IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-20233 _____________________
DAVID R. RUIZ; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
GARY JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; ALLEN B. POLUNSKY; CAROLE S. YOUNG; JOHN R. WARD; JOHN DAVID FRANZ; NANCY PATTON; CAROL S. VANCE; PATRICIA DAY; ALFRED C. MORAN; ALFRED M. STRINGFELLOW,
Defendants-Appellants.
***************************************************************** _____________________
No. 98-20841 _____________________
versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant
GARY JOHNSON, ETC.; ET AL.,
Defendants. _________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston _________________________________________________________________ June 25, 1999
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from the efforts of Texas officials to
terminate the federal consent orders that have in substantial part
governed Texas prisons for almost twenty-five years. Today, we
have before us two separate issues: first, mootness--whether an
appeal of a district court order holding the automatic stay
provision of the Prison Reform Litigation Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(e)(2), unconstitutional has been rendered moot by a
subsequent order of the district court addressing the merits of the
state’s claim and, second, whether the district court erred in
finding the automatic stay provision, § 3626(e), unconstitutional.
The PLRA, among other things, was designed by Congress to address
unduly burdensome injunctive judgments against prisons. The act
effectively encourages state and local governments to seek
termination of such judgments. When these cases come to the
district court, § 3626(e) requires the court, if it does not rule
2 on a motion to terminate relief within thirty days, to issue an
automatic stay of all court orders granting relief related to
prison conditions. In the case at hand, the district court ruled
that § 3626(e) is unconstitutional because such congressional
involvement in specific court orders violated the Separation of
Powers doctrine and the due process rights of the parties. Before
we issued an opinion with respect to an appeal of this ruling, the
district court ruled on the motion to terminate. We conclude that
the district court’s subsequent ruling does not render the issue on
appeal moot. Turning then to the merits of the appeal, we conclude
that the district court erred in its interpretation of the statute
and that, under the correct interpretation, § 3626(e) is
constitutional.
I
This suit was originally brought in 1974 in the Southern
District of Texas by plaintiff-appellants, a class of inmates
confined in various institutions operated by the Texas Department
of Corrections (the “prisoners”), challenging the constitutionality
of the conditions of their confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983. After the district court found that the prison conditions
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the parties
submitted to the court a proposed final judgment that set forth the
relief the prisoners were to be granted with regard to such issues
as population limits, use of force, and the Prisoners’ access to
the courts. Although the district court through interim orders and
3 consent decrees has exercised authority over Texas prisons for
almost twenty-five years, it was not until 1992 that the district
court entered an order approving the parties’ proposed final
judgment.
In March 1996, the defendant-appellants--the Director of the
Department of Criminal Justice and members of the Texas Board of
Criminal Justice (“prison officials”)--filed a motion to vacate the
1992 Final Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). One
month later, the President signed into law the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA” or the “Act”). 18 U.S.C. § 3626. The Act
provides that a district court should not grant prospective
relief--defined as “all relief other than compensatory money
damages,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7)--in a prison litigation case
“unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
The Act similarly provides that a defendant is entitled to the
immediate termination of any prospective relief that was ordered
prior to the enactment of the PLRA “if the relief was approved or
granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief”
satisfies the PLRA’s new tripartite test, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2),
unless the court makes written findings based on the record that
prospective relief remains necessary and meets the Act’s
requirements. 18 U.S.C. §3626(b)(3).
4 The PLRA, as originally enacted, further contained an
automatic stay provision, which stated that “[a]ny prospective
relief subject to a pending motion [for termination] shall be
automatically stayed during the period . . . beginning on the 30th
day after such motion is filed . . . and ending on the date the
court enters a final order ruling on the motion.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(e)(2), superseded by Pub. L. No. 105-119 § 123(b).
