Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14229 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cv-00664-RBD-GJK
RUFUS LOVELL BROOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MOBILITIE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(September 19, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 2 of 9
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Rufus Brooks, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Mobilitie Management, LLC (“Mobilitie”) in
Plaintiff’s civil action alleging employment discrimination in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff is an African-American male with substantial previous work
experience in wireless telecommunications. Between August 2015 and March
2017, Plaintiff applied for 81 posted job openings with Mobilitie, a privately held
wireless infrastructure company. In September 2015, Plaintiff received an email
from a Mobilitie recruiter asking about Plaintiff’s availability for an interview. No
interview was scheduled, however; and Plaintiff was later told that Mobilitie had
decided to outsource the position. In October 2015, Plaintiff received another
email asking about his availability for an interview but was told moments later to
disregard the email, which was sent in error. Plaintiff never interviewed for or was
hired for a position with Mobilitie.
1 We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 3 of 9
In April 2017, Plaintiff filed pro se this civil action against Mobilitie,
asserting a claim for race discrimination.2 Plaintiff contends that Mobilitie decided
not to hire Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff says that Mobilitie
canceled his job interviews after viewing Plaintiff’s LinkedIn profile and learning
that Plaintiff is African-American.
The district court granted Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment. In
pertinent part, the district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate
that Mobilitie’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring Plaintiff were a
pretext for race discrimination.
I.
On appeal, Plaintiff first argues that the district court erred in failing to deny
Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment for lack of proper service. Plaintiff says
he received no mailed or emailed copy of the motion.
A pleading is served properly on another party by mailing the pleading to the
person’s last known address or by sending the pleading “by other electronic means
2 Plaintiff also alleged claims for race discrimination by Mobilitie’s staffing agency and for retaliation. Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these two claims; these claims are not before us on appeal. 3 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 4 of 9
that the person consented to in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (E). Service is
considered complete upon the mailing, filing or sending of the pleading. Id.
Attached to Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment was a certificate of
service, in which Mobilitie’s lawyer certified that a copy of the motion had been
served on Plaintiff. That the physical mailing address and email address listed for
Plaintiff on the certificate of service reflected accurately Plaintiff’s addresses on
file with the district court is undisputed. Whether or not Plaintiff in fact received
the service copy, service was considered complete upon mailing or sending
electronically the service copies to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (E).
Moreover, the record reflects that Plaintiff in fact learned about Mobilitie’s
motion and did file a timely response to the motion. Plaintiff does not contend that
he had inadequate time to prepare his response. Given the circumstances, the
district court concluded correctly that Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of the
purported improper service. We see no error in the district court’s failure to deny
Mobilitie’s motion based on improper service.
4 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 5 of 9
II.
Plaintiff next challenges the district court’s determination that Plaintiff failed
to show that Mobilitie’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring him
were pretextual.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d
1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2013).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of a
person’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
proving -- by a preponderance of the evidence -- that Mobilitie discriminated
unlawfully against him. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir.
2008).
Because Plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we
apply the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 975. “Under this
framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of discrimination], the
burden shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
5 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 6 of 9
reason’ for the adverse employment action.” Id. If the employer meets its burden
of production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to produce sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the employer’s
articulated reasons are a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
If the employer’s “proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable
employer,” the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and . . . cannot
succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A plaintiff can show
pretext by demonstrating such “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions” in the proffered reason for the employment action
that a reasonable factfinder could find the reason was unworthy of credence.
Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.
2006).
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Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14229 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cv-00664-RBD-GJK
RUFUS LOVELL BROOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MOBILITIE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(September 19, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 2 of 9
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Rufus Brooks, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Mobilitie Management, LLC (“Mobilitie”) in
Plaintiff’s civil action alleging employment discrimination in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff is an African-American male with substantial previous work
experience in wireless telecommunications. Between August 2015 and March
2017, Plaintiff applied for 81 posted job openings with Mobilitie, a privately held
wireless infrastructure company. In September 2015, Plaintiff received an email
from a Mobilitie recruiter asking about Plaintiff’s availability for an interview. No
interview was scheduled, however; and Plaintiff was later told that Mobilitie had
decided to outsource the position. In October 2015, Plaintiff received another
email asking about his availability for an interview but was told moments later to
disregard the email, which was sent in error. Plaintiff never interviewed for or was
hired for a position with Mobilitie.
1 We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 2 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 3 of 9
In April 2017, Plaintiff filed pro se this civil action against Mobilitie,
asserting a claim for race discrimination.2 Plaintiff contends that Mobilitie decided
not to hire Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff says that Mobilitie
canceled his job interviews after viewing Plaintiff’s LinkedIn profile and learning
that Plaintiff is African-American.
The district court granted Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment. In
pertinent part, the district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate
that Mobilitie’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring Plaintiff were a
pretext for race discrimination.
I.
On appeal, Plaintiff first argues that the district court erred in failing to deny
Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment for lack of proper service. Plaintiff says
he received no mailed or emailed copy of the motion.
A pleading is served properly on another party by mailing the pleading to the
person’s last known address or by sending the pleading “by other electronic means
2 Plaintiff also alleged claims for race discrimination by Mobilitie’s staffing agency and for retaliation. Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these two claims; these claims are not before us on appeal. 3 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 4 of 9
that the person consented to in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (E). Service is
considered complete upon the mailing, filing or sending of the pleading. Id.
