OPINION AND ORDER
LAFFITTE, District Judge.
Defendants come before this Court for partial relief from judgment contending that this Court’s order of January 23, 1985, assessing jury costs to the Justice Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was an improper exercise of its discretionary powers under Local Rule 323.1 They further contend that the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity, precluding .suits against state governments for money damages in federal court, applies to the assessment of jury costs and was not waived when the Commonwealth assumed representation of defendants.
Moreover, they allege that payment of jury costs for purposes of judicial economy or efficient utilization of juror service was not a public end as intended by the Puerto Rico Legislature and, therefore, public funds could not be used to pay for the assessed jury costs. They add that Commonwealth funds cannot be used to pay for jury costs because this would make the Commonwealth a party to the suit and thus violate the Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity doctrine. The Court disagrees.
Local Rule 323 allows this Court, upon the settlement of a scheduled jury trial in a civil action, to assess jury costs “equally against parties and their counsel” or as otherwise directed. However, this taxing of costs will not occur if good cause is shown or “the Clerk is notified before twelve noon of the last business day preceding the time when the action is scheduled for trial in time to advise the jurors that it will not be necessary for them to attend.”2 In this case, the parties and attorneys, including the Justice Department of Puerto Rico, were forewarned of this provision, yet they failed to settle prior to 2:00 P.M. on January 21, 1985. It was not until the scheduled date of trial, January 22, 1985, that the Court was informed of a settlement, at which time it dismissed the already assembled jury. Furthermore, the record discloses that plaintiff had made earlier settlement attempts and such late settlement was attributable to the Justice Department’s lack of diligence. See Order filed on January 23, 1985.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, acting through its Justice Department, assumed the defendant Police officers’ legal representation in this civil rights suit pursuant to 25 L.P.R.A. Section 1016 and 32 L.P.R.A. Section 3090. The latter statute allows the Commonwealth to “defray the reasonable cost of said legal representation.”
Considering that the Justice Department assumed defendants’ legal representation [401]*401in a suit filed in this Court, and its attorneys, or the Secretary of Justice decided to allow such a late date settlement, knowing these costs would be avoidable only upon prior notification or upon showing good cause, the imposition of jury costs can only be seen as part and parcel of their legal representation. This measure should not be interpreted as a disciplinary sanction on the Justice Department, but instead as a cost for settling a federal district court case at such a late date. Nesco Design Group, Inc. v. Grace, 577 F.Supp. 414, 416 (W.D.Penn.1983).
Defendants contend that jury costs are unreasonable costs which Commonwealth legislators have prohibited from being paid out of public funds.3 The Court disagrees and instead considers them reasonable costs in the light of the already mentioned circumstances before us. It is to be noted that these costs are only imposed on last minute civil settlements, and only when the parties do not give prior notification or cannot show good cause for their dilatory action. This local rule does not prohibit settlement “on the steps of the Courthouse” but warns the parties and their counselors that they will incur the jury costs for unjustifiably late settlements. Such a provision merely assesses a cost of representing civil litigants in federal court, to be imposed just as filing fees, translation fees, or court reporter fees are imposed. Local Rule 323 is not intended and does not compel a litigant to make a settlement under a purported duty to settle. Nor does it coerce settlements.
The Court does not intend to make the Commonwealth a party to this suit, as defendants allege, instead this measure is directed at all parties and attorneys that decide to reach a last minute settlement “on the Courthouse steps.”
Federal district courts enjoy broad discretionary power to interpret and apply their local rules to promote efficiency in their courts. Matter of Adams, 734 F.2d 1094, 1102 (5th Cir.1984). Local Rule 323 is consistent with Puerto Rico’s legislation, Acts of Congress and the Supreme Court Rules; it complies with 28 U.S.C. section 2071, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, and does not change the parties’ substantive rights nor does it alter the Court’s jurisdiction in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 82 or 28 U.S.C. Section 2071. See also, Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1983). The Court’s imposition of jury costs does not conflict with the Eleventh Amendment or contravene the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the legislators of Puerto Rico through 32 L.P.R.A. 3090, Act No. 9 Laws of Puerto Rico 1975, p. 954, consented to incur the reasonable costs of representation which in this forum include jury fees for last minute civil settlements in absence of prior notification or showing of good cause. Furthermore, in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Court stated:
“Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes back to 1849 in this Court ...”
