Ruffin v. Caruana

2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 21, 2019
• Docket: 2-18-0933
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U No. 2-18-0933 Order filed November 21, 2019

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

JOHNNY M. RUFFIN, JR., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Winnebago County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 2018-MR-784 ) GARY CARUANA, ROBERT REDMOND, ) SWANSON SERVICES CORPORATION, ) and WINNEBAGO COUNTY BOARD ) CHAIRMAN FRANK HANEY, ) Honorable ) Stephen E. Balogh, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Where pretrial inmate filed complaint alleging wrongdoing in the operation of the jail, his appeal from the involuntary dismissal of the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

¶2 Plaintiff, Johnny Ruffin, Jr., was a pretrial detainee in the Winnebago County jail. He filed

a complaint pro se, alleging multiple theories of wrongdoing in the operation of the jail. The

Winnebago County State’s Attorney’s office appeared on behalf of defendants Gary Caruana, the

Sheriff of Winnebago County; Robert Redmond, the jail superintendent; Frank Haney, the chair 2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U

of the Winnebago County Board, and Swanson Services Corporation. On defendants’ motion, the

trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. Within 30 days, plaintiff filed a

postjudgment motion to reinstate the lawsuit and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but before

the trial court ruled on the filings, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. The motion and the petition

remain pending in the trial court, and therefore, plaintiff’s appeal must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On September 22, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging multiple theories of

wrongdoing in the Winnebago County jail. He alleged that he had been subjected to excessive

lockdown and that the jail’s commissary had been run improperly. He also alleged that his

religious freedom was unduly restricted by the jail charging interest on his trust account. Finally,

he asserted that his personal and legal mail had been lost, depriving him of meaningful access to

the courts.

¶5 Pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West

2018)), defendants filed a combined motion under sections 2-615 and 2-619 to dismiss the

complaint. Following a hearing on October 10, 2018, the trial court granted the motion and

dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

¶6 On October 17, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to “reinstate the lawsuit.” Plaintiff alleged

that he attempted to arrange a transfer from the jail to attend the October 10, 2018, hearing but was

unsuccessful. Plaintiff believed that his absence caused the trial court to dismiss his complaint

with prejudice. Plaintiff asked the court to reinstate the lawsuit and rehear defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff’s motion was accompanied by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to facilitate

his attendance at the proposed rehearing.

-2- 2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U

¶7 However, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on November 5, 2018. There is no indication in

the record that the trial court ruled on plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the action or his related petition

for a writ of habeas corpus.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 Plaintiff appeals from the involuntary dismissal of his complaint. We must address the

issue of our jurisdiction before we may consider the merits of his appeal. Although defendants do

not contest jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to confirm our jurisdiction and dismiss an

appeal, or portion thereof, if jurisdiction is lacking. D’Attomo v. Baumbeck, 2015 IL App (2d)

140865, ¶ 22; see also In re Adoption of S.G. v. S.G., 401 Ill. App. 3d 775, 780 (2010) (parties

cannot confer appellate jurisdiction by agreement).

¶ 10 Except as provided by statute or the rules of our supreme court, a court of review lacks

jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb.

1, 1994); Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp., 209 Ill. 2d

471, 478 (2004). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it determines the litigation on the

merits or some definite part thereof so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with

the execution of the judgment. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 553 (1989). “The

reason for requiring finality of judgments is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and piecemeal

appeals.” In re Estate of Devey, 239 Ill. App. 3d 630, 632 (1993); see also In re Estate of French,

166 Ill. 2d 95, 109 (1995) (piecemeal appeals “cause delays and often waste judicial effort”). The

function of a reviewing court is limited to review of issues decided by the trial court and cannot

be extended to issues not passed upon at trial. Devey, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 633.

¶ 11 After the trial court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, plaintiff filed a motion

to reinstate the lawsuit and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but there is no indication in the

-3- 2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U

record that either filing was ever ruled upon. The judgment is not final and appealable because a

motion attacking the judgment remains pending. See In re Marriage of Valkiunas, 389 Ill. App.

3d 965, 968 (2008) (if there is an unresolved postjudgment motion or pending claim, the notice of

appeal does not become effective until the trial court resolves them or makes an express written

Rule 304(a) finding). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the dismissal of the amended

complaint.

¶ 12 We note that In re Marriage of Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1049-1050 (2007), provides

for the possible reinstatement of an appeal, like this one, that is dismissed as premature. An

appellant’s options depend on whether the trial court’s jurisdiction has lapsed since the court

entered the judgment from which he appealed.

¶ 13 If the court has retained jurisdiction because fewer than 30 days have passed, a claim

remains pending, or both, the appellant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after (1) a Rule

304(a) finding regarding the judgment appealed or (2) the final judgment on the last pending claim.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. June 4, 2008). However, if a timely postjudgment motion is filed, the

appellant must wait for the ruling on that motion and file his notice of appeal within 30 days

thereafter. John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (2001) (for purposes of

Rule 304(a), “pending” petitions also include those filed within 30 days after the judgment

appealed).

¶ 14 If the trial court has lost jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal, such that a

subsequent notice of appeal would be late, the appellant may invoke the saving provisions of

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. June 4, 2008). Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. This

court may give effect to the appellant’s premature notice of appeal upon the resolution of the last

pending motion. Thus, if necessary, the appellant may move within 21 days to establish our

-4- 2019 IL App (2d) 180933-U

jurisdiction by supplementing the record to show (1) the rulings on the previously pending claims

and (2) the absence of any other pending claims. If the appellant’s motion is well-founded, we

will grant it, vacate this disposition, and proceed to the merits. We note that in Knoerr, and several

subsequent cases, this court has stated that an appellant may seek to supplement the record by

means of a petition for rehearing. See, e.g., Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. However, because

pursuing this course does not raise any error in our decision, a petition for rehearing technically is

inappropriate. Ill. S. Ct. R. 367 (eff. Dec. 29, 2009). Filing a simple motion to supplement the

record is the correct method.

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 17 Appeal dismissed.

-5-