Attached to Mobilitie’s motion for summary judgment was a certificate of
service, in which Mobilitie’s lawyer certified that a copy of the motion had been
served on Plaintiff. That the physical mailing address and email address listed for
Plaintiff on the certificate of service reflected accurately Plaintiff’s addresses on
file with the district court is undisputed. Whether or not Plaintiff in fact received
the service copy, service was considered complete upon mailing or sending
electronically the service copies to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (E).
Moreover, the record reflects that Plaintiff in fact learned about Mobilitie’s
motion and did file a timely response to the motion. Plaintiff does not contend that
he had inadequate time to prepare his response. Given the circumstances, the
district court concluded correctly that Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of the
purported improper service. We see no error in the district court’s failure to deny
Mobilitie’s motion based on improper service.
4 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 5 of 9
II.
Plaintiff next challenges the district court’s determination that Plaintiff failed
to show that Mobilitie’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring him
were pretextual.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d
1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2013).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of a
person’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
proving -- by a preponderance of the evidence -- that Mobilitie discriminated
unlawfully against him. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir.
2008).
Because Plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we
apply the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 975. “Under this
framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of discrimination], the
burden shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
5 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 6 of 9
reason’ for the adverse employment action.” Id. If the employer meets its burden
of production, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to produce sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the employer’s
articulated reasons are a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
If the employer’s “proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable
employer,” the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and . . . cannot
succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A plaintiff can show
pretext by demonstrating such “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions” in the proffered reason for the employment action
that a reasonable factfinder could find the reason was unworthy of credence.
Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.
2006). “A reason is not pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that the
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’” Id. (emphasis in
original).
Here, Mobilitie satisfied its burden of production by articulating legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring Plaintiff. First, many of the positions for
which Plaintiff applied (34 out of the 81 applied-for positions) were simply never
filled due to changes in Mobilitie’s hiring needs. Second, Plaintiff failed to satisfy
6 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 7 of 9
Mobilitie’s minimum hiring criteria, as set forth in Mobilitie’s guidance document:
“The Successful Recruit.” Mobilitie required, in pertinent part, that an applicant
(1) have a “[h]istory of job continuity with significant duration with each employer
(i.e., not a job hopper; less than 24 months at multiple employers);” and (2) reside
locally to the applied-for position, described as within a 1-hour commute or 50-
mile radius of the job site.
Because Mobilitie’s stated reasons are ones that would motivate a
reasonable employer,3 the burden shifted back to Plaintiff to produce sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to determine that Mobilitie’s stated
reasons were false and that race discrimination was the real reason for Mobilitie’s
hiring decisions. Plaintiff, however, makes no challenge to Mobilitie’s first stated
reason -- that many of the posted positions were never filled.
About Mobilitie’s second stated reason, Plaintiff makes no argument that he
satisfied Mobilitie’s hiring criteria under “The Successful Recruit” guidelines. 4
Plaintiff contends, instead, that “The Successful Recruit” guidelines did not go into
3 For instance, we have said expressly that “leaving several employers in a recent and short period of time, or job-skipping, is an imminently reasonable basis upon which to choose between job applicants.” See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1031.
4 We note that the record supports a finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Mobilitie’s hiring criteria. Plaintiff’s resume demonstrated that, between October 2010 and July 2015, Plaintiff had worked for seven different employers. Also, none of the 81 positions for which Plaintiff applied were located within 50 miles of Plaintiff’s home in Orlando, Florida. 7 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 8 of 9
effect until November 2015, after Plaintiff had already applied for several
positions. In support of his argument, Plaintiff relies solely on the “November
2015” date printed on the front page and the “(Rev 11/15)” printed on the bottom
of each page of “The Successful Recruit” document. Two Mobilitie human
resources employees attested, however, that “The Successful Recruit” guidelines
were in effect throughout all of 2015, 2016, and 2017. This testimony is not
contradicted by the November 2015 revision date printed on the document. The
district court, thus, committed no error in determining that Mobilitie’s hiring
criteria were in effect when Plaintiff first began applying for positions with
Mobilitie in August 2015.
As evidence of race discrimination, Plaintiff contends that Mobilitie
cancelled job interviews after Mobilitie employees viewed his LinkedIn profile and
learned his race. The evidence shows, however, that Plaintiff’s LinkedIn profile
was viewed both before and after Plaintiff received emails about interviews and
that Mobilitie used LinkedIn regularly to verify information on applicants’
resumes. Mobilitie also presented evidence that, due to the high number of
openings and applicants, interview notices were sometimes sent out in error and
would later need to be rescinded.
8 Case: 18-14229 Date Filed: 09/19/2019 Page: 9 of 9
Plaintiff has failed to rebut head-on each of Mobilitie’s stated reasons and
has failed to demonstrate that Mobilitie’s stated reasons are unworthy of credence.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s conclusory and speculative allegations are insufficient to
raise a triable issue about whether the real reason for Mobilitie’s hiring decisions
was race discrimination. Because Plaintiff has failed to show that Mobilitie’s
articulated reasons were pretextual, the district court granted properly Mobilitie’s
motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.