In September 1996, the defendants filed a supplemental motion
to vacate the 1992 Final Judgment, in which they argued that the
district court had not made the necessary findings under
§ 3626(b)(2) to sustain the prospective relief granted in the 1992
Final Judgment.1 The district court entered an order finding that
it was impossible for the court to resolve the defendants’ motions
within the 30-day period specified by § 3626(e), but that it would
not stay the 1992 Final Judgment because the PLRA’s automatic stay
provision was an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of
Powers doctrine and due process of law. The district court also
stated in the order that it would not rule on the motions to
terminate until it had conducted an evidentiary hearing.
The prisons officials appealed the district court’s refusal to
rule immediately on their motion to terminate relief, but did not
appeal the district court’s ruling regarding the constitutionality
1 The district court approved the 1992 Final Judgment under the then proper standard, which is applicable to class actions generally.
5 of the PLRA’s then-existing automatic stay provision. In February
1997, the Prison officials filed for a writ of mandamus to order
the district court to terminate the 1992 Final Judgment under
§ 3626(b)(2) without an evidentiary hearing, which was consolidated
with its appeal. In August 1997, this court held that (1) it would
not review the district court’s constitutional holding; (2) the
remainder of the district court’s order was not appealable; and (3)
the prison officials were not entitled to the immediate termination
of the previously ordered prospective relief. Ruiz v. Scott, 124
F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997). The court did note, however, that,
consistent with the PLRA, the district court should rule promptly
on the officials’ termination motion.
In September 1997, the defendants then filed in the district
court (1) a motion for a prompt ruling on their supplemental motion
to vacate; and (2) a motion for a ruling on the motion for stay,
asserting that the court’s earlier ruling was not made in response
to a request for a stay. While the defendants’ motions were
pending, Congress amended the stay provision of the PLRA to read as
follows:
Procedure for motions affecting prospective relief.
(1) Generally. — The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions. Mandamus shall lie to remedy any failure to issue a prompt ruling on such a motion.
(2) Automatic Stay. — Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period —
6 (A)(I) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); * * *; and (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
(3) Postponement of automatic stay. — The court may postpone the effective date of an automatic stay specified in subsection (e)(2)(A) for not more than 60 days for good cause. No postponement shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court’s calendar.
(4) Order blocking the automatic stay. — Any order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay described in paragraph (2) (other than an order to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay under paragraph (3)) shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1-4). Congress provided that the Amended Stay
Provision “shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this
Act and shall apply to pending cases.”
In January 1998, the district court ruled that, like the
original stay provision, the Amended Stay Provision is also
unconstitutional because it “would encroach upon the powers of the
judiciary, overturn a judgment of an Article III court, and deprive
parties of a vested property right without due process of law”
(“January Order”). The district court further concluded that “the
automatic stay provision suspends valid judgments based on the mere
act of filing a motion” in violation of the holding of United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), that a legislative
7 rule that mandates the outcome of a case encroaches upon the power
reserved for the judiciary.
The United States, which had intervened as a plaintiff in
1974, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s January
Order, in which it advanced an interpretation of the Amended Stay
Provision that would avoid the district court’s constitutional
concerns and allow the district court to delay the stay under its
inherent equitable powers (as the government puts it, the district
court retains the equitable power to “stay the stay.”). In June
1998, the court denied the government’s motion, rejecting its
proposed construction of the stay provision of the PLRA (“June
Order”).
The prison officials then filed another petition for mandamus
to order the district court to rule immediately on the officials’
September 1996 termination motion. In December 1998, this court
declined to order the district court to rule instanter, as the
district court had scheduled an evidentiary hearing for January 21,
1999. The court, however, chastised the district court for having
delayed the process and ordered the court to rule on the prison
officials’ termination motion within a reasonable time after
beginning the evidentiary hearing and, in no event, later than
March 1, 1999. In re Scott, 163 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1998).
