Rudnicki v. Andersons, Inc.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
Barbara Rudnicki Court of Appeals No. L-16-1078 Appellant Trial Court No. CI0201404913 v. The Andersons, Inc., et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellee Decided: December 2, 2016
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John A. Coble, Joseph F. Albrechta, and George J. Schrader, for appellant.
Elizabeth J. Hall and James R. Jeffery, for appellee.
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YARBROUGH, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Barbara Rudnicki, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, The Andersons, Inc., on appellant’s premises liability claim stemming from a slip and fall accident that occurred on appellee’s property.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On December 8, 2014, appellant filed a complaint against appellee in which she alleged that appellee failed to adequately maintain certain walkways at its retail store located in Maumee, Lucas County, Ohio, resulting in the formation of black ice. According to the complaint, appellant was a patron at the Maumee store on December 30, 2012. On that date, appellant and her husband were walking under an overhang attached to the store entrance when appellant suddenly slipped and fell on the walkway, which was allegedly covered with a “hidden sheet of unsalted black ice.” Appellant injured her left wrist during the fall, ultimately requiring surgery. Based upon her assertion that the black ice was “not naturally occurring, but rather the result of [appellee’s] drainage and clearance activities,” appellant sought damages from appellee in excess of $25,000.
{¶ 3} On January 6, 2015, appellee filed its answer, in which it generally denied appellant’s allegations and asserted seven affirmative defenses. Relevant here, appellee stated that appellant was barred from recovery on her premises liability claim because the conditions of the walkway at its Maumee store were open and obvious.
{¶ 4} The matter proceeded through discovery, during which depositions were taken from appellant and the manager of appellee’s Maumee store, James Whitehead. Thereafter, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment, in which it noted that Ohio law does not permit recovery from a landowner for injuries occurring on the landowner’s property stemming from the natural accumulation of ice and snow. Appellee asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s premises liability claim because the evidence demonstrated that the ice upon which appellant fell was a naturally occurring, open and obvious hazard, the existence of which appellee had no knowledge.
{¶ 5} On December 16, 2015, appellant filed her memorandum in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment. In her memorandum, appellant argued that the black ice was not visible to a person walking on the walkway, and was consequently not an open and obvious hazard. Further, appellant contended that the black ice was not naturally occurring but, rather, was the product of water dripping from the poorly designed gutter system attached to the overhang above the walkway. According to appellant, the water froze as a result of appellee’s negligent failure to monitor the conditions of the walkway. Relying, in part, upon Whitehead’s deposition testimony, appellant stated that “the transparent ice upon which [she] fell was neither a natural accumulation nor open and obvious. At the very least, both of these propositions are subject to genuine issues of material fact upon which summary judgment must be denied.”
{¶ 6} Upon consideration of the foregoing, the trial court issued its decision on appellee’s motion on March 18, 2016. In its decision, the trial court found that there was no evidence to support appellant’s claim that appellee was actively negligent in permitting or creating the accumulation of ice on the walkway underneath the overhang. In so finding, the court noted Whitehead’s uncontroverted deposition testimony, in which he stated that the walkway where appellant fell had never needed salting or shoveling because of the protection of the overhang. Whitehead also testified that he was unaware of any defects in the gutter system that would lead to a buildup of ice on the walkway, especially since the gutters drained into an underground drain. Consequently, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
B. Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee. On appeal, appellant asserts the following assignment of error:
{¶ 8} The trial court erred by granting summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff’s claims against defendant.
II. Analysis
{¶ 9} In appellant’s sole assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 10} We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).
{¶ 11} On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). In doing so, the moving party must point to some evidence in the record in the form of “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action.” Civ.R. 56(C); Dresher at 292-293. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Id. at 293.
{¶ 12} In a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty of care; and (3) as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's breach, the plaintiff suffered injury. Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984). The status of the person who enters upon the land of another defines the scope of legal duty that the landowner owes the entrant. Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996).
{¶ 13} In this case, the parties agree that appellant was a business invitee. A landowner ordinarily owes no duty to business invitees to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from the premises, or to warn invitees of the dangers associated with such natural accumulations of ice and snow. Brinkman v. Ross, 68 Ohio St.3d 82, 83-84, 623 N.E.2d 1175 (1993); Jeswald v. Hutt, 15 Ohio St.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 37 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus; Abercrombie v. Byrne-Hill Co., Ltd., 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-05-1010, 2005-Ohio-5249, ¶ 12. This rule is known as the “no-duty winter rule.” Miller v. Tractor Supply Co., 6th Dist. Huron No. H-11-001, 2011-Ohio-5906, ¶ 8.
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