“A federal court’s interest in orderly, expeditious proceeding ‘justifies [i]t in treating the state just as any other litigant and in imposing costs upon it’ when an award is called for.” Id. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2576, citing from Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 77, 48 S.Ct. 97, 100, 72 L.Ed. 168 (1927).
Defendants attempt to distinguish the present case from Martinez v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Co., 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.1979), where a local rule virtually identical to this Court’s Rule 323, was upheld. Granted, the settlement stipulation in Martinez made it a more clear cut ease. However, it still serves as a useful precedent to follow. There, the Court of Appeals not [402]*402only upheld the district court’s power to make local rules (Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 83) prescribing the conduct of its business, but more specifically ruled that the power needed to promote efficiency in the court included the power of imposing jury costs. Martinez, at 994.
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OPINION AND ORDER
LAFFITTE, District Judge.
Defendants come before this Court for partial relief from judgment contending that this Court’s order of January 23, 1985, assessing jury costs to the Justice Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was an improper exercise of its discretionary powers under Local Rule 323.1 They further contend that the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity, precluding .suits against state governments for money damages in federal court, applies to the assessment of jury costs and was not waived when the Commonwealth assumed representation of defendants.
Moreover, they allege that payment of jury costs for purposes of judicial economy or efficient utilization of juror service was not a public end as intended by the Puerto Rico Legislature and, therefore, public funds could not be used to pay for the assessed jury costs. They add that Commonwealth funds cannot be used to pay for jury costs because this would make the Commonwealth a party to the suit and thus violate the Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity doctrine. The Court disagrees.
Local Rule 323 allows this Court, upon the settlement of a scheduled jury trial in a civil action, to assess jury costs “equally against parties and their counsel” or as otherwise directed. However, this taxing of costs will not occur if good cause is shown or “the Clerk is notified before twelve noon of the last business day preceding the time when the action is scheduled for trial in time to advise the jurors that it will not be necessary for them to attend.”2 In this case, the parties and attorneys, including the Justice Department of Puerto Rico, were forewarned of this provision, yet they failed to settle prior to 2:00 P.M. on January 21, 1985. It was not until the scheduled date of trial, January 22, 1985, that the Court was informed of a settlement, at which time it dismissed the already assembled jury. Furthermore, the record discloses that plaintiff had made earlier settlement attempts and such late settlement was attributable to the Justice Department’s lack of diligence. See Order filed on January 23, 1985.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, acting through its Justice Department, assumed the defendant Police officers’ legal representation in this civil rights suit pursuant to 25 L.P.R.A. Section 1016 and 32 L.P.R.A. Section 3090. The latter statute allows the Commonwealth to “defray the reasonable cost of said legal representation.”
Considering that the Justice Department assumed defendants’ legal representation [401]*401in a suit filed in this Court, and its attorneys, or the Secretary of Justice decided to allow such a late date settlement, knowing these costs would be avoidable only upon prior notification or upon showing good cause, the imposition of jury costs can only be seen as part and parcel of their legal representation. This measure should not be interpreted as a disciplinary sanction on the Justice Department, but instead as a cost for settling a federal district court case at such a late date. Nesco Design Group, Inc. v. Grace, 577 F.Supp. 414, 416 (W.D.Penn.1983).
Defendants contend that jury costs are unreasonable costs which Commonwealth legislators have prohibited from being paid out of public funds.3 The Court disagrees and instead considers them reasonable costs in the light of the already mentioned circumstances before us. It is to be noted that these costs are only imposed on last minute civil settlements, and only when the parties do not give prior notification or cannot show good cause for their dilatory action. This local rule does not prohibit settlement “on the steps of the Courthouse” but warns the parties and their counselors that they will incur the jury costs for unjustifiably late settlements. Such a provision merely assesses a cost of representing civil litigants in federal court, to be imposed just as filing fees, translation fees, or court reporter fees are imposed. Local Rule 323 is not intended and does not compel a litigant to make a settlement under a purported duty to settle. Nor does it coerce settlements.