The prison officials timely appealed the district court’s
January Order (No. 98-20233). The United States timely appealed
the district court’s June Order (No. 98-20841). The parties argued
8 the case to this panel on February 2, 1999. On March 1, 1999
(“March Order”), the district court issued an order denying the
prison officials’ motion for termination, finding that the PLRA’s
termination provisions were unconstitutional and that, even if they
were constitutional, the prisoners nevertheless would be entitled
to relief.
Because the district court ruled on the underlying motion for
termination, any ruling by us on the automatic stay provision
arguably will have no effect on the outcome of the case. We
therefore requested supplemental briefing from the parties as to
whether the district court’s March 1999 order rendered the appeal
moot.
II
In order to have jurisdiction under Article III of the
Constitution, we must have before us an actual case or controversy
at the time we issue our decision. United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (noting that a case becomes moot
"'when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'") (quoting
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). In this case, all
of the parties agree that the March Order denying the motion for
termination prevents the appellants from obtaining any meaningful
remedy at this time2 with respect to the district court’s refusal
2 Because the parties will appeal the March Order, it is possible that, if a subsequent panel reverses that order, the
9 to apply the automatic stay. The parties further agree that an
appeal of the March Order will only address the termination
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), and will not address the automatic
stay provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e).
The parties disagree, however, over whether the prison
officials retain a cognizable legal interest in the outcome of the
instant appeal. The prison officials argue that the controversy at
issue here--over the constitutionality of the stay provision--fits
into an exception to the mootness doctrine for actions that are
“capable of repetition yet evading review.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. 478, 482 (1982). The prison officials argue that the case
falls into the exception and that we should rule on the appeal; in
addition, they argue that we should also rule on the constitutional
issue involved in the appeal of the March Order. To accomplish
this objective, the prison officials have filed a motion seeking to
bifurcate its appeal of the March Order and consolidate it with the
current appeal.3
The prisoners argue that this case does not fall into the
exception and that we should therefore dismiss the appeal. The
government argues that the case may fit into the exception, but
parties in this case could find themselves in essentially the same posture as they were before the district court issued its March Order. If, at that point, the district court refused to permit the operation of the automatic stay under the PLRA, the parties could be entitled to a remedy. 3 We hereby deny the prison officials’ motion to bifurcate and consolidate.
10 that we should hold the appeal in abeyance pending the appeal of
the March Order. After consideration of the arguments presented,
we hold that this controversy falls into the category of
controversies that are capable of repetition yet evading review.
The exception is limited to a situation where “two elements
combine[]: (1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short
to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). We address each element in
turn.
A
Both the prison officials and the government seem to agree
that the action at issue here--the district court’s refusal to
apply the automatic stay provision--is in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration. The
prison officials assert, and the government seems to agree, that a
district court can avoid the requirement of the automatic stay
provision by ruling that the provision is unconstitutional and then
ruling on the motion before we rule on the appeal.
The prisoners disagree, arguing that it is not clear that the
prison officials could not have expedited their appeal in such a
way that the issue could have been resolved before the district
court ruled on the motion to terminate. The prisoners point to the
prison officials’ alleged delay in appealing the district court’s
11 action in this case as evidence that a prompt appeal could permit
resolution of the claim.
We conclude that, because of the constitutional issue involved
and the time frame under which the district court must operate
under the PLRA, it is exceedingly unlikely that an appeal of a
district court order holding the automatic stay unconstitutional
would be resolved before the district court ruled on the underlying
motion to terminate. At the outset, we note that this case is
unusual in that the events that render the appeal moot are uniquely
within the control of the federal judiciary. We are therefore
placed in the awkward position of having to adjudicate the
consequences of our own actions. An examination of the process by
which the PLRA operates nevertheless makes clear that when the
district court concludes the automatic stay provision is
unconstitutional, that issue is unlikely to be resolved on appeal
before the district court determines the motion to terminate.
