Ruffin-Stanford v. County of Cook

2020 IL App (1st) 191264-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 31, 2020
• Docket: 1-19-1264
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 191264-U

FIFTH DIVISION March 31, 2020

No. 1-19-1264

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

LATONYA RUFFIN-STANFORD, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 15 CH 5722 ) COUNTY OF COOK, THOMAS J. DART as Sheriff ) of Cook County, and THE COOK COUNTY ) SHERIFF’S MERIT BOARD, ) Honorable ) Pamela McLean Meyerson, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The de facto officer doctrine barred plaintiff’s challenge to the Merit Board’s order discharging her as a correctional officer.

¶2 Latonya Ruffin-Stanford sued the County of Cook, Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, and the Cook

County Sheriff’s Merit Board, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Merit Board’s 2008

termination of her employment was invalid because the Merit Board was improperly constituted.

The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the de facto officer

doctrine barred Ruffin-Stanford’s claim. We affirm. 1-19-1264

¶3 The following factual recitation is taken from the pleadings, exhibits, and evidence in the

record. Ruffin-Stanford was employed as a correctional officer by the Cook County Sheriff. In

2008, the sheriff filed charges against her before the Merit Board, alleging that she gave false

statements regarding her failure to secure her weapon in the trunk of her vehicle. After a hearing,

the Merit Board sustained the charges and terminated Ruffin-Stanford’s employment. She sought

administrative review of that decision. The circuit court affirmed the Merit Board’s termination

order and this court affirmed. Ruffin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, No. 1-09-2398 (July

15, 2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In 2011, she also filed a federal

lawsuit challenging her termination, alleging gender discrimination under the federal civil rights

laws. The district court dismissed that case under the doctrine of res judicata. Ruffin-Stanford v.

County of Cook, No. 11 C 747 (N. D. IL July 21, 2011).

¶4 In 2015, Ruffin filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Cook

County, seeking a declaration that the Merit Board’s termination order was invalid because the

board had been improperly constituted. In particular, she alleged that certain board members

continued to serve after their terms had expired. She sought a declaration that her termination was

null and void, reinstatement to her position, retroactive back pay, and benefits.

¶5 The defendants answered the complaint and asserted various affirmative defenses. The

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2014)). In their motion, the defendants asserted that:

(1) Ruffin-Stanford’s claim was barred by laches; and (2) she forfeited her claim because she failed

to raise the issue of the board’s composition during her termination hearing, her administrative

review case, or her federal discrimination case. The defendants acknowledged that, in Taylor v.

Dart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143684, this court granted relief to a terminated employee on the basis

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that the board was improperly constituted. However, the defendants argued that Taylor did not

explore whether Cook County impliedly used its home rule authority to supersede the statutory

term restrictions on the Merit Board members, and that a home rule analysis might warrant a

different result. In response, Ruffin-Stanford argued that Taylor was controlling. In particular, she

argued that the defendants’ home rule argument was unsupportable in light of Taylor, that the

county could not exercise its home rule powers through mere implication, and that laches could

not bar her claim that the board’s decision was void ab initio.

¶6 Ruffin-Stanford filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that at least “four

members of the Merit Board who made the decision to terminate [her] were appointed for terms

of less than six years, or remained on the Merit Board after their terms had expired without being

reappointed as required under the statute.” Her legal argument rested on the precedent set in

Taylor. In response, the defendants repeated their home rule argument. They also contended that,

under state law, board members could continue to serve if their terms had expired, until their

successors took office; and that laches barred Ruffin-Stanford’s claim.

¶7 On June 7, 2017, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order which first

noted that the parties agreed that the relevant facts were not in dispute. The court found Taylor to

be controlling, granted Ruffin-Stanford’s motion for summary judgment, denied the defendants’

cross-motion, declared Ruffin-Stanford’s termination void, and “remanded” the case to the Merit

Board for a hearing before a “properly constituted” board. On June 16, Ruffin-Stanford filed a

motion to “supplement” the court’s earlier order, to address her requested back pay remedy.

¶8 On July 6, 2017, the defendants filed a notice of appeal from the June 7 summary judgment

order (case no. 1-17-1771). A different panel of this court granted Ruffin-Stanford’s motion to

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dismiss that appeal on the basis that the summary judgment order was not appealable while Ruffin-

Stanford’s back pay motion “to supplement” was still pending.

¶9 Although they had an appeal pending, the defendants filed a motion in the circuit court

(also on July 6) to stay further proceedings. The defendant’s motion recited that on January 25,

2017, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order, directing the appellate court to vacate

that portion of its opinion in Taylor in which that court declined to determine whether the Cook

County Board of Commissioners had home rule authority to approve interim appointments to the

Merit Board. The supreme court further directed the appellate court to address that issue and

determine whether a different outcome was warranted. The circuit court denied the motion for stay

and set the matter for further status.

