1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JOHN MANUEL RUIZ, Case No.: 2:16-cv-00931-APG-VCF
4 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying as Moot 5 v. Plaintiff’s Motions to Attach Addendum and to Extend Time 6 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., [ECF Nos. 114, 125, 127] 7 Defendants 8
9 Plaintiff John Manuel Ruiz is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of 10 Corrections. He sues over events that took place while he was incarcerated at Lovelock 11 Correctional Center (LCC) and then transferred to Northern Nevada Correctional Center 12 (NNCC). 13 In brief, while Ruiz was at LCC, he tore his right bicep tendon when he fell off his top 14 bunk. He alleges he told defendant Samuel Chapman, a correctional officer, about his injury but 15 Chapman refused to call for medical assistance. He was eventually seen days later by Dr. Van 16 Horn, who ordered him to wear an arm sling. He alleges defendants Tara Carpenter and William 17 Sandie, who were both associate wardens, told Van Horn not to treat Ruiz unless Ruiz was 18 dying, due to the financial cost. Despite this alleged directive, Ruiz was transferred from LCC to 19 NNCC within five days of the accident and had surgery on his torn tendon about two weeks later. 20 Ruiz alleges that defendant Karen Gedney, a doctor at NNCC, directed the doctor who 21 performed the surgery to remove the tendon rather than repair it, again due to financial 22 23 1 considerations. Based on these allegations, I allowed a claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate 2 indifference to proceed against Chapman, Carpenter, Sandie, and Gedney. ECF No. 15.1 3 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ruiz failed to exhaust his 4 administrative remedies. They also argue that no genuine dispute remains that they were not 5 deliberately indifferent or, alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Ruiz
6 opposed and, after briefing was completed, moved for leave to add a declaration from his former 7 cellmate regarding the incident where he fell off his bunk and Chapman allegedly refused to call 8 for medical assistance. The defendants opposed this motion based in part on its untimeliness. In 9 response, Ruiz moved to extend time to explain the late filing. 10 I grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Ruiz did not exhaust his 11 administrative remedies. None of Ruiz’s grievances asserted that Chapman refused to call for 12 medical assistance, that Carpenter and Sandie told Dr. Van Horn not to treat Ruiz, or that 13 Gedney told the surgeon to remove the tendon. I deny as moot Ruiz’s motions to supplement the 14 record and to extend time because the affidavit he attaches to his motion does not relate to his
15 failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 16 I. ANALYSIS 17 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to 18 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence 21 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 22
23 1 I also allowed this claim to proceed against Robert LeGrand and Marsha Johns, but I later dismissed these two defendants because Ruiz failed to serve them. ECF Nos. 15; 112. 1 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 2 the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence 3 of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The 4 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a 5 genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th
6 Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a 7 genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and 8 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zetwick v. Cnty. of 9 Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with 11 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 12 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 13 are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies prior 14 to filing a lawsuit is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
15 The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of an inmate’s claims. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 16 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The inmate must “use all steps the prison holds out, enabling the prison to 17 reach the merits of the issue.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). The 18 inmate must comply “with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no 19 adjudication system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the 20 course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91. 21 Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 22 Consequently, the defendants bear the burden of proving the inmate failed to exhaust an 23 available administrative remedy. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 1 If the defendants do so, the burden shifts to the inmate to show “there is something particular in 2 his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 3 unavailable to him by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly 4 prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 5 2015) (quotation omitted). The defendants bear the “ultimate burden” of proving a failure to
6 exhaust. Id. 7 Ruiz filed multiple grievances related to his torn tendon. But none of those grievances 8 asserted that Chapman refused to call for medical assistance, that Carpenter and Sandie told Dr. 9 Van Horn not to treat Ruiz, or that Gedney told the surgeon to remove the tendon. In grievance 10 number 20062981952, Ruiz requested to be returned to the infirmary after being discharged 11 following his surgery. ECF Nos. 114-1 at 21-26, 47; 123 at 39-40, 42; 123-1 at 1-3. In grievance 12 number 20062984005, Ruiz requested to be seen by a doctor following his surgery and he 13 requested copies of his medical kites. ECF Nos. 114-1 at 28-31, 46; 123 at 25-29, 33-37. 14 Grievance number 20062998332 involved Ruiz’s request for an MRI, a second opinion on
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JOHN MANUEL RUIZ, Case No.: 2:16-cv-00931-APG-VCF
4 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying as Moot 5 v. Plaintiff’s Motions to Attach Addendum and to Extend Time 6 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., [ECF Nos. 114, 125, 127] 7 Defendants 8
9 Plaintiff John Manuel Ruiz is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of 10 Corrections. He sues over events that took place while he was incarcerated at Lovelock 11 Correctional Center (LCC) and then transferred to Northern Nevada Correctional Center 12 (NNCC). 13 In brief, while Ruiz was at LCC, he tore his right bicep tendon when he fell off his top 14 bunk. He alleges he told defendant Samuel Chapman, a correctional officer, about his injury but 15 Chapman refused to call for medical assistance. He was eventually seen days later by Dr. Van 16 Horn, who ordered him to wear an arm sling. He alleges defendants Tara Carpenter and William 17 Sandie, who were both associate wardens, told Van Horn not to treat Ruiz unless Ruiz was 18 dying, due to the financial cost. Despite this alleged directive, Ruiz was transferred from LCC to 19 NNCC within five days of the accident and had surgery on his torn tendon about two weeks later. 20 Ruiz alleges that defendant Karen Gedney, a doctor at NNCC, directed the doctor who 21 performed the surgery to remove the tendon rather than repair it, again due to financial 22 23 1 considerations. Based on these allegations, I allowed a claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate 2 indifference to proceed against Chapman, Carpenter, Sandie, and Gedney. ECF No. 15.1 3 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ruiz failed to exhaust his 4 administrative remedies. They also argue that no genuine dispute remains that they were not 5 deliberately indifferent or, alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Ruiz