Even without the automatic stay provision, the PLRA clearly
mandates the district court to resolve the motion to terminate as
expeditiously as possible. We therefore feel it inappropriate to
instruct the district court to delay a ruling on the motion to
terminate absent compelling circumstances. On the other hand, in
an instance where the district court rules the automatic stay
provision unconstitutional, we are confronted with an issue that
requires reflective and deliberative treatment. We are therefore
hesitant to assert that a subsequent panel can resolve the case
12 without the benefit of oral argument. However, even with an
expedited appeal, it could still take a few months to brief,
process, hear and decide the appeal.
And, if the district court holds the stay provision to be
unconstitutional when the thirty-day period has expired, we would
expect a conscientious district court to rule on the underlying
motion to terminate before we resolved the appeal on the
constitutionality of the stay provision. Thus, the complained of
injury suffered by the prison officials--that the district court
does not apply the automatic stay--is too short in duration to be
resolved on appeal prior to its expiration. We therefore conclude
that the first element of the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception is met in this case.
B
With respect to the second element--whether a reasonable
expectation exists that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again--the parties diverge
considerably in their definitions of a “reasonable expectation.”
The prisoners focus on the prospect that, in this litigation, the
prison officials will again be entitled to an automatic stay and
conclude that it is unlikely. We need not address this argument,
however, as the prison officials are likely to encounter the same
situation in other litigation.
The prison officials intend to file termination motions under
the PLRA in two other cases, Castillo v. Cameron County, No.
13 93-CV-260 (S.D. Tex., Brownsville Div.), and Devonish v. Hauck, No.
SA-73-CA-59 (W.D. Tex., San Antonio Div.). In addition, the prison
officials filed a termination motion in Guajardo v. McAdams, No.
H-71-570 (S.D. Tex., Houston Div.), in 1997 that is still pending.
In the light of these other cases, we hold that there is a
reasonable expectation that the complaining party in this case,
that is, the prison officials, will be subjected to the same action
again.
C
Although the relief requested by the prison officials may not
be likely to avail them in the current litigation, the prison
officials clearly retain a cognizable legal interest in this
appeal. Under the PLRA, the prison officials are, by the terms of
the statute, entitled to the operation of an automatic stay if the
district court has not ruled on the termination motion within
thirty days. However, because an appeal of a district court order
holding the stay unconstitutional is unlikely to be resolved before
the district court rules on the termination motion, the prison
officials are likely to be deprived the benefit of such a stay
unless we address the issue now. We therefore hold the appeal
before us not moot and turn to its merits.
III
We are confronted with appeals of two separate orders--the
January Order, holding the amended § 3626(e) unconstitutional, and
the June Order, refusing to reconsider the January Order in the
14 light of the government’s proposed interpretation of § 3626(e).
Because we find the government’s argument persuasive and hold that
the district court’s June Order was erroneous, we do not address
the constitutionality of the amended PLRA as that statute has been
interpreted by the district court.
The government argues that the Amended Stay Provision is
constitutional because, although the statute provides an
“automatic” stay, it does not explicitly displace the district
court’s inherent equitable powers to suspend the stay--as the
Government terms it, the inherent, equitable authority to “stay the
stay.” Thus, as the Amended Stay Provision does not absolutely
mandate a particular judicial result, but instead permits the
district court an opportunity to assay the equities of the case, it
violates neither the Separation of Powers doctrine nor due process.
The district court rejected this argument in its June Order.
To properly understand the district court’s reasoning, we turn
first to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e). We then look to two
recent cases in other circuits that address this issue. Finally,
we explain why we believe the government has the better
interpretation.
It is necessary first to parse through the subsections of the
amended stay provisions. The principal subsection instituting the
stay, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), reads:
15 (2) Automatic Stay. — Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period —
(A)(I) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); * * *; and (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
This subsection makes the stay “automatic” and clearly defines when
it will take effect. The subsection is silent, however, with
respect to whether the automatic stay, once it has taken effect, is
subject to the equitable principles traditionally available to a
federal court.4
The remaining two subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) address
actions by federal courts that can prevent the automatic stay from
taking effect. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3), a district court may
postpone the automatic stay for an additional sixty days. Finally,
under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(4), the parties may immediately appeal
any ruling that delays the stay other than a postponement:
(4) Order blocking the automatic stay. — Any order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay described in paragraph (2) (other than an order to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay under paragraph (3)) shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling.
