Ruffner v. Beeghly

828 A.2d 475, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 506
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 15, 2003
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 828 A.2d 475 (Ruffner v. Beeghly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ruffner v. Beeghly, 828 A.2d 475, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 506 (Pa. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Senior Judge KELLEY.

M. Susan Ruffner appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (trial court) dismissing her exceptions and objections to a tax sale of real property situated in Jefferson Township, Somerset County. We affirm.

Ms. Ruffner owned property located in Jefferson Township, Somerset County. The property was exposed to a tax sale on September 24, 2001, for nonpayment of school and township real estate taxes for the years 1999 and 2000. The property was sold to the highest bidder, Wayne J. Beeghly. Thereafter, Ruffner filed exceptions and objections to the tax sale with [477]*477the trial court on the basis that the property was not sold in accordance with the notice provisions of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Law)1 and a hearing was held.

Before the trial court, the parties stipulated that the Somerset County Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau) properly posted notice of the tax sale on the property itself and properly published notices of the tax sale in two local newspapers and the local legal journal in accordance with Section 602 of the Law.2 The trial court found that the Bureau also sent notices of the impending tax sale via certified mail to Ruffner’s proper address in Allegheny County, all of which were returned to the Bureau as “unclaimed.”3 The trial court found that upon not receiving the signed certified mail receipt from Ruffner, the Bureau sent Ruffner another notice, first class with proof of mailing, as required by the Law.4 The trial court found further that this notice was not returned to the Bureau by the postal authorities, that none of the first class mail sent by the Bureau to Ruffner was returned by the postal authorities, and that prior to the tax sale, the Bureau reviewed the assessment records to confirm that the notices had been sent to Ruffner’s correct and only address. The trial court noted that Ruffner did not dispute that the Bureau was sending these notices to her proper mailing address.

The trial court rejected Ruffner’s contentions that the Bureau failed to take additional reasonable efforts as required by Section 607.1 of the Law5 to locate her [478]*478whereabouts upon not receiving any signed receipt confirming the delivery of the notices sent to her by-the Bureau. Specifically, the trial court held that the Bureau was not required by the Law to: (1) conduct an internet search for Ruffner’s telephone number or office address; or (2) search the telephone directories of Allegheny County to find Ruffner’s telephone number. The trial court found that the record established that: (1) proper notice was sent to Ruffner by the Bureau by certified mail, return receipt requested but Ruffner chose not to claim the mail from the postal authorities; (2) proper first class mail notice was forwarded to Ruffner at her proper mailing address and was not returned to the Bureau; and (3) adequate efforts were made by the Bureau to determine whether there was any other address at which Ruffner could have been served; While the trial court acknowledged that the Bureau did not search the other sources specified in Section 607.1 of the Law, the trial court found that it was apparent that any additional effort by the Bureau would have been futile and pointless because the proper notices were sent to the proper address.

Accordingly, by order of December 20, 2002, the trial court dismissed Ruffner’s exceptions to the tax sale. This appeal followed.6

We initially point out that Ruffner is not disputing that the Bureau complied with the notice requirements of Section 602 of the Law. Ruffner contends that the Bureau failed to comply with Section 607.1 of the Law when it became apparent to the Bureau that Ruffner did not receive the notices required by Section 602 of the Law. Therefore, Ruffner argues, that she did not have actual notice of the sale.

Ruffner contends that when a certified mail letter sent to Ruffner by the Bureau was returned unclaimed, the Bureau should have been alerted to the fact that the mail was not received thereby triggering the obligations imposed by Section 607.1 of the Law to make reasonable efforts to assure that Ruffner had been notified of the potential loss of her property. Ruffner argues that none of the efforts required by Section 607.1 of the Law were made by the Bureau to assure that she received actual notice of the tax sale despite the fact: (1) that her home and office phone numbers were easily obtainable through an internet search; (2) that she was a public figure in Allegheny County, previously as a judge of the court of common pleas and then the public defender of Allegheny County; (3) that the local attorney who prepared the deed could have been obtained through a search of the recorder of deeds records and he in turn could have notified Ruffner of the impending sale; and (4) that since the Bureau knew Ruffner was a resident of Allegheny County, it could have searched the Allegheny County phone book.

In a tax sale case, the Bureau has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory notice provisions of the Law. Geier v. Tax Claim Bureau of Schuylkill County, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 321, 570 A.2d 134 (1990), aff'd, 527 Pa. 41, 588 A.2d 480 [479]*479(1991). As noted herein, Section 607.1 of the Law requires that when any notification of a pending tax sale is required to be mailed to any owner and such mailed notification is either returned without the required receipted personal signature of the addressee or under other circumstances raising a significant doubt as to the actual receipt of such notification by the named addressee or is not returned or acknowledged at all, then, before the tax sale can be conducted or confirmed, the Bureau must exercise reasonable efforts to discover the whereabouts of such person or entity and notify him or her. 72 P.S. § 5860.607a. Section 607.1 further provides that the “[B]ureau’s efforts shall include, but not necessarily be restricted to, a search of current telephone directories for the county and of the dockets and indices of the county tax assessment offices, recorder of deeds office and prothonotary’s office, as well as contacts made to any apparent alternate address or telephone number which may have been written on or in the file pertinent to the property.” Id.

It is well settled that the notice provisions of the Law are to be strictly construed and that strict compliance with the notice provisions is essential to prevent the deprivation of property without due process. Murphy v. Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau, 784 A.2d 878 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). The purpose of a tax sale is not to strip an owner of his property but rather to insure that the tax on the property is collected. Id. At a minimum, due process requires that if reasonably possible, a government must notify an owner before his property is sold at an upset tax sale. Id.

The requirement of due process was explained by this Court in Farro v. Tax Claim Bureau of Monroe County, 704 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 555 Pa.

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Related

In Re Tax Sale of Real Property Situated
828 A.2d 475 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
828 A.2d 475, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruffner-v-beeghly-pacommwct-2003.