¶ 10 On December 8, 2017, Public Act 100-562 became effective. That act amended section 3-

7002 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2016)), to abolish the terms of all sitting

members of the Merit Board and establish a new term rotation schedule. New members of the

Merit Board, some of whom were holdovers, were appointed pursuant to the new law.

¶ 11 On February 7, 2018, the circuit court granted Ruffin-Stanford’s motion to supplement and

found that she was entitled to back pay, less set-offs, and reinstatement to her position as a

correctional officer. The court set the matter for further status regarding discovery on back pay

and set-offs.

¶ 12 Around this time, the parties exchanged discovery regarding back pay. Sheriff Dart, now

represented by outside counsel, moved to halt discovery and for reconsideration of the court’s

summary judgment and back pay orders. The motion for reconsideration raised two defenses,

apparently for the first time: (1) that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Ruffin-Stanford’s

declaratory judgment claim because it was barred by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS

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5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)); and (2) that only the first terminated officer to challenge the Merit

Board’s composition could obtain relief, under the “first case” doctrine enunciated by Justice

McMorrow’s special concurrence in Daniels v. Indus. Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 176-77 (2002)

(McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.). Daniels involved a challenge to the

composition of the Illinois Industrial Commission. Justice McMorrow’s special concurrence

suggested that the first person to challenge should obtain relief, but that the de facto officer doctrine

should apply to maintain the validity of the decisions rendered by the illegally composed

commission in other cases. Dart’s motion also argued that Ruffin-Stanford’s claim was barred by

res judicata. The other county defendants joined Dart’s motion.

¶ 13 On September 28, 2018, the Third Division of this court issued an opinion in Lopez v.

Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, a case in which another officer challenged both his termination

by the Merit Board on administrative review, and the composition of the Merit Board itself. The

Lopez court noted that the sheriff cited there were “over sixty” Merit Board challenge cases filed

in the circuit court since Taylor. The opinion contains an exhaustive recitation of case law

involving the de facto officer doctrine. The court held that under the de facto officer doctrine, the

decision of the Merit Board was valid notwithstanding the board’s composition. A few months

later, the First Division issued an opinion in Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, following

the rationale of Lopez and applying the de facto officer doctrine to reject the plaintiff’s challenge

to the composition of the Merit Board. In the court below, the parties filed supplemental briefs

regarding Lopez and Cruz.

¶ 14 On June 12, 2019, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motions to reconsider. Based

on the new authority of Lopez and Ortiz, the court vacated its summary judgment and back pay

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orders, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and against Ruffin-Stanford, and

dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal followed.

¶ 15 On July 22, 2019, the assigned motion panel of this court granted Ruffin-Stanford’s motion

for stay. The panel noted that the parameters of the de facto officer doctrine were “still being

explored by different decisions of this court” so that the outcome of this appeal was “difficult to

predict”. The panel required Sheriff Dart to reinstate Ruffin-Stanford to her position and stayed

the termination of Ruffin-Stanford until further order of this court.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, Ruffin-Stanford argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary

judgment to the defendants. She argues that: cases such as Lopez and Cruz were wrongly decided;

the defendants waived their de facto officer defense by not raising it sooner below; the de facto

officer doctrine does not apply here because the composition of the Merit Board was a “serious”

deviation from the statutory norm; and her declaratory judgment action is not barred by either the

Administrative Review Act or res judicata.

¶ 18 The defendants have filed a joint brief urging this court to follow the line of cases beginning

with Lopez. They also argue that: Ruffin-Stanford’s claim is barred by res judicata; they did not

waive their de facto officer defense by raising it too late; and Ruffin-Stanford’s claim is barred by

her failure to list it as a claim in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.

¶ 19 Above, we explained that the circuit court relied on Lopez and Cruz to find that the de facto

officer doctrine barred Ruffin-Stanford’s claims. While the circuit court was wrapping up its work

on this case, and while this appeal was pending, other divisions of this court addressed virtually

identical claims. First, on May 7, 2019, the Second Division issued an opinion in Acevedo v. Cook

County Sheriff’s Merit Bd., 2019 IL App (1st) 181128, following Cruz and Lopez, and applying

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the de facto officer doctrine to reject a terminated correctional officer’s claim that the Merit

Board’s decision to fire him was void.

