Ruggiero v. Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY P. RUGGIERO II, No. 25-5978 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-01125-BJR v. MEMORANDUM* SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION BENEFIT AREA CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 15, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Anthony Ruggiero appeals the dismissal of his employment discrimination

action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the Snohomish

County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation, doing business as

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Community Transit. The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do not recite

them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo whether a default judgment was void due to a lack of

personal jurisdiction because of insufficient service of process while reviewing for

clear error the district court’s jurisdiction-related factual findings. S.E.C. v.

Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). We also review

de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Panelli v. Target

Corp., 172 F.4th 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2026).

The district court did not err in vacating the default judgment previously

entered against Community Transit. A signed return of service constitutes prima

facie evidence of valid service only “where the defendant had actual notice of the

original proceeding but delayed in bringing the motion until after entry of default

judgment.” Internet Sols., 509 F.3d at 1165. In Internet Solutions, we enforced

the presumption because the defendant admitted that he knew the suit against him

had been filed. Id. at 1166. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that

Community Transit knew it had been sued before the default judgment was

entered. Moreover, Community Transit presented conclusive evidence that the

process server’s declaration that she had specifically served Community Transit’s

“CEO” or his “office assistant” was untrue. The proof of service declares that the

CEO or office assistant, who “appeared to be a blonde-haired white female contact

2 25-5978 [sic] 35–45 years of age, 5’6”–5’8” tall and weighing 140–60 lbs,” was served at

5:20 PM on August 12, 2023. But the district court’s factual findings regarding the

CEO’s and his assistant’s genders, appearances, and schedules—based upon sworn

declarations—make clear that neither was served. Nor did Ruggiero establish that

any other authorized individual was validly served: It is unclear if Rachel Woods

was given the summons based on the service processor’s description of the served

party, and, even if Woods was served, no evidence establishes that her position

within Community Transit in August 2023 fits within the valid service parameters

set by RCW 4.28.080(9) (2023). The district court’s decision to vacate the default

judgment correctly held Ruggiero to his burden to prove sufficient service and

aligns with “our general policy that, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of

the motion to set aside the default judgment” so that the case can be decided on its

merits. NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 613 (9th Cir. 2016)

(citation modified).

Ruggiero’s complaint fails to state a claim for discrimination under the

ADA. The ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A). The complaint asserts that Ruggiero has a disability because he

“never received a vaccination for COVID-19” and at one point “tested positive for

having contracted COVID-19.” But the complaint does not “plead facts plausibly

3 25-5978 establishing that [Ruggiero] had ‘[1] a physical or mental impairment [2] that

substantially limits [3] one or more major life activities.’” See Shields v. Credit

One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A)). Neither lack of vaccination nor contracting COVID-19 qualifies

per se as a disability under the ADA. Ruggiero’s complaint thus fails to state a

claim and was correctly dismissed.

AFFIRMED.

4 25-5978