Ruiz v. County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 3, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-01921
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VERONICA LEAL RUIZ; STEPHANIE Case No.: 20-CV-1921 TWR (NLS) LEAL; ALEX LEAL; MARIA LEAL, BY 12 AND THROUGH THEIR GUARDIAN ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 13 AD LITEM ALMA CHAVEZ COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT 14 Plaintiffs, PREJUDICE 15 v. (ECF No. 5) 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1 to 20, 17 Defendants. 18

19 Presently before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego’s (“County”) Motion 20 to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 5). The Court held a 21 hearing on December 2, 2020. Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’ First Amended 22 Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 1-3), the Parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court 23 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 24 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 On February 28, 2018, Deputy Sheriffs from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department 3 responded to a 911 call concerning Decedent Oscar Leal (“Decedent”), who was acting 4 mentally unstable and was under the influence of methamphetamine. (See FAC at 3.) The 5 Deputy Sheriffs used excessive and unreasonable physical force to subdue Decedent, 6 which caused Decedent’s death on February 28, 2018. (Id.) 7 On January 4, 2019, the surviving wife and dependent of Decedent, Plaintiff 8 Veronica Leal Ruiz, and the surviving children of Decedent, Plaintiffs Stephanie, Alex, 9 and Maria Leal, through their guardian ad litem, Alma Chavez, filed their initial Complaint 10 in state court. (See generally ECF No. 1.) On August 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the FAC 11 in state court alleging two causes of action for: (1) violation of federal civil rights under 42 12 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) Monell Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See generally 13 ECF No. 1-3.) On September 25, 2020, the case was removed. Defendant filed the instant 14 Motion on October 5, 2020. (See generally Mot.) 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 17 state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” 18 Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro 19 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to 20 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of 21 a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 22 theory.’” Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 23 Cir. 1988)). 24 “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and 25 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. 26

27 1 The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC are accepted as true for purposes of Defendant’s Motion. See 28 Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in ruling on a motion to 1 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[T]he pleading 2 standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands 3 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 4 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “[a] 5 pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 7 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 8 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 10 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 11 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the 12 well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 13 misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—'that the pleader is 14 entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 8(a)(2)). 16 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 17 granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 18 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight 19 Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 20 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A district court does not err in 21 denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton 22 Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)). 23 ANALYSIS 24 I. Plaintiffs’ Standing 25 As an initial matter, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs have standing to 26 bring § 1983 claims on behalf of Decedent. In § 1983 actions, a decedent’s survivors may 27 bring a claim for the violation of their or decedent’s substantive constitutional rights. Cotta 28 v. Cty. of Kings, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2015). “The party seeking to bring 1 a survival action bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state's law authorizes 2 a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state's requirements for bringing a survival 3 action.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 California law provides that a survival action “may be commenced by the decedent's 5 personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest.” Cal. Civ. Code 6 § 377.30. In California, a person who seeks to commence an action as the decedent's 7 successor in interest is required to “execute and file an affidavit or declaration” under 8 penalty of perjury, stating (1) the decedent's name; (2) the date and place of decedent's 9 death; (3) that no proceedings are pending in California for the administration of the 10 decedent's estate; (4) either that the declarant is the decedent's successor in interest or is 11 authorized to act on behalf of the decedent's successor in interest; and (5) that no other 12 person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding for the decedent. Cal. 13 Civ. Code § 377.32(a). Further, if the decedent's estate was administered, the declarant 14 must produce a copy of the final order showing distribution of the decedent's cause of 15 action to the successor in interest. Cal. Civ. Code 377.32(a)(4). 16 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not filed any declaration or affidavit as required 17 by Cal. Civ. Code § 377.32 with their FAC. (See generally FAC.) Further, there are no 18 allegations in the FAC that show Plaintiffs met the requirements for bringing a survival 19 action.2 (Id.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion on the basis that Plaintiffs 20 lack standing to pursue their § 1983 claims on behalf of Decedent.

