Ruiz v. Elko County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMarch 12, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-00297
StatusUnknown

This text of Ruiz v. Elko County Jail (Ruiz v. Elko County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruiz v. Elko County Jail, (D. Nev. 2024).

Opinion

2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 VICTOR RUIZ, Case No. 3:23-cv-00297-MMD-CLB 7 Plaintiff, ORDER 8 v. 9 ELKO COUNTY JAIL, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Plaintiff Victor Ruiz brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress 13 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Elko County Jail. 14 (ECF No. 9 at 1.) On January 26, 2024, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended 15 complaint within 30 days from the entry date of its order. (ECF No. 8 at 8.) The Court 16 warned Plaintiff that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended 17 complaint by that deadline. (Id.) That deadline expired, and Plaintiff did not file an 18 amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. Finally, the Court 19 found that Plaintiff could not prepay the full filing fee and granted his application to 20 proceed in forma pauperis. (Id. at 7.) 21 I. DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 23 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 24 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 25 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 26 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 27 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 28 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 2 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 3 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 4 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 5 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 6 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal 7 Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 9 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 10 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 11 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 12 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 13 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 14 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 16 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 17 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 18 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 19 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 20 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 21 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 22 order as satisfying this element,” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 23 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply,” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 24 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 25 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 26 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 27 unless Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 28 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 1 || delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 2 || do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Plaintiff needs 3 || additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting 4 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. The fifth 5 || factor favors dismissal. 6 || Ul. CONCLUSION 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 8 || weigh in favor of dismissal. 9 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 10 || Plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s January 26, 11 || 2024, order and for failure to state a claim. 12 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 13 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his 14 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 15 DATED THIS 12!" day of March 2024. 16

18 MIRANDAM.DU- ssi‘ □□□□□□ 19 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Gregory Carey v. John E. King
856 F.2d 1439 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)

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Ruiz v. Elko County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruiz-v-elko-county-jail-nvd-2024.