Rudnik v. Mayers

183 N.W.2d 891, 27 Mich. App. 560
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 22, 1971
DocketDocket 8,069
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 183 N.W.2d 891 (Rudnik v. Mayers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rudnik v. Mayers, 183 N.W.2d 891, 27 Mich. App. 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinions

O’Hara, J.

On June 17, 1965, plaintiff-appellant purchased certain real property in Northfield Township, Washtenaw County. The property had a cottage on it which appellant intended to use. A zoning ordinance, adopted in 1954 and amended in 1961, provided that every lot in the area on which a building was erected was to have not less than 6,000 square feet if public sanitary sewers were available, or not less than 8,000 square feet if public sanitary sewers were unavailable. The lot in question was less than 4,000 square feet in area. There was no public sanitary service available to serve the premises and no sanitary sewer facility existed on the property at the time of plaintiff’s purchase.

The cottage had been in existence at the time the ordinance was passed and was allowed to remain as a nonconforming use. However, the cottage had not been occupied for some time before plaintiff’s purchase.

After his purchase, plaintiff made various repairs, such as painting and replacement of windows. In the summer of 1965, plaintiff became aware of deterioration of the foundation of the cottage and [563]*563became fearful that it might collapse. He, therefore, desired to make repairs to the foundation of the cottage but was denied a building permit on the grounds that it was a nonconforming use, and the prior permitted nonconforming use had been discontinued because of abandonment.

On August 23, 1967, the plaintiff filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to grant him the building permit. Trial was held on February 8, 1968, and on April 1, 1969, an opinion was filed denying plaintiff’s requested relief. Judgment was filed in accordance with the court’s opinion and plaintiff takes this appeal.

The Northfield Township Permanent Zoning Ordinance provides at § 5.02:

“The lawful use of the premises existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions hereof. Such use may be extended throughout the building, provided no structural alterations, changes or expansions are made therein or thereon or thereto, except such as may be required by law, ordinance or regulation promulgated by proper governmental authority; or such as may be required for safety; or such as may be necessary to secure or insure the continued advantageous use of the building during its natural life; or the erection of its height, as originally planned and designed, of a building, with foundations and structural members designed to carry a higher building.”

The trial court, in its opinion, found that the premises in question were such a nonconforming use but that this nonconforming use had been terminated by operation of § 5.04 of the ordinance, reading as follows:

“When a non-conforming use of building or land is discontinued through vacancy, lack of operation [564]*564or otherwise, for a continuous period of three (3) months, thereafter no right shall exist to maintain on said property a non-conforming use.”

It was the finding of the trial court that non-use of the premises by the prior owner constituted an abandonment of the nonconforming use of the building chargeable against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff purchased the property in question with no notice of the nonconforming use. His lack of notice was in large part attributable to the failure of the township board and the zoning board to comply with the mandatory provisions of §§ 7.01 and 7.02 of the zoning ordinance which require the recording of nonconforming uses in the county.1

[565]*565The problem confronting the trial judge was properly conceived by him in his opinion:

“Inasmuch as the proper notices were not recorded in the Register of Deeds office, the title insurance policy, exhibit 7, made no reference to the non-conforming use of the property or its abandonment. If proper recording had been done, the title policy should have referred to these facts, and, plaintiff would have had actual notice of the situation. On the other hand, plaintiff is presumed to know the law, so it would be presumed that he knew the provision of the zoning ordinance, and, that unless the use of the property was a non-conforming use, that he could not occupy a lot the size of the present one. It would be presumed that he knew of the provision of the ordinance regarding abandonment of the non-conforming use, and, that when he purchased the lot the non-conforming use, had been abandoned and it was subject to the ordinance. Theoretically, he would have been so informed if inquiry had been made. Unfortunately he did not inquire, and due to the failure to record the facts, the title company did not report the situation to him.”

We do not, however, agree with this resolution.

The doctrine that one is presumed to know the law has many proper applications. We should, however, exercise care in the application of this presumption lest we do violence to the very law of which we would have all persons take notice. See, e.g., Lambert v. California (1957), 355 US 225 (78 [566]*566S Ct 240, 2 L Ed 2d 419); Averill v. Wood (1889), 78 Mich 342, 351, 352. Its application in this case is not proper as it renders a nullity Art VII (§§ 7.01 and 7.02) of the Zoning Ordinance. It is to be presumed that the Northfield Township Board in the exercise of its powers determined that the protection extended to plaintiff by these sections was necessary and wise. It is not a permissible exercise of the judicial function for a court to reconsider this determination and substitute instead a judicial conclusion that because plaintiff is presumed to know the law, such protection was unnecessary.

Plaintiff who purchased without notice of the nonconforming use when the ordinance itself required a specific form of notice cannot, thereby, be deprived of the rights conferred on owners of nonconforming property by § 5.01. In other words, the township board and the zoning board cannot wilfully ignore an important part of its own ordinance and thereby deprive plaintiff of rights conferred by another part of the same ordinance.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Bronson, J., concurred.

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Related

Northville Area Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. City of Walled Lake
204 N.W.2d 274 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1972)
Rudnik v. Mayers
196 N.W.2d 770 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
183 N.W.2d 891, 27 Mich. App. 560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rudnik-v-mayers-michctapp-1971.