Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1)

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 15, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00867
StatusUnknown

This text of Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1) (Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1), (M.D. Ala. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

TRAVIS SENTELL RUDOLPH, #312044, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-867-WHA ) (WO) MONICA McCOY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Easterling Correctional Facility, recently initiated the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Doc. 1. Plaintiff did not submit the $350 filing fee or $50 administrative fee upon the initiation of this case and, instead, filed an application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis before the Court. Doc. 2. Based on the financial information provided by Plaintiff in support of his application, see Doc. 2 at 3, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), the court determined Plaintiff owed an initial partial filing fee of $11.93. Doc. 3 at 1–2. The Court therefore ordered Plaintiff to file the required initial partial filing fee on or before November 17, 2020. Doc. 3 at 2. The Court cautioned Plaintiff “if he fails to pay the initial partial filing fee in compliance with this order the Magistrate Judge will recommend that this case be dismissed and such dismissal will not be reconsidered unless exceptional circumstances exist.” Doc. 3 at 3. As of the present date, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with the initial partial filing fee. The foregoing reflects Plaintiff’s lack of interest in the continued prosecution of this case. This action cannot properly proceed absent Plaintiff’s participation in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the undersigned finds that lesser

sanctions than dismissal are not appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia, 248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, this case is due to be dismissed. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion.); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629– 31 (1962) (acknowledging that the authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to

prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and empowers courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”); Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket. . . . . The sanctions imposed [upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the

action with or without prejudice.”). Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) as ordered by this court. On or before December 29, 2020, Plaintiff may file objections to the

Recommendation. Plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions set forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party

from a de novo determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and

those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). Done this 15th day of December, 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Related

Link v. Wabash Railroad
370 U.S. 626 (Supreme Court, 1962)
David Richard Moon v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
863 F.2d 835 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)
Kenneth Henley v. Willie E. Johnson, Warden
885 F.2d 790 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)
Resolution Trust Corporation v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.
996 F.2d 1144 (Eleventh Circuit, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rudolph-v-mccoy-inmate-1-almd-2020.