Ruiz v. Scripps Health

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 22, 2022
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00233
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROMULO A. RUIZ, an individual, Case No.: 22cv00233-LL-WVG

Plaintiff, 12 ORDER (1) GRANTING THE JOINT 13 v. MOTION DISMISS AND (2) GRANTING-IN-PART THE JOINT 14 JORGE JIMENEZ, et al., MOTION REMAND 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 7] 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Romulo A. Ruiz brings this personal injury action against Defendants 18 Scripps Health, a nonprofit public benefit corporation (“Scripps Health”); Scripps Mercy 19 Hospital, a nonprofit hospital (“SMH”); Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla, a nonprofit 20 hospital (“SMH LJ”); Sharp Healthcare, a nonprofit public benefit corporation (“Sharp”); 21 Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center, a nonprofit public benefit corporation (“SCVMC”); 22 Massoud H. Soumekh, M.D., an individual (“Dr. Soumekh”); James S. Grisolia, M.D., 23 an individual (“Dr. Grisolia”); Edward B. Friedman, M.D., an individual (“Dr. 24 Friedman”); Vernan D. White, M.D., an individual (“Dr. White”); James E. Cevallos, 25 M.D., an individual (“Dr. Cevallos”); Natalie J. Medina, M.D., an individual (“Dr. 26 Medina”); Jorge Jimenez, an individual (“Jimenez”) (collectively, “Defendants”); and 27 Does 1 through 100. ECF No. 1-3. 28 1 Before the Court are the Joint Motion of Plaintiff and the United States of America 2 (the “United States”) to (1) dismiss the United States, which was substituted for Dr. 3 Cevallos, and (2) remand the case. ECF No. 7. After considering the papers submitted, 4 supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court (1) GRANTS the joint motion 5 to dismiss the United States and (2) GRANTS-IN-PART the joint motion to remand. 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 A. Statement of Facts 8 On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff was standing at the rear of his parked United 9 States Postal Service Mail Truck on the northbound side of Highland Avenue in National 10 City, California. ECF No. 1-3 at 7,1 ¶ 2. At the same time, Jimenez was driving a 2014 11 white Nissan Rogue northbound on Highland Avenue, drove out of his lane, hit Plaintiff, 12 and pinned him to the rear of his mail truck (the “Accident”). Id. at 7, ¶¶ 1, 3. The force 13 of the impact also caused Plaintiff’s mail truck to collide with the vehicle parked in front 14 of it. Id. As a result of Plaintiff’s injuries, he underwent multiple surgeries to his legs, 15 which had been pinned between the vehicles during the accident. Id. at 25, ¶ 22. 16 B. Procedural History 17 On or about November 6, 2019, Plaintiff sued Jimenez and Does 1 through 100 for 18 personal injuries arising from the Accident in a lawsuit styled as Ruiz v. Jimenez, San 19 Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2019-00059052-CU-PO-CTL (the “Personal Injury 20 Action”). ECF No. 1-3 at 3-8. On March 20, 2020, Jimenez answered the complaint. Id. 21 at 9. During discovery in the Personal Injury Action, Plaintiff obtained copies of 22 Jimenez’s medical records and discovered that he had been receiving medical treatment 23 for a pre-existing seizure disorder. Id. at 25, ¶ 24. 24 On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second state court action against all 25 Defendants other than Jimenez alleging causes of action for (1) medical negligence and 26 (2) negligence per se, styled as Ruiz v. Scripps Health, et al., San Diego Superior Court 27 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all page number references are to the ECF-generated 28 1 Case No. 37-2021-00002137-CU-MM-CTL (the “Malpractice Action”). ECF No. 1-3 at 2 21. He alleged that it was inherently dangerous for the named defendants to fail to advise 3 Jimenez that it was impermissible for him to drive a motor vehicle as a result of the 4 limitations created by his condition. Id. at 25, ¶ 24. 5 On September 17, 2021, the Malpractice Action was consolidated with the Personal 6 Injury Action, with the Personal Injury Action being designated as the lead case. ECF 7 No. 1 at 1:26-28. On November 24, 2021, the Sharp Defendants filed a demurrer in the 8 consolidated proceeding to the complaint, which was originally scheduled for March 4, 9 2022.2 ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF No. 5-4 at 1. On February 22, 2022, before the hearing on 10 the demurrer, the United States removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. That same 11 day, the United States also filed a Notice of Substitution, substituting itself in for Dr. 12 Cevallos, who was acting within the scope of his employment with Centro de Salud de la 13 Comunidad San Ysidro, Inc. doing business as San Ysidro Health (“SYH”), which has 14 been deemed to be an employee of the Public Health Service for purposes of the Federal 15 Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (the “FTCA”). ECF No. 4 at 2, ¶ 2. 16 On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff and the United States jointly moved the Court to 17 dismiss all claims against the United States without prejudice. ECF No. 7. Further, 18 because the United States being named as a defendant served as the only basis for 19 removing this case, the moving parties jointly move the Court to remand the case back to 20 the San Diego Superior Court. ECF No. 7 at 1-2. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 A. Joint Motion to Dismiss 23 Plaintiff and the United States seek dismissal of the United States as a party without 24 specifying under which rule they seek dismissal. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil 25

