Rupprecht v. United States

11 Cl. Ct. 689, 59 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 648, 1987 U.S. Claims LEXIS 33
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedFebruary 20, 1987
DocketNos. 86-84T to 88-84T and 167-84T
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 11 Cl. Ct. 689 (Rupprecht v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rupprecht v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 689, 59 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 648, 1987 U.S. Claims LEXIS 33 (cc 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

MAYER, Judge.

Plaintiffs claim they have overpaid federal income taxes on money they received in exchange for certain unexercised stock options. No facts are in dispute and the case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Background

Plaintiffs Charles F. Rupprecht, John D. Hartigan, Bernard P. Lauber, and Putnam L. Crafts, Jr.,1 2are former officers and employees of Studebaker-Worthington, Inc. (SWI). Under two different incentive stock option plans available to key executives of SWI, they received non-qualified stock op[690]*690tions 2 to purchase shares of SWI stock at their fair market value on the date the options were granted. When the options were granted, they were restricted and not actively traded on an established market. As a result, they did not have a readily ascertainable fair market value within the meaning of section 83(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (I.R.C.), 26 U.S.C. § 83(e).

In 1979 McGraw-Edison Co. (McGraw), a Delaware corporation, decided to acquire SWI by obtaining its entire equity interest. SWI then had outstanding approximately 14 million shares of its common stock, and non-qualified options to buy approximately 900,000 additional SWI shares. In August of 1979, a McGraw subsidiary initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding SWI shares. In September the subsidiary ended its tender offer and became the owner of approximately 93 percent of the stock. Using an expedited Delaware merger procedure, McGraw, through its subsidiary, subsequently obtained the remaining SWI shares.

For McGraw to secure the entire equity interest in SWI, however, it also had to acquire the outstanding SWI stock options. To assure that the services of Deraid H. Ruttenberg, SWI’s chief executive officer, would be available to McGraw after the merger, McGraw allowed him to exchange his SWI stock options for equivalent McGraw options. Ruttenberg, who agreed to become a member of McGraw’s board of directors and provide executive and consulting services for at least five years, was also guaranteed an annual salary of at least $200,000. This, however, still left outstanding matured and unmatured stock options (the “Non-Ruttenberg options”) which entitled their owners to purchase 681,160 SWI shares, representing more than 4 percent of SWI’s common stock.

Because McGraw wanted to be the sole owner of SWI, it negotiated with the holders to buy all of the Non-Ruttenberg options, both matured and unmatured, for cash. Plaintiffs held the options to approximately 142,450 of the 681,160 SWI shares available through these remaining options. It was agreed that the Non-Ruttenberg options would be surrendered for cash to be provided by McGraw and delivered through SWI or its subsidiaries. Payment for plaintiff Crafts’ options came directly from McGraw; the other plaintiffs’ payments were delivered through SWI or its subsidiaries. In the course of those proceedings, McGraw never discussed past or future performance of services with any SWI employees, including plaintiffs, except for Ruttenberg.

The payments received by plaintiffs for their unexercised options were taxed as ordinary income. Plaintiffs assert they should have been taxed at capital gain rates. Defendant responds that the payments were properly treated as ordinary income and that section 83 3 controls.

Discussion

I

Section 83 governs the taxation of non-qualified stock options issued as compensation for the performance of services after June 30, 1969. In pertinent part, it provides: [691]*691For section 83 to apply to these stock options, section 421 must not apply, I.R.C. § 83(e)(1); see n. 2, supra, and the options must have been transferred “in connection with the performance of services.” See Bagley v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 663, 669 (1985), aff,d, 806 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.1986). The parties stipulate that section 421 does not apply here, so only the service connection is at issue.

[690]*690(a) General Rule.—If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of—
(1) the fair market value of such property ..., over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property,
shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services ____

[691]*691Whether property has been transferred in connection with the performance of services is “essentially a question of fact.” Bagley, 85 T.C. at 669. Cf. Treas.Reg. § 1.83-3(f). In concluding that the option there was compensatory, Bagley observed that it was granted to a “key employee,” the purposes of the option were to “assist [the corporation] in retaining the services of its executives and key employees and to offer such personnel additional incentives to put forth maximum efforts for the success of the business,” and that the “sole consideration” furnished to the corporation was the employee’s “promise to render services as an employee.” 85 T.C. at 670. Although two separate incentive stock option plans are involved, our facts are similar.

The purpose of the first plan was to “provide additional incentive to key executive personnel ... and, by encouraging stock ownership, to increase their proprietary interest in the success of [SWI] by providing them with a more direct interest in the welfare and success of the enterprise.” The consideration given by the optionees was an agreement to remain in the employment of SWI (or one of its subsidiaries) for at least two years from the date of the grant. Except under rare circumstances, the option could not be exercised unless the optionee was then employed by SWI. The option could not ordinarily be exercised prior to 36 months from the date of the grant. In determining which key executives should receive options, when the options would be granted, and the number of shares subject to the options, SWI was permitted to “take into account the nature of the services rendered by the respective employees, [and] their present and potential contributions to the success of [SWI].”

The purpose of the second plan was to “enable Key Executives to acquire ownership interests in SWI on a basis that will encourage them to remain in the Company’s employ and use their best efforts to promote its growth and profitability.” Once again the optionee had to agree to remain for two years. And in deciding which key executives should receive' options, when they would be granted, and the number of shares covered, SWI was permitted to consider the key executives’ “present and potential contributions to [SWI’s] success.”

In the context of a stock option plan, the Supreme Court said, “When assets are transferred by an employer to an employee to secure better services they are plainly compensation.” Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247, 76 S.Ct. 800, 803, 100 L.Ed. 1142 (1956).

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11 Cl. Ct. 689, 59 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 648, 1987 U.S. Claims LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rupprecht-v-united-states-cc-1987.