The Court does not intend to make the Commonwealth a party to this suit, as defendants allege, instead this measure is directed at all parties and attorneys that decide to reach a last minute settlement “on the Courthouse steps.”
Federal district courts enjoy broad discretionary power to interpret and apply their local rules to promote efficiency in their courts. Matter of Adams, 734 F.2d 1094, 1102 (5th Cir.1984). Local Rule 323 is consistent with Puerto Rico’s legislation, Acts of Congress and the Supreme Court Rules; it complies with 28 U.S.C. section 2071, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, and does not change the parties’ substantive rights nor does it alter the Court’s jurisdiction in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 82 or 28 U.S.C. Section 2071. See also, Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1983). The Court’s imposition of jury costs does not conflict with the Eleventh Amendment or contravene the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the legislators of Puerto Rico through 32 L.P.R.A. 3090, Act No. 9 Laws of Puerto Rico 1975, p. 954, consented to incur the reasonable costs of representation which in this forum include jury fees for last minute civil settlements in absence of prior notification or showing of good cause. Furthermore, in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Court stated:
“Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes back to 1849 in this Court ...”
“A federal court’s interest in orderly, expeditious proceeding ‘justifies [i]t in treating the state just as any other litigant and in imposing costs upon it’ when an award is called for.” Id. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2576, citing from Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 77, 48 S.Ct. 97, 100, 72 L.Ed. 168 (1927).
Defendants attempt to distinguish the present case from Martinez v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Co., 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.1979), where a local rule virtually identical to this Court’s Rule 323, was upheld. Granted, the settlement stipulation in Martinez made it a more clear cut ease. However, it still serves as a useful precedent to follow. There, the Court of Appeals not [402]*402only upheld the district court’s power to make local rules (Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 83) prescribing the conduct of its business, but more specifically ruled that the power needed to promote efficiency in the court included the power of imposing jury costs. Martinez, at 994.
In this case, defendants were sued individually and as police officers and the mere fact that the Commonwealth Justice Department assumed representation does not confer preferential treatment upon the parties or their attorneys (i.e. public vis a vis private parties or attorneys) in the application of Local Rule 323. The Commonwealth Justice Department, when acting as a litigant in this Court, enjoys no special privileges and none shall be recognized. In the eyes of the law, all litigants enjoy equal status. As Theodore Roosevelt once said: “No man is above the law and no man is below it, nor do we ask permission when we require him to obey it.”
It is now settled that in a personal-capacity action fees cannot be recovered from a governmental entity by a prevailing party, because it would be inconsistent with the rule that the entity cannot be made liable on the merits under section 1983 on a respondeat superior basis. Kentucky v. Graham, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). However, the situation is different in Puerto Rico on account of Act No. 9 of 1975, 32 L.P.R.A. 3090. Here, the Commonwealth has consented to the payment of any judgment that may be entered against a Commonwealth official sued in his personal capacity.4 Furthermore, Section 3092 provides that “The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay the judgments, costs and attorney’s fees imposed on the defendants from available funds in the Treasury of Puerto Rico.”5
In Torres v. Toledo, 586 F.2d 858 (1st Cir.1978), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that under Act No. 9 of 1975 the Commonwealth Government assumes payment of all and any amounts, including attorney’s fees, and that the party defendant has no personal liability of any kind.
Finally, the payment of costs by the Commonwealth Government is not foreign in this jurisdiction. Under the provisions of the Act of Claims and Suits against the Commonwealth, 32 L.P.R.A. 3077 et seq., the latter may be ordered to pay costs. Ramos Rivera v. Commonwealth, 90 P.R.R. 806 (1964).
For the above mentioned reasons, defendants’ motion for partial relief of judgment is hereby DENIED. Furthermore, within the next thirty (30) days the Justice Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is to deposit with this Court the sum of $1,455.74, which is the total amount assessed for jury costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.