Ruohs v. Traders Fire Insurance

111 Tenn. 405
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 111 Tenn. 405 (Ruohs v. Traders Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruohs v. Traders Fire Insurance, 111 Tenn. 405 (Tenn. 1903).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McAlister

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Complainants, who are original policy-holders in the Traders Fire Insurance Coinpany, preferred this bill against the North British & Mercantile Insurance Company to recover indemnity, first, for fire lóssés claimed to have been sustained; second, for returned premiums on account of canceled policies; and, third, Claims of W J. Colburn & Co. for returned premiums paid to policy[408]*408holders of the Traders Company under written instructions of the North British Company. The theory of the bill is that complainants are the beneficiaries of a contract entered into between the Traders and the North British Companies, by which the latter assumed the payment of the liabilities of the former company. The contract, which is made the basis of the present suit, is in the words and figures following, to-wit:

“In consideration of one dollar, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and a further payment of ten thousand dollars before twelve o’clock noon, on Saturday, April 28, the North British & Mercantile Insurance Company of Edinburgh and London, hereby agrees through its United States manager, to assume the fire risks of the Traders Fire Insurance Company, of New York, from six o’clock p. m., April 27, 1900, not otherwise reinsured.
“A further payment on account, of twenty-five thous- and dollars, to be paid on or before May 1, and the balance due, namely, the net, unearned premiums on outstanding policies, less fifteen per cent, commissions thereon, to be paid upon completion of schedules, and at least, within thirty days from date hereof.
“This contract to be null and void unless payments as above stated are duly made.
“This temporary agreement to be replaced by a final contract of like terms and conditions when the total amount due hereunder is determined as per schedule Schedules to be completed as soon as practicable.
[409]*409“NORTH British & Mercantile Insurance Oo. op Edinburgh & London,
“By E. G. Richards, United States Manager. “The Traders Fire Insurance Company op New York,
“By W. A. Halsey, President.
“April 27, 1900.”

It is insisted on behalf of the North British Company that no liability attaches to it on account of said contract, for the reason, as disclosed on its face, it was only a provisional and temporary agreement, dependent for its consummation upon the payment of the consideration therein expressed, and that the Traders Company, having defaulted in the payment of $70,000 due thereunder, the North British Company was constrained on August 3, 1900, to declare said contract forfeited. The insistence made on behalf of the North British Company is that the policy holders of the Traders Fire Insurance Company can have no higher rights than that company, for the reason they claim under the contract which the Traders forfeited. It is said. that this contract was clearly a contract of reinsurance, as is disclosed by the language used, “not otherwise reinsured.” Joyce on Insurance, section 117, is then cited for the proposition, viz.: “A reinsurance contract is a contract of indemnity to the company reinsured only. The reinsured sustains as to the reinsurer the same relation which the original insured bears to the reinsured. The contract of reinsurance does not inure to the benefit of the insured. He has no claim, legal or equitable, against the reinsurer.”

[410]*410Royal Insurance Company v. Vanderbilt Insurance Company, 102 Term., 267, 52 S. W. 168, is also cited, in which it was said as follows:

“A contract of reinsurance is peculiar in its Character, and differs from the ordinary policy of insurance. It claims no privity between the reinsurer and- the party originally insured. It is simply an agreement to indemnify the insurer, partially or altogethery against a risk assumed by the latter in a policy issued to a third party.”

The general rule is conceded that á third party may sue directly in his own name on a contract made for his benefit, but it is insisted that the exception is well established that >such third party cannot maintain an action to enforce; the promise, where the promiseds void as between; the promisor and the promisee.: In support of this position counsel for the North British Company cite Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N.Y., 30, 39 Am. Rep., 617, where it appeared that a grantee, holding under a warranty deed which contained a covenant that the grantee assumed and agreed to ¡pay a mortgage on the premises, had been evicted by a paramount title. It was held that the holder of the mortgage could not enforce the covenant for the reason that -the consideration therefor had wholly failed.- Andrews, J., delivering the opinion -of the court, wrote: ..■■vifk.

“It is said that, the action can be maintained upon the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y., 268, and kindred cases, but I know of no authority to support the proposition that a person not a party to the promise, but for [411]*411whose benefit the promise is made, cari maintain an action to enforce the promise where the promise is void as between the promisor and the promisee for fraud warit of consideration, or failure of consideration. It would be strange, I think, if such an adjudication; should be found."

The position assumed by counsel for the North British Company may be best stated in his own language, to wit:

“First. That the preliminary contract was not a contract of assumption, but was a contract of reinsurance. Seconds That, if construed to be a contract of assumption, the Traders Fire Insurance! Company could not recover from the North British & Mercantile Company^ by reason of its own breach, and that these claimants could not be in any better attitude than the Traders Company. Third. That, as shown on this record, the North British .& Mercantile Insurance Company acted as agent during the existence of’ the preliminary- contract, and has done no act or thing which: would mis-• lead these claimants. Fourth. That the North British & Mercantile Insurance Company made the preliriiinary contract in good faith - witR the Traders Fire Insurance Company, and used every effort to effectuate and consummate the same, and to induce the Traders Ficé Insurance Company to pay the consideration agreed'.- And that because of-such default on the párt of the Traders Fire Insurance Company the North British & Mercantile Insurance-Company, shotild not be made to suffer.” ’

[412]*412This brief outline comprises a general statement of the principal defenses relied on by the North British Company. We will now proceed to state the case made on behalf of the complainant policy holders, and cannot do better in presenting their contention than to state the proposition formulated by their counsel, as follows:

First. This is not an ordinary case of technical insurance between two insurance companies. The facts found by the court of chancery appeals make it a contract for the use and benefit of complainants and other policy holders of the Traders for a valuable consideration under circumstances entitling them to maintain this suit.

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111 Tenn. 405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruohs-v-traders-fire-insurance-tenn-1903.