4 For a description of these principles, see Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 1998).
16 We note that, while the statute permits interlocutory appeal of a
suspension of the (e)(2) stay, the statute is silent with respect
to the standard of review the circuit court should apply on the
appeal of such a decision.5
Reading (e)(3) and (e)(4) together, the district court
concluded that the amended automatic stay provision permits
postponement but prevents any action by the district court that
would otherwise bar the effect of the stay provision. In the Fifth
Circuit, the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) is an issue of
first impression. We note, however, that the Sixth and the Seventh
Circuits have addressed the issue, although the two circuits
reached opposite results with respect to statutory interpretation:
the Sixth Circuit, in Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir.
1998), upheld the government’s reading of the statute, i.e., that
the district court retained the equitable power to stay the stay;
while the Seventh Circuit, in French v. Duckworth, 1999 WL 288267
(7th Cir. 1999), upheld the prison officials’ reading that the
district court could only postpone the stay pursuant to (e)(3).
The court in Hadix adopted the government’s interpretation
based on two separate rationales. First, the court noted that it
was bound by the principle of statutory construction that a statute
5 We take this evidence as leaving broad discretion in the Article III appellate court in reviewing the failure of the district court to adhere to the automatic stay provision.
17 will not limit “the equitable jurisdiction of federal courts absent
a clear command from Congress to the contrary.” 144 F.3d at 936.
Relying on § 3626(e)(4), the court concluded that, because that
subsection permits appeal of a delay or denial of the stay,
Congress must have intended to permit district courts, in some
circumstances, to deny or suspend the automatic stay. Hadix notes
that, had Congress intended to bar the district court from denying
the stay, the traditional remedy would have been one of mandamus
rather than appeal. Id. The court then concluded that nothing in
either 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) or its legislative history “compels a
departure from the courts’ inherent power to stay judicial orders
in order to achieve equity.” Id. at 937-38.
The second rationale advanced by the court in Hadix for
concluding that the statute’s silence effectively preserved the
district court’s equitable power to “stay the stay,” is the rule
of statutory construction that “‘where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the [courts] will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent
of Congress.’” Id. at 937. The court engaged in a lengthy
analysis of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) and
concluded that, if interpreted to prevent a district court from
equitably suspending an automatic stay, it would amount to a
violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. Id. at 938-45.
Because such an interpretation would result in finding § 3626(e)
18 unconstitutional, the court adopted the government’s proposed
interpretation instead.
In French, the Seventh Circuit adopted the prison official’s
interpretation of § 3626(e), i.e., that the provision bars
suspension or delay of the stay except as provided for in (e)(3),
and concluded that the statute, as interpreted, was
unconstitutional. The court characterized the decision in Hadix as
adopting its position “[i]n order to avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality.” French, 1999 WL 288267 at *4. The court
noted that “the qualification that the [statutory] language must be
able to bear the constitutional interpretation [that the government
proposed] is an important one. Courts cannot redraft statutes so
that they read the way Congress might have written them, or should
have written them.” Id. at *5. Turning to the language of the
stay provision, the court stated that “Congress used unequivocal
words when it drafted (e)(2). . . . Congress specified that the
stay would be automatic. Finally it specified not only a clear
starting point, but also the ending point for the stay.” Id.
The court then addressed the reasoning in Hadix that the
(e)(4) remedy of appeal of an order barring the operation of the
stay, instead of mandamus, evinced an intent to permit suspension
of the stay:
Why would Congress have included this in the statute, they reasoned, if it did not anticipate that courts would continue to have the power to issue equitable relief against them? In our view, there is an answer to this question. The drafters of the PLRA realized that they
19 were skating close to the line in (e)(2), and they wanted to ensure that the issue that is now before us could be resolved in an interlocutory appeal. The fact that a district court’s effort to stay the (e)(2) stay can be appealed says nothing about what an appellate court must do once it has the case.
