Runco, C. v. Runco, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided August 3, 2022·No. 1288 WDA 2021·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CARLA B. RUNCO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JOSEPH GREGORY RUNCO :

:

Appellant : No. 1288 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 19, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): FD 17-007050-006

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: August 3, 2022 Joseph Gregory Runco (“Husband”) appeals from the order granting in part and denying in part Husband’s exceptions to a divorce master’s recommendations and report. The report had found Husband in contempt of the parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”). We affirm.

Husband and Carla B. Runco (“Wife”) were married in June 1988. In January 2017, Wife filed for divorce. The parties ultimately entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in May 2019, and the court entered a divorce decree shortly thereafter. Under the terms of the MSA, Husband was required to pay Wife $265,000 over time. Husband made a $10,000 initial payment, as per the agreement, after which he was required to make a payment of $800 on the first and 15th of every month. The MSA required

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

Husband to make the payments by electronic transfer: “The payments due to Wife…shall be paid by electronic transfer directly into wife’s chosen bank account in bi-monthly payments of $800 on the 1st and 15th of each and every month. The parties shall cooperate to set up the electronic transfer immediately to ensure timely payment.” MSA at 10-11.

Although Wife gave Husband a deposit slip with her bank information shortly after signing the MSA, Husband never paid Wife via electronic transfer, instead opting for paper checks. Further, although Husband initially made all payments to Wife, he failed to make payments on April 15, 2020, May 1, 2020, May 15, 2020, and June 1, 2020, for a total delinquency of $3,200. Husband, a pediatric dentist, claimed that he was unable to make these payments due to his inability to work at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.

In October 2020, Wife filed a petition for enforcement of the MSA plus other special relief. On October 15, 2020, the trial court issued an order requiring Husband to pay Wife the $3,200 delinquency by October 17, 2020, and Husband did so. However, the court subsequently clarified, in a November 4, 2020 order, that Wife was entitled to a hearing regarding Husband’s failure to comply with the MSA.

At a hearing before a divorce master in January 2021, Wife presented evidence that although she had a consent order barring Husband from contacting her, Husband had nonetheless sent her hundreds of emails and text messages, as well as numerous voice mails. Wife also detailed that in December 2019, the District Attorney had brought criminal charges against

Husband after Wife discovered that he had been following her. Husband pled guilty. Wife also presented evidence that Husband had been writing rude and demeaning comments in the subject line of the checks he gave her. The comments included remarks such as “selfishness mid-life crisis,” “kindness payment,” and “loyalty to our family.” Tr. Ct. Op. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 12/22/21, at 4. Husband also used return address stamps that bore Wife’s name.

Wife further explained that she had given Husband the necessary information to establish electronic payment shortly after they executed the MSA. Husband countered that Wife had not been cooperative in setting up electric payment, which is why he resorted to paper check.

The master believed Wife and found that Husband had purposely failed to set up electronic payment in order to further communicate with and harass Wife. Thus, the master issued a report and recommendation that found Husband in contempt of the MSA and imposed various sanctions, including requiring Husband to pay Wife $6,621 in accrued legal fees due to his repeated harassment of Wife. The master required Husband to cease communicating with Wife absent emergency (“no contact provision”).

Husband filed exceptions to the master’s report and Wife filed cross exceptions. The trial court granted Husband’s exceptions regarding the master’s no contact provision, dismissed Wife’s cross exceptions, and adopted the master’s recommendations in all other respects. Husband filed the instant timely appeal. Both Husband and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Husband raises two issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred by finding Husband in willful violation of the parties’ [MSA] dated May 1, 2019, and by accordingly holding him in contempt of court[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred by imposing contempt purge conditions upon Husband that are groundless, baseless, excessive, punitive and manifestly unreasonable, with specific reference to those identified within items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of the Master’s recommended order, all of which were subsequently adopted by the trial court[.]

Husband’s Br. at 4.

In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial court erred by finding him in contempt of the MSA. He asserts that the court incorrectly interpreted the MSA as requiring electronic payment for purposes of eliminating contact between the parties because the unambiguous terms of the MSA state that electronic payments are necessary only to “ensure timely payment.” Husband argues that the paper checks he used fulfilled the purpose of “timely payment” and the court erred by reading an additional purpose into an unambiguous contract. Further, Husband avers that the court abused its discretion by concluding that Husband willfully failed to fulfil the MSA’s electronic payment requirement because his testimony established that his efforts had been stymied by Wife’s failure to cooperate. Thus, according to Husband, his failure to comply with the MSA was de minimis and not sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of contempt.

Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super.

2007) However, “[w]hen interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial court's fact-finding function.” Id.

“[A] settlement agreement between spouses is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise." Id. (citation omitted). If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a court must construe them in accordance with “the plain, ordinary and accepted meaning of the words used.” Sorace v. Sorace, 655 A.2d 125, 127 ( Pa.Super. 1995).

A marital settlement agreement is enforceable by remedies set forth in the Divorce Code, regardless of whether the agreement is merged or incorporated into a divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S.A § 3105(a). Such remedies include holding the offending party in contempt, the award of counsel fees and costs to the complaining party, and requiring security to insure future payments in compliance with the court's order. 23 Pa.C.S.A § 3502.

Contempt is appropriate where the complaining party has shown that the (1) the contemnor had notice of the order, (2) the contemnor purposefully violated the order, and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. Sorace, 655 A.2d at 127 (citing Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa.Super. 2006)). A marital settlement agreement is enforceable through contempt. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(a); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e)(9).

Here, the trial aptly concluded that Husband was in contempt of the MSA agreement for failure to execute electronic payments to Wife:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Runco, C. v. Runco, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2022).

Runco, C. v. Runco, J. (Runco, C. v. Runco, J.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Sorace v. Sorace
655 A.2d 125 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger
928 A.2d 333 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
Stahl v. Redcay
897 A.2d 478 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Norman, D. v. Temple University Health
208 A.3d 1115 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Sirio v. Sirio
951 A.2d 1188 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2008)
Habjan v. Habjan
73 A.3d 630 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)