6 opposed and, after briefing was completed, moved for leave to add a declaration from his former 7 cellmate regarding the incident where he fell off his bunk and Chapman allegedly refused to call 8 for medical assistance. The defendants opposed this motion based in part on its untimeliness. In 9 response, Ruiz moved to extend time to explain the late filing. 10 I grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Ruiz did not exhaust his 11 administrative remedies. None of Ruiz’s grievances asserted that Chapman refused to call for 12 medical assistance, that Carpenter and Sandie told Dr. Van Horn not to treat Ruiz, or that 13 Gedney told the surgeon to remove the tendon. I deny as moot Ruiz’s motions to supplement the 14 record and to extend time because the affidavit he attaches to his motion does not relate to his
15 failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 16 I. ANALYSIS 17 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to 18 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence 21 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 22
23 1 I also allowed this claim to proceed against Robert LeGrand and Marsha Johns, but I later dismissed these two defendants because Ruiz failed to serve them. ECF Nos. 15; 112. 1 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 2 the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence 3 of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The 4 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a 5 genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th
6 Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a 7 genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and 8 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zetwick v. Cnty. of 9 Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with 11 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 12 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 13 are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies prior 14 to filing a lawsuit is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
15 The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of an inmate’s claims. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 16 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The inmate must “use all steps the prison holds out, enabling the prison to 17 reach the merits of the issue.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). The 18 inmate must comply “with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no 19 adjudication system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the 20 course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91. 21 Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 22 Consequently, the defendants bear the burden of proving the inmate failed to exhaust an 23 available administrative remedy. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 1 If the defendants do so, the burden shifts to the inmate to show “there is something particular in 2 his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 3 unavailable to him by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly 4 prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 5 2015) (quotation omitted). The defendants bear the “ultimate burden” of proving a failure to
6 exhaust. Id. 7 Ruiz filed multiple grievances related to his torn tendon. But none of those grievances 8 asserted that Chapman refused to call for medical assistance, that Carpenter and Sandie told Dr. 9 Van Horn not to treat Ruiz, or that Gedney told the surgeon to remove the tendon. In grievance 10 number 20062981952, Ruiz requested to be returned to the infirmary after being discharged 11 following his surgery. ECF Nos. 114-1 at 21-26, 47; 123 at 39-40, 42; 123-1 at 1-3. In grievance 12 number 20062984005, Ruiz requested to be seen by a doctor following his surgery and he 13 requested copies of his medical kites. ECF Nos. 114-1 at 28-31, 46; 123 at 25-29, 33-37. 14 Grievance number 20062998332 involved Ruiz’s request for an MRI, a second opinion on
15 whether another surgery could repair his arm, and complaints that the surgery was unsuccessful. 16 ECF Nos. 114-1 at 38-40; 123 at 5-13, 17-22. Grievance number 20062985193 involved Ruiz 17 complaining that the surgery was unsuccessful. ECF No. 114-1 at 44-45. Although Ruiz 18 complained about the surgery being unsuccessful, he did not assert that Gedney told the surgeon 19 to remove the tendon.2 In grievance number 20063050153, Ruiz complained that the medical 20 providers would tell him that he would be seen but never called him for an appointment, and he 21 requested to be seen by an outside surgeon. ECF No. 123-1 at 5-11. Although Ruiz’s medical 22
23 2 In any event, Ruiz’s medical records from the surgery indicate that his tendon was not removed. ECF No. 116-8 at 8, 14-15, 18-19. would not count as grievances, I note that the kites also do not assert the allegations at issue this case. ECF Nos. 116-2; 123 at 15, 30-32, 41; 123-1 at 21; 123-2 at 5, 7-15, 17-30; 123-3 at 1-22; 123-4 at 5; 123-5 at 3, 5-16. Ruiz does not present any evidence or argument that the grievance system was unavailable to him. His ability to file grievances shows it was available. 5 I therefore grant the defendants’ summary judgment motion because no genuine dispute remains that Ruiz did not exhaust his administrative remedies for any of his claims in this case. I deny as moot Ruiz’s motion to supplement the record because the affidavit he attaches to his motion does not relate to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See ECF No. 125 at 2-5 9}| (affidavit by former cellmate regarding Chapman’s alleged refusal to call for help). I also deny 10||as moot Ruiz’s related motion to extend time to file the affidavit. 11} 11. CONCLUSION 12 I THEREFORE ORDER that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13]| 114) is GRANTED. 14 I FURTHER ORDER that the plaintiff’s motions to attach addendum and to extend time (ECF Nos. 125, 127) are DENIED as moot. 16 I FURTHER ORDER the clerk of court to enter judgment in favor of defendants Samuel 17|| Chapman, Tara Carpenter, William Sandie, and Karen Gedney, and against plaintiff John Manuel Ruiz, and to close this case. 19 DATED this 7th day of March, 2023. 20 (IER. ANDREWP.GORDON. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE