Ruhosha v. Maine Medical Center

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 9, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2218
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JEAN PAUL RUHOSHA,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-2218 (JMC)

v.

MAINE MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jean Paul Ruhosha, proceeding pro se, filed a civil Complaint against Maine

Medical Center and Medstar Georgetown University Hospital. 1 Amongst other allegations, Mr.

Ruhosha claims that Defendants denied him the right to medical treatment, knowingly and

purposely infected him with a deadly disease, and sent third parties to poison him. ECF 1 at 1. For

the reasons described below, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint and this action sua sponte.

It is well-settled that “federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within

their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,

wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous . . . .” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37

(1974). A complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when

it is “‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly,

39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)).

Claims are patently insubstantial if they are “essentially fictitious,” for example, advancing

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization, and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 “bizarre conspiracy theories,” “fantastic government manipulations of [one’s] will or mind,” or

some type of “supernatural intervention.” Id. In such cases, a district court may dismiss the case

sua sponte. See Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008).

Here, Mr. Ruhosha alleges that his doctors “knew that [he] had hepatitis C and early signs

of diabetes” but colluded to “deliberately misdiagnose[]” him so that he would succumb to those

illnesses. ECF 1 ¶¶ 15, 29. Mr. Ruhosha also alleges that his doctors deliberately “poisoned [his]

blood and infected [him] with a deadly disease that would gradually lead to [his] death,” id. ¶ 14,

then contacted an acquaintance to “seduce” and “poison” him, id. ¶ 10. Finally, Mr. Ruhosha

alleges that—in addition to the conspiracy against him personally—doctors working for

Defendants also conspired to intentionally misdiagnose and deny treatment to his mother, id. ¶ 64–

68, his daughter, id. ¶¶ 70–71, his son, id. ¶¶ 73–74, and his brother, id. ¶ 77, and to murder the

grandfather of his children, who was in Rwanda at the time, id. ¶ 76. Mr. Ruhosha seeks 300

million dollars in compensation for his injuries. Id. at 2.

These are precisely the kind of “fanciful” allegations that do not state a substantial federal

question. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; see also Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C.

Cir. 1981) (“A court may dismiss as frivolous complaints . . . postulating events and circumstances

of a wholly fanciful kind.”). Accordingly, upon sua sponte review, this action is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: August 9, 2023

Jia M. Cobb U.S. District Court Judge