Rupley v. United States

124 Ct. Cl. 59, 1952 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 134, 1952 WL 5918
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 2, 1952
DocketNo. 49715
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 124 Ct. Cl. 59 (Rupley v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rupley v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 59, 1952 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 134, 1952 WL 5918 (cc 1952).

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1947 a fire burned a portion of the Eldorado National Forest in California. The Forest Service designated it the Allen Ranch Fire, or Burn.

Ordinarily trees that have been killed, or severely burned, deteriorate rapidly. Consequently the Forest Service, on September 18, 1947, advertised an invitation for bids

[61]*61* * * for all the live timber marked or designated for cutting, and all merchantable dead timber in the Allen Ranch burn located on an area embracing about 1,800 acres within Eldorado National Forest, California, estimated to be approximately 10,600 M feet b. m., more or less, of ponderosa pine, sugar pine, Douglas fir and incense cedar, 70 percent pine. * * * Before bids are submitted full information concerning the timber, the conditions of sale, and submission of bids should be obtained from the Forest Supervisor, Placerville, California.

No bids had been received up to October 17, 1947. Prior to this date the Forester had talked with representatives of two box companies. After October 17, 1947, the Forester and his assistant endeavored to interest several local lumbermen and operators.

In December one of the box companies approached Theodore Rupley, one of the plaintiffs, concerning the purchase by the box company of timber to be logged by the Rupleys.

Rupley was engaged in logging operations near the property in question during November and December 1947. He learned of the fire damaged timber that was being offered for sale, and made inquiry of the Forester in his office at Placerville. At about that time he read the invitation to bid, obtained a map of the burned area and a standard form of timber sales agreement.

Rupley and the Forester met in the box company’s office. Rupley asked if any of the overmatured trees in the virgin stands would be marked for cutting, and was told by the Forester that such trees would be marked when needed to complete the logging of the area in order to obviate the necessity of further logging of high-risk trees in the burned area at a later date.

A few days later contract terms were discussed, and an agreement was reached as to a definition of the term merchantability. Other matters also were discussed. At one point Rupley asked about the volume of marketing and cutting that had theretofore been done in the cutover portions of the Allen Ranch burn and was informed that it was 65 or 70 percent of the green timber. Rupley was told also the method which the Forester had used in the estimating of timber to be removed from the Allen Ranch burn.

[62]*62A contract was submitted December 31, 1947. The negotiations, representations and wording of the contract justified plaintiffs’ understanding that the timber to be logged was in a fire-salvage area and consisted of fire-damaged timber, plus some high-risk trees, that it also included in the virgin stands timber to be marked, consisting of fire-damaged trees and any undamaged trees considered by the Forester to be high risk. It does not justify an interpretation that green, undamaged trees (other than high-risk trees) were to be marked for cutting, nor that cutting was to be limited to trees that were dead or dying.

An agreement was signed by plaintiff January 26, 1948, and approved by the Forest Supervisor January 30, 1948. It was on a standard Forest Service Timber Sale Agreement form, with deletions and additions agreed upon by the parties. Pertinent parts are set out in finding 15.

The agreement described the estimated amounts of the different kinds of timber and recited the total estimated amount to be cut, live and dead, as 10,100,000 board feet, more or less.

Plaintiffs were permitted to cut only 6,602,210 board feet. This was taken from the cut over areas of the land covered by the contract. Plaintiffs asked that trees be marked in the virgin stand area. In the meantime either the weather conditions in the growing season following the fire had been favorable, or the fire damage was less than either party had anticipated. At any rate, the forest supervisor declined to mark any trees in the virgin area.

Plaintiffs sue for the difference in the value of their contract based on the privilege of cutting 10,000,000 board feet and the amount they were permitted to cut. They assert that the estimate as worded in the contract amounted to a warrant and a promise, and that the defendant breached its contract in refusing to mark trees in the virgin area.

The defendant answers that the 10,100,000 board feet was purely an estimate, and that the use of the term, more or less, permitted a variation even in the amount of the estimate.

We are inclined to the view that the term more or less as used in the particular setting was intended to cover minor errors. Pine River Logging & Imp. Co. v. United [63]*63States, 186 U. S. 279. However, that is not the important phase of this case.

No doubt the estimate was in good faith and seemed reasonable at the time it was made. The crucial fact in the case is that the contract called for “all the dead timber standing or down and all the live timber marked or designated for cutting by a Forest officer, merchantable as hereinafter defined for sawlogs.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The contract also contained the following:

Marking — 1. Live timber shall be marked or designated for cutting as follows: Only trees of merchantable size as determined by Sections 5 and 5a herein shall be marked for utilization.

When the contract is construed as a whole there is not the slightest doubt that it was intended to include in the virgin area covered by the contract (1) high-risk trees, that is,' trees that had become fully matured, and would therefore soon tend to deteriorate, and (2) trees that had been xiiaterially damaged by fire. These the Forest supervisoi declined to have marked and declined to permit to be cut. In doing so both the spirit and the letter of the contract were breached.

There was within the unmarked virgin areas a sufficient number of trees that had suffered some fire damage when added to trees in that area which would properly be classed as high-risk trees, to have produced a total of 3,500,000 board feet in addition to the trees in the area which plaintiffs were permitted to cut.

However, as indicated, probably on account of a subsequent favorable growing season, or because the damage was less than had been anticipated, many of the somewhat damaged trees fully recuperated and in line with an over-all forest conservation policy these were not allowed to be cut.

It is fair to conclude from the evidence as a whole that approximately one-half of the 3,500,000 board feet is represented by trees that had fully recovered, and that only approximately one-half is represented by high-risk trees and substantially damaged trees in the virgin area covered by the contract. These under the terms of the contract plaintiffs had a right to expect to be marked for cutting.

[64]*64Plaintiffs claim a right to recover for the full amount covered by the estimate. With this position we cannot agree.

True both Rupley and the defendant expected that the full amount would be marked for cutting.

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Related

Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States
651 F.2d 723 (Court of Claims, 1981)
Russell & Pugh Lumber Company v. United States
290 F.2d 938 (Court of Claims, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
124 Ct. Cl. 59, 1952 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 134, 1952 WL 5918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rupley-v-united-states-cc-1952.