21 II. Violation of Federal Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 22 Defendant contends that the first cause of action should be dismissed, because the 23 claim was brought against County alone and a local government cannot be held vicariously 24 liable for the wrongful acts of their employees. (See Mot. at 6.) Plaintiffs’ Opposition is 25 26

27 2 Plaintiffs attach a successor in interest declaration in their Opposition. However, in determining the 28 propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint. See Schneider v. 1 silent as to their cause of action against County for violation of Decedent’s federal civil 2 rights, and, only discusses the Monell cause of action. 3 “A local government entity . . . can only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its 4 official policies (or its unofficial, but well-entrenched, practices) that violate the 5 Constitution.” Shaw v. Baca, No. CV 13-8873 R (RZ), 2013 WL 12333478, at *3 (C.D. 6 Cal. Dec. 19, 2013). A local government entity cannot be vicariously liable in a § 1983 7 action for the wrongful acts or omissions of its employees. Id. Plaintiffs brought their first 8 cause of action for violation of federal civil rights under § 1983 against County based on 9 the Deputy Sheriffs’ unreasonable and excessive use of force against Decedent.3 Plaintiffs 10 allege that “Decedent had constitutional interests and rights under the Fourth and 11 Fourteenth Amendments . . . to be free from an unreasonable or excessive use of force by 12 peace offers.” (See FAC at 6.) County, as a local government entity, cannot be liable for 13 the unreasonable and excessive use of force by the Deputy Sheriffs in a § 1983 action. 14 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.

15 III. Monell Liability Under § 1983 16 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege an underlying 17 constitutional deprivation, and therefore, County cannot be held liable for Monell 18 Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Mot. at 6). Defendant contends that “the 19 FAC is devoid of any factual allegations showing that the [D]ecedent . . . was subjected to 20 excessive force by any Sheriff’s deputy.” (Id.) In their Opposition, Plaintiffs do not 21 directly respond to Defendant’s argument. Instead, Plaintiffs state that they “have alleged 22 . . . deputy sheriffs violated [Decedent’s] constitutional rights by using excessive and 23 unreasonable physical force to subdue him [while he was acting mentally unstable and was 24 25

26 3 Although Plaintiffs’ counsel represented during the hearing that Plaintiffs did not allege a vicarious 27 liability claim against County, the first cause of action in the FAC alleges violation of federal civil rights 28 under § 1983 against County, for the unreasonable and excessive use of force by the County Deputy 1 under the influence of methamphetamine] that caused his death on February 28, 2018.” 2 (See Opposition at 6). 3 To establish Monell Municipal Liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that 4 the plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that 5 the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 6 plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the 7 constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 8 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Monell claims require a plaintiff to show 9 an underlying constitutional violation. Lockett v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 10 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding 11 that a jury’s determination that an individual officer did not use excessive force precluded 12 § 1983 on that ground). In an excessive force context, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a 13 Monell claim without first establishing the deprivation of a federal right by an officer. 14 Lockett, 977 F.3d at 741. 15 The only facts Plaintiffs allege in their FAC regarding constitutional violations are 16 that on February 28, 2018, the Deputy Sheriffs responded to a 911 call concerning 17 Decedent who was acting mentally unstable and was under the influence of 18 methamphetamine and that the Deputy Sheriffs used excessive and unreasonable physical 19 force to subdue Decedent. (See FAC at 5). These facts are insufficient to establish that 20 violations of Decedent’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights occurred. 21 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs fail to show an underlying constitutional violation, they 22 cannot establish Monell Municipal Liability under § 1983. Patel v. Maricopa County, 585 23 Fed.Appx. 452, 452 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s “Monell and supervisory 24 liability claims fail as there was no underlying constitutional violation”). Therefore, the 25 Court GRANTS the Motion as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action. 26 CONCLUSION 27 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 28 No. 5) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint 1 || (ECF No. 1-3) in its entirety. Plaintiffs MAY FILE an amended complaint on or before 2 || twenty-one (21) days of the electronic docketing of the Order. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: December 3, 2020 | 99> (2 re Honorable Todd W. Robinson ] United States District Court 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28