person visiting a friend at a hospital and escorting the patient’s minor son was a business invitee. Wilson v. Baptist-Mem’l Hosp.-N. Miss., Inc., 93 So. 3d 48, 50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). The court stated “[o]ur own independent review of the law confirms, as other courts have observed, that the rule is nearly universal that hospital visitors are invitees.” Id. at 51.
19 Cade v. Beard, 130 So. 3d 77, 81 (Miss. 2014) (citations omitted).
¶39. This Court previously has held that an apartment tenant’s nephew who had visited his
uncle and decided to go to the swimming pool at the apartment complex was a trespasser.
Handy v. Nejam, 111 So. 3d 610, 612 (Miss. 2013). Because the leasing provision and
posted regulations for the apartment complex stated that guests were required to be
accompanied by the tenant when they entered the pool area, this Court reasoned that the
nephew was an invitee when he entered his uncle’s apartment but “lost his status as an
invitee when he entered the swimming pool without being accompanied by his uncle.” Id.
at 613 (citing Leffler v. Sharp, 891 So. 2d 152, 154 (Miss. 2004)).
¶40. Rush cites Sharlow v. Raybourn, 135 So. 3d 238, 240 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), in which
a receptionist at a hair salon entered the salon on a day off for an appointment for a free
haircut from one of the stylists. The receptionist left the salon during a rainstorm and slipped
and fell on a concrete ramp leading to the parking lot. Id. Despite the fact that the salon
owner allowed stylists to give free haircuts to employees, the Court of Appeals found that
the receptionist had “failed to create a fact question as to whether [the hair salon] received
a mutual advantage from her free haircut.” Id. at 243. The court found relevant that the
receptionist had not paid for the haircut but had tipped her stylist and that any tip paid to the
stylist was not shared with the hair salon. Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the
receptionist was a licensee at the time she fell. Id. at 244.
¶41. Although Rush argues that Sparrow was using the parking garage for her own benefit
and convenience, Sparrow testified that Carlisle’s nurse had specifically directed her to exit
20 the premises through the employee parking garage and had proceeded to escort her to the
parking-garage exit. Sparrow testified that she would not have exited the hospital in that way
had she not been instructed to do so. Further, Sparrow testified that when the nurse and she
arrived at the exit door leading to the employee parking deck, the nurse opened the door and
told Sparrow to go through the parking deck and to take a left at the opening to get back to
the emergency-room entrance where she had parked.
¶42. Barksdale testified that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, it was practice that
individuals would enter the hospital through one area and be required to exit the hospital
through another area. He also explained that people would come into the hospital through the
emergency room to be screened but they would leave through a different exit. Kennedy
admitted that during the COVID-19 “craziness[,]” the hospital had “so many changes to the
way that” the hospital was allowing people to enter the hospital that he could not remember
what the hospital’s policy was on what particular day. He further stated that there would be
no way for him to know what an employee would have told Sparrow regarding an exit route.
¶43. Again, “[w]hen circumstances surrounding the victim’s purpose on the property are
in dispute, status will be a fact question for a jury to decide.” Cade, 130 So. 3d at 81 (citing
Little ex rel. Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 760 (Miss. 1998), overruled on other grounds by
Johnson v. Goodson, 267 So. 3d 774 (Miss. 2019)). Because Sparrow presented evidence
that she was instructed to exit the premises through an employee parking garage by one of
Rush’s employees and was escorted to the employee parking-garage exit, a factual dispute
21 exists as to Sparrow’s status as an invitee or licensee at the time of her fall. Therefore, issues
of material fact remain, and the trial court correctly denied summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
¶44. Genuine issues of material fact remain; therefore, the trial court correctly denied
Rush’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶45. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND SULLIVAN, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRIFFIS, J. BRANNING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶46. The drainage gate upon which the plaintiff slipped is a normal architectural feature
and no different from a curb or any other normal architectural feature the like of which do
not give rise to a claim for negligence. Accordingly, and with respect, I dissent.
¶47. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long held that common architectural features,
such as curbs, sidewalks, and drainage grates, cannot give rise to a successful premises
liability claim. In Stanley v. Morgan & Lindsey, Inc., 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967), the
plaintiff, Ivey M. Stanley, fell when stepping off of a sidewalk that was seven-and-one-half
inches above the parking lot on to which Stanley fell. Id. at 476. Stanley was wearing
bifocals and testified that the sun, shining brightly in her face, impeded her ability to see.
She testified that customers leaving the defendant store could not see the change in elevation
22 between the sidewalk and the parking lot. Id. The trial court directed the verdict in favor
of the defendant, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 477
¶48. In McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1990), the plaintiff, Tommy
McGovern, tripped over a raised door threshold. Id. at 1226. The Supreme Court could
“find no evidence from which a jury could find this door entrance was not reasonably safe
. . . .” Id. The McGovern Court reviewed a few earlier cases in reaching its holding,
including City of Greenville v. Laury, 172 Miss. 118, 159 So. 121 (1935), in which the
Supreme Court had reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff who had fallen on a
Greenville city street when the heel of her shoe got stuck in a crevice. Laury, 159 So. at 121.
The Court noted that the crevice had been there long enough for the city to have constructive
notice, id., but nevertheless reversed and rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant city on
the ground that the crevice was not of such a nature as to make the street unsafe for use by
persons in the exercise of reasonable care. Id. at 122. The McGovern Court also relied on
Mercy Regional Medical Center v. Doiron, 348 So. 2d 243 (Miss. 1977), in which the Court
reversed and rendered another plaintiff’s verdict. There, the plaintiff fell on a stairway that
lacked a handrail. Id. at 243. The Doiron Court wrote as follows:
In this case the steps were built on the ground which sloped gradually down from the street to the lower parking lot and did not constitute a hazard to one using due care when using them. This case does not fall within the rule that, where facts are undisputed, but reasonable minds may draw different inferences as to negligence therefrom, solution of the issue of negligence should be left to the jury. We are of the opinion that plaintiff’s injury belongs to that class of ordinary accidents which are properly imputed to the carelessness or the misfortune of the one injured.
23 Id. at 246. In concluding its opinion affirming the directed verdict in favor of the defendant,
the McGovern Court wrote:
If this Court were to hold a jury question was made on whether this doorway was not reasonably safe, we would have to say a jury question is made as to any doorway from the street which is not on the same level as the street. Property owners would indeed be insurers of invitees' safety.
McGovern, 566 So. 2d at 1228.
¶49. Turning to the case sub judice, like the drop from a sidewalk to a parking lot, a crevice
in a street, or stairs without a handrail, the drainage grate at issue here is not of such a nature
as to support Sparrow’s claim for negligence. Like a curb, see Sessums v. Chicken Nugget,
Inc., 396 So. 3d 510 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), an uneven sidewalk, see Bond v. City of Long
Beach, 908 So. 2d 879 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), or a sloped ramp, see Simmons v. City of
Picayune, 417 So. 3d 174 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), to provide a few examples of persuasive
treatments of the issue from our Court of Appeals, the drainage grate was a common
architectural feature. In holding that the drainage grate here can support Sparrow’s claim for
negligence, the majority ignores the warning of the McGovern Court and makes Rush the
insurer of Sparrow’s safety.
GRIFFIS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.