Rumford Chemical Works v. Muth

35 F. 524, 1 L.R.A. 44, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2503
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland
DecidedJuly 9, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 35 F. 524 (Rumford Chemical Works v. Muth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rumford Chemical Works v. Muth, 35 F. 524, 1 L.R.A. 44, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2503 (circtdmd 1888).

Opinion

Morris, J.

It appears from the testimony that in chemistry the product obtained by partly neutralizing phosphoric acid with a base is called an acid phosphate of that base, as acid phosphate of lime, acid phosphate of potassium, acid phosphate of magnesium or sodium or zinc or strychnine. There are therefore very many acid phosphates, and the words “acid phosphate” alone suggests an indefinite and incomplete idea, unless, by the context or use or association, there is suggested to the mind the base which must be present a's a constituent of every phosphate. The complainant corporation, doing business in Providence, R. I., about the year 1868, guided by the chemical knowledge and discoveries of Prof. Eben N. Horsford, and under his direction, began the manufacture for sale of a preparation to be used as a medicine, condiment, or beverage, which was essentially an acid phosphate of lime, and to which it gave the name of “Ilorsford’s Acid'Phosphate, ” aud by that name labeled, advertised, and sold it in large and increasing quantities. This preparation went into very general use; and as it was the first preparation of the kind thus popularized, and for a long time the only one known to the public, it came to be usually called for, not as “Horsford’s Acid Phosphate,” but simply as “Acid Phosphate.”

Parke, Davis & Co., manufacturing chemists of Detroit, Mich., began, in 1881, the manufacture and sale of a preparation'of the same character, after a formula used by Dr. William Peppier, of Philadelphia, very similar to Horsford’s, and which they called “Liquor Acidi Phosphorici,” and which, by labels, circulars, and advertisements, they represented to he a scientific substitute for “Horsford’s Acid Phosphate.” In 1887, Parke, Davis & Co. changed the name aud label of their preparation, and called and labeled it “ Liquid Acid Phosphate,” representing it to be the same as their “ Liquor Acidi Phosphorici,” and a substitute forllorsr ford’s Acid Phosphate, stating that it contained phosphoric acid in combination with calcium, magnesium, iron, sodium, and .potassium. In these circulars they say;

[526]*526“We have hitherto labeled this preparation ‘Liquor Acidi Phosphorici,’ adopting the name and following the formula of Dr. Wm. Peppier, of Philadelphia. The preparation has, however, come to be so universally known as ‘Acid Phosphate’ that we have thought it best to adopt that name on our labels.”

There is no question that the preparation had become so universally known by the name “Acid Phosphate” because it had been brought into public notice by the complainant’s preparation-, which was extensively used as an aid to digestion, and called for at soda-fountains as a tonic beverage by that name. The nominal defendants in this case are Messrs. Muth & Bro., of Baltimore, but it is the sale by them of the preparation made and advertised by Parke, Davis & Co., and labeled “Liquid Acid Phosphate,” which is complained of, and it is they who are defending this suit. There is no complaint of any misleading representation with regard to. the manufacture or origin of the goods sold by the defendant, and no ground for complaint of-a,ny deceptive imitation of complainant’s labels or packages. Indeed, Parke, Davis & Co., in all respects except in the use'of the name “Acid Phosphate,” seek to give prominence to the fact that the article sold by defendants is made by them, and not by complainant, and that the formula is somewhat different, and, as they claim, an improvement upon Prof. Horsford’s. There is therefore entirely wanting that element of deception by imitative labels and false representations which moves the court to grant restraining injunctions in many trade-mark cases.

The sole question for decision is whether or not the words “acid phosphate,” as applied to complainant’s preparation, are words of that class which the law will protect as a trade-mark. This narrow question of great importance to the complainant has been most thoroughty and ably presented by counsel, and it resolves itself into a question of fact; for as to the principles of law there is no contest. The right of the complainants to protection in the trade-mark claimed by them depends upon whether or not acid-phosphate is an arbitrary name given by them to a preparation to which it had never before been applied, and not a description of it; for, if it is a reasonably sufficient description of the character, kind, and quality of the thing to which it has been applied, then it is a well-settled rule of law that no one can make an exclusive appropriation, of such a name. The phrase “acid phosphate ” is common in chemistry, and constantly found in treatises and text-books. It was not invented by the complainants, but had been in use some 20 or 30 years before they made use of it. Any compound of any phosphoric acid with a. base may appropriately be calléd a phosphate; and, if there is present so much acid that it could saturate a greater quantity of the base, it is properly called an “acid phosphate,” to distinguish it from a “basic phosphate,” in which the base preponderates, or a neutral phosphate, in which neither is in excess, all three of these terms being perfectly well known in chemistiy. It is not to be gainsaid that as a complete and exhaustive indication of all that the preparation contains the phrase “ acid phosphate” is inexact. It does not indicate that it is a solution-, which it is, [527]*527while a proper acid phosphate is a solid until it is dissolved. - It does not indicate the character of the acid, and it does not indicate what base or bases have been used. But this criticism is true of most words or phrases in common use. “ Fresh bread ” is one of the commonest phrases, and vet it does not indicate with precision whether the bread is made of wheat or rye, of bolted or unbolted flour, whether or not it contains salt, or with what character of yeast it is made. In fact, it means a somewhat different thing in every community in which it is used, as travelers are apt to find out. The true test, it appears to me, must be not whether the words are exhaustively descriptive of the article designated, but whether in themselves, and as they are commonly used by those who understand their meaning, they are reasonably indicative and descriptive of the thing intended. If they are thus reasonably descriptive, and not arbitrary, they cannot be appropriated from general use, and become the exclusive property of any one. This rule is clearly explained and applied by Judge Folgek, speaking for the court of appeals of New York in the case of Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223. He says:

“Nor is the question whether the name used as a trade-mark will convey an exact notion of how to compound an article, so that one reading it will be able to make a like article. If the necessary effect is to inform the reader or hearer of the general characteristics and composition of the thing, it is a name which niay be used with equal truth by any one who has made and offers for sale a thing compounded of the same ingredients, and who desires to express to the public the same facts. Nor does the coupling together, in a new combination >f words which before that had been used apart, and had entered into the common scientific vocabulary, give a right to the exclusive use of such combination, where it is indicative, not of origin, maker, use, and ownership alone, but also of quality and other characteristics.”

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Bluebook (online)
35 F. 524, 1 L.R.A. 44, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2503, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rumford-chemical-works-v-muth-circtdmd-1888.