¶ 20 On June 19, 2019, the Third Division issued an opinion in Goral v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st)

181646. The twist in Goral is that the plaintiffs therein had cases pending before the improperly

constituted Merit Board which were stayed when Taylor was issued. Once the General Assembly

enacted Public Act 100-562 and the board was reconstituted with newly appointed members, the

sheriff amended the then-pending charges against the Goral plaintiffs, essentially to start things

afresh before the new Merit Board. Id., ¶¶ 16-18. The plaintiffs sued on several theories—some

relating to the original composition of the Board, and some relating to the Board as reconstituted

after Public Act 100-562 became effective. The circuit court dismissed all the claims for lack of

jurisdiction, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. On

appeal, the Goral court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction over some of plaintiffs’ claims

even though they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Along the way, the Goral

court cited the de facto officer doctrine of Lopez and Cruz with approval, noting that after Taylor,

employees with pending claims (like the Goral plaintiffs) could still challenge the board’s

composition but those with cases already resolved could not. Id., ¶ 105. Our supreme court granted

the county defendants’ petition for leave to appeal in Goral on September 25, 2019, and the case

is now in the final briefing stage in that court. It is fair to say that Goral will address the de facto

officer doctrine as it applies to the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, which will in turn affect,

and possibly resolve, the many pending claims, cases, and appeals challenging the Merit Board’s

composition.

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¶ 21 On July 26, 2019, the Sixth Division issued an opinion in Pietryla v. Dart, 2019 IL App

(1st) 182143, which also followed Lopez and Cruz and applied the de facto officer doctrine to

reject the plaintiff’s claims regarding the constitution of the Merit Board.

¶ 22 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West

2018). Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should only be granted when the moving

party’s right to judgment is “clear and free from doubt.” Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual

Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). “Where a reasonable person could draw divergent

inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied.” Id. We review a circuit

court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 102.

¶ 23 Here, there are no disputed facts and the court resolved the dispute as a matter of law. We

therefore look to the most analogous recent cases regarding the constitution of the Merit Board,

which are Cruz, Lopez, Acevedo, and Pietryla. All involved employees whose cases had long been

resolved and challenged their disciplinary action on the basis that the Merit Board was improperly

constituted. While we are not required to follow these cases, we find they are well-reasoned and

we find no reason to depart from their analysis. We therefore hold that the circuit court properly

granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the de facto officer doctrine. We note that

our supreme court is likely to address the issue soon in the appeal it granted in Goral.

¶ 24 We are unpersuaded by Ruffin-Stanford’s attempt to distinguish her case from the Lopez

line of cases on the basis that those cases involved Merit Board members who were appointed to

terms of improper length, whereas her challenge is to board members who served longer than their

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allotted terms. The de facto officer doctrine is grounded in public policy. Justice McMorrow’s

special concurrence in Daniels, which the Lopez court adopted, explains:

“By permitting the claimant who brought the illegal appointments to light to receive a new

hearing, the incentive to discover and pursue such illegality is maintained. Once the matter

has been litigated and decided by the courts, however, the public interest in uncovering and

addressing illegality is served. At that juncture, the public interest in preserving the validity

of a large multitude of commission decisions takes precedence. Public policy and

competing public interests often require courts to draw equitable lines. That line is best

drawn in this case by permitting Daniels a new hearing, but by applying the de facto officer

doctrine to maintain the validity of the decisions rendered by the illegally composed

commission in other cases.” Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 176–77 (McMorrow, J., specially

concurring, joined by Freeman, J.).

¶ 25 Under that analysis, whether the board members in question were serving terms of

improper length or were holding over is a distinction without a difference. We therefore reject

Ruffin-Stanford’s contention that this case does not fit within the Lopez framework. See also

Pietryla, ¶ 18 (applying Justice McMorrow’s special concurrence in Daniels to reject attempt to

distinguish challenge against all board members from cases involving less than all the board

members).

¶ 26 We likewise decline to reverse the court below on the basis that the defendants waived the

de facto officer doctrine by failing to raise it until their motion for reconsideration. Waiver is a

limitation on the parties and not the court. Collins v. Lake Forest Hospital, 213 Ill. 2d 234, 239

(2004). “The intended purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court’s attention newly

discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the court’s previous application of existing

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law.” (Emphasis added.) Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Universal Underwriters

Insurance Co., 348 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422 (2004). Throughout the pendency of the case in the court

below, the case law was rapidly changing, and the court hardly abused its discretion by allowing

defendants to rely on new and highly relevant case law, regardless of whether it had been argued

at an earlier stage.

¶ 27 We affirm the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the defendants. The

stay granted by the motion panel shall dissolve upon the issuance of this court’s mandate. We need

not address the defendants’ additional contention that Ruffin-Stanford’s lawsuit is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata or by her failure to assert it as a claim in her bankruptcy case.

¶ 28 Affirmed.