Ruppert v. Washington

366 F. Supp. 683, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14560
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 12, 1973
DocketCiv. A. No. 227-73
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 366 F. Supp. 683 (Ruppert v. Washington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp. 683, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14560 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

GESELL, District. Judge.

This is an action by some property owners in the Mt. Vernon area of the central city against the D.C. Zoning Commission and the Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA) claiming that the Commission acted arbitrarily and illegally in down-zoning the area to the detriment of plaintiffs. The Court has jurisdiction. The Redevelopment Land Agency is a federal agency, Goddard v. DCRLA, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 304, 287 F.2d 343 (1961), and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. A federal question under the Fifth Amendment is also raised.

Plaintiffs ask for a preliminary injunction, contending that the zoning change prevents rental and contemplated office development of their property. The matter was fully heard and argued on papers filed.

The Zoning Commission did not give any statement of its reasons when it entered the down-zoning order following notice and public hearings. Various agencies of the federal and state governments and the property owners had submitted information to the Commission favoring or opposing the proposed change. These proceedings, held under Part III of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, were not a “contested case” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, but were adversary in nature and equity may be invoked. Citizens Assn, of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, 291 A.2d 699 (D.C.Ct.App. 1972).

Two threshold legal questions are raised on the motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs rely on the recent Georgetown Waterfront case, The Citizens Assn, of Georgetown v. Zoning Commission, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C.Cir., February 6, 1973), and urge that the Commission’s action is a nullity because the Commission was required to set out its reasons for the down-zoning, which it failed to do and because it acted without an environmental impact statement from the federal agencies urging the zoning change, in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The Zoning Commission and RLA contend that the Georgetown [685]*685Watei'front case must be limited to its special facts and that the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction remains the same, i. e., that when the Zoning Commission acts in a quasi-legislative manner, as it did here, no statement of reasons is necessary. Further they state that NEPA is not applicable since no federal action affecting the down-zoned area is involved and the zoning change was endorsed by the National Capital Planning Commission which presented favorable environmental considerations.

This down-zoning affects a substantial area of the city. Indeed, the very nature of down-zoning for a high-density area may have a particularly far-reaching effect, often adverse, on the utilization and purchase of many properties affected. While the exact scope and meaning of the so-called Georgetown Waterfront case is uncertain, the decision appears to require the Commission to file a statement of its reasons in a case such as this provided the Court is satisfied that judicial review will thereby be faciliated and the nature of the issues tendered suggests a clear necessity.

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366 F. Supp. 683, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruppert-v-washington-cadc-1973.