26 2 The Court takes judicial notice, sua sponte, of the San Diego Superior Court register 27 of actions, which indicates the demurrer was continued on the state court’s own motion to May 6, 2022. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2); see also Asdar Group v. Pillsbury, Madison 28 1 Procedure allows the court “[o]n motion or on its own, … at any time, on just terms” to 2 “add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Although Plaintiff and the United States have 3 not proceeded by noticed motion, they both seek dismissal of the United States without 4 prejudice. Thus, the Court finds just terms to dismiss the United States from this case. 5 B. Joint Motion to Remand 6 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 7 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consequently, district courts are presumed to lack 8 jurisdiction unless the Constitution or a statute expressly provides otherwise. Stock West, 9 Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Where a plaintiff files 10 in state court a civil action over which the district courts of the United States have original 11 jurisdiction, the defendant may remove that case “to the district court of the United States 12 for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1441(a). However, removing a case does not deprive another party “of his right to move 14 to remand the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1448. Courts strictly construe the removal statute 15 against removal jurisdiction. Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect 17 other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing 18 of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). 19 However, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 20 subject matter jurisdiction, the case [must] be remanded.” Id. 21 Plaintiff and the United States jointly moved to remand within thirty (30) days. 22 Thus, the motion to remand is timely. However, district courts have two grounds to 23 remand cases: (1) the lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in removal 24 procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Thus, if the Court finds a defect in subject matter 25 jurisdiction, the timing of removal is irrelevant. In this case, and according to the notice 26 of removal, see ECF No. 1, the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding 27 because it arose under a law of the United States by implicating the FTCA. See U.S. 28 Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. As such, remand appears appropriate given the only asserted 1 basis for removal has been destroyed with the dismissal of the United States, meaning the 2 case no longer falls under the FTCA. 3 That being said, the Court acknowledges that the instant “Joint Motion” is not a 4 true joint motion, 3 the other defendants in this case were not given the opportunity to 5 oppose remand, and consent to remand is not a ground for remanding a case where federal 6 jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) (“The 7 jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by . . . consent of 8 the parties.”); see also Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) 9 (providing that “a federal court must assure itself of its own jurisdiction to entertain a 10 claim regardless of the parties’ arguments or concessions”); City of Colton v. Am. 11 Promotional Events, Inc.-W., 614 F.3d 998, 1005-06 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is well 12 established that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded . . . ‘by . . . consent of the 13 parties.’”). Thus, having established federal jurisdiction over this case and not heard from 14 the other defendants as to whether other grounds for federal jurisdiction may exist over 15 this case, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART the request to remand. Any party objecting to 16 the remand of this case must file an objection advancing all arguments against reman by 17 Wednesday, March 30, 2022. If the Court receives any objections, the Court will rule on 18 the objections. Provided the Court receives no objections to remand, the Court will 19

20 3 The parties “indication that the present motion is brought as a ‘joint’ motion is somewhat misleading.” Harville v. Cty. Comm’n of Lawrence Cty., Alabama, No. cv-08- 21 C-0222-NE, 2008 WL 11379962, at *1 n. 3 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2008). “Typically, ‘joint’ 22 motions are brought by all parties to a particular lawsuit and not, as here, by only the 23 defendants.” Id. Here, the Joint Motion is not brought by all parties. ECF No. 7. There is no declaration from the other parties’ counsel stating under penalty of perjury that they 24 agree with the motion. See, e.g., Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 305 F.R.D. 115, 122-23 25 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that “courts will “not consider any arguments based on factual assertions that are unsupported by evidence”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c); CivLR 26 7.1(f)(1)-(3). Thus, even though “joint motions” require neither a hearing date for the 27 motion nor a “a separate points and authorities or declaration unless required by the nature of the motion or requested by the assigned judicial officer,” CivLR 7.2(b), it appears this 28 1 remand this case. CONCLUSION 3 For the above reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 4 1. The joint motion of Plaintiff and the United States to dismiss Plaintiffs claims 5 || against the United States, who substited in for Dr. Cevallos, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s 6||claims against the United States are dismissed in their entirety as to all claims without 7 || prejudice. 8 2. The joint motion of Plaintiff and the United States to remand this case is 9 || GRANTED-IN-PART as follows: Any party objecting to the remand of this case must 10 || file an objection advancing all arguments against reman by Wednesday, March 30, 2022. 11 no objection is received by that date, this case will be remanded to the San Diego 12 || Superior Court. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. hp DATED: March 22, 2022 15 HON. LINDA LOPEZ 6 United States District Judge

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