We note that the district court in this case relied on the same
rationale when it addressed this argument in the June Order.
In deciding the case, we find the first rationale advanced in
Hadix to be dispositive. As that court noted, nothing in either
the language of § 3626(e) or its statutory history indicates that
Congress intended to supersede the district court’s equitable power
to stay judicial orders. We acknowledge that the terms in 18
U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), such as the word “automatic” and the
description of the duration of the stay, could suggest that
Congress intended the stay to take place without exception.
Furthermore, if read in a vacuum that excluded an understanding of
general legal principles, it could read as if the drafters of §
3626(e)(2) had no thought of the possibility of a court exercising
its equitable power to suspend the stay. We think this argument
fails, however, in the light of § 3626(e)(4), which expressly
addresses the possibility of a district court suspending the stay.
The district court’s and the French court’s explanation that
Congress merely intended to permit an appeal of the
constitutionality of the stay is certainly plausible. It is
equally plausible, however, that Congress understood that there
20 would be some cases in which a conscientious district court acting
in good faith would perceive that equity required that it suspend
the (e)(2) thirty-day stay and Congress therefore permitted the
district court to do so, subject to appellate review.
Given our deference to the district court’s equitable powers,
we must select the latter interpretation. As the Supreme Court
stated in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.: “Unless a statute in so
many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts
the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great
principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be
yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’” 328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946) (quoting Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1836)).
In the case at hand, we find neither words nor inference that
justify encroaching the district court’s equitable powers.
Because we find the first rationale expressed in Hadix to be
persuasive standing alone, we do not address the constitutionality
of the automatic stay provision as interpreted by the prison
officials and the prisoners. Although we recognize the rule of
statutory construction requiring courts to construe statutes
consistently with the Constitution, the application of that rule is
not necessary here. As written, the statute simply does not state
with sufficient specificity that the district court may not
exercise its equitable power to stay judicial orders. There is
21 therefore no violation of the Separation of Power doctrine or the
prisoners’ due process rights.
As we noted previously, we have been given no statutory
guidance with respect to the standard of review for such an
appeal.6 However, because the issue before us is the
constitutionality of the automatic stay provision, we do not decide
the appropriate standard of review beyond holding that the
appellate court may address the merits of a district court’s
decision to suspend an (e)(2) stay and noting the traditional
principles of equity should apply.
IV
We sum up. In this case, the district court held
unconstitutional the automatic stay provision of the PLRA, as
originally enacted and as amended. The district court later ruled
on the prison officials’ motion to terminate the consent decree,
denying relief under the statute because the statute was
unconstitutional. We therefore first had to consider whether the
district court’s later ruling rendered the instant appeal moot. We
6 The district court and the French court seem to conclude that our standard of review is solely one of constitutionality-- i.e., if 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) is constitutional, the district court must be reversed. The government, on the other hand, suggests that a district court has the authority to stay the (e)(2) stay on application by the plaintiffs in two limited circumstances: (1) when, under traditional preliminary injunction factors, plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing on the merits of the termination motion; and (2) when it would be inequitable to require the plaintiffs to make such a showing because circumstances beyond the plaintiffs’ control make it impossible for plaintiffs to present sufficient information about current prison conditions.
22 find that it does not because the alleged injury incurred here--the
prison officials’ right to the operation of the automatic stay--is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Turning to the constitutionality of the automatic stay
provision, we note that nowhere in the language of § 3626(e) is
there either a direct statement or the basis for an inference that
Congress intended to curtail the district courts’ equitable powers.
Under our reading of § 3626(e), the district court therefore
retains its discretion to suspend the (e)(2) stay and § 3626(e) is
therefore constitutional. For that reason, we hold that the
district court erred in holding the provision unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